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While there is general consensus on the need to reduce poverty and food insecurity in Africa, 
considerable debate exists on the effectiveness of transfers, such as social grants, in attaining 
these goals. The concern is that transfers may affect people’s social and economic behaviour 
negatively and entrench a culture of dependency and entitlement. This concern is echoed by 
policy-makers and academics in South Africa, where more than 16 million poor people were 
social grants beneficiaries in 2014. Even though a wide range of literature has explored many 
dimensions of the impact of social grants, limited in-depth research has explored the potential 
linkages between social grants and smallholder farming in South Africa. This is despite the 
importance of these two interventions, especially in the rural areas where poverty and 
household food insecurity are concentrated.  
The objective of the study was to investigate the impact of social grants on: incentives to farm, 
chemical fertiliser adoption, market participation and farm entrepreneurship in the rural areas 
of the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province. Using a sample of 984 households randomly selected 
across four districts of the province, different econometric techniques (such as the logit 
transformation technique, Papke and Wooldridge model, propensity score matching, 
generalised propensity score method, double-hurdle model and the Bartlett factor score 
regression) were utilised to analyse the data. The social grants variable was captured in two 
ways: as a dummy showing whether a household has access to social grants and as a continuous 
variable indicating the level of household dependency on social grants.  
The study results indicated that social grants have a wide coverage, benefiting most of the rural 
households that were interviewed. The study indicated high levels of unemployment among 
the household members in the rural areas in KZN, implying shortage of economic opportunities 
in these areas. While this underscores the importance of smallholder farming as a livelihood 
option, the results indicated low areas of land under cultivation, reduced participation by 
unemployed household members in smallholder farming activities and low levels of farm 
entrepreneurship. The question answered in this study pertains to whether these outcomes are 
a result of the households’ access to, or dependency on, social grants. 
The study results revealed that the disincentive effects of social grants are not just about access, 
but about the level of dependency on them. This implies that there is value in introducing the 
dummy and the continuous variable, as the influence of the two variables varied for some of 
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the different outcomes studied. The findings of the study were largely consistent with the 
disincentive hypothesis, indicating that access to social grants and the level of dependency on 
them generally had negative effects on individuals’ incentives to take part in smallholder 
farming activities. However, this result did not apply on all the outcome variables. The 
econometric results indicated that access to, and level of dependency on, social grants did not 
influence, either positively or negatively, the proportion of land under cultivation. This result, 
which was robust across several econometric techniques, suggests that the declining land under 
cultivation among rural households is not due to social grants. Instead the study identified 
several other constraints that policy-makers should focus on to improve the proportion of 
cultivated land area in the rural areas.  
In terms of the impact of social grants on household members’ participation in farming 
activities, the results were in line with the disincentive hypothesis. The results indicated that 
both access to, and increasing levels of dependency on, social grants led to a significant 
reduction in the number of the household members that participate in smallholder farming 
activities. The implication of this result is that, although social grants are targeted to the 
vulnerable household members, they also reach the unintended household members, creating 
disincentive effects. The increase in household income due to access to social grants increases 
the reservation wage of the household members and lowers their motivation to participate in 
farming activities. The increase in the reservation wage means that household members would 
require smallholder farming to be more remunerative than currently for them to participate in 
it. The study identified other variables that affect participation in smallholder farming by 
household members, highlighting the importance of expectations of farming success as a key 
motivator.  
Access to, and level of dependency on, social grants were found to have mixed impacts on 
chemical fertiliser adoption. While the results indicated that access to social grants was 
associated with higher levels of chemical fertiliser use, increasing levels of dependency on 
social grants was associated with decreasing intensity of chemical fertiliser use. This implies 
that, although social grants may relax the financial constraints facing rural farmers amidst 
imperfect credit markets, high levels of dependency on social grants results in disincentives to 
invest in farms. In order to promote self-sufficiency and independence among the rural poor, 
the study highlights the need to find strategies, such as introducing subsidies and focussed 
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training, to encourage rural households to invest part of their social grants in smallholder 
farming activities. 
In terms of commercialisation incentives, the results found that higher social grant-dependency 
was associated with decreased probability of market participation. This suggests that the 
households who depend more on social grants are more likely to be subsistence-oriented as 
they rely on social grants for income. After the decision to enter the market is made, households 
with access to social grants sold lower maize volumes compared to those with no access to 
social grants. The study concluded that social grants had negative effects on the incentives of 
rural households to commercialise their farming activities. This has negative implications on 
the government’s drive to increase commercialisation levels of smallholder farmers by helping 
them graduate from subsistence farming. The results identified a number of factors that 
significantly influenced household market participation, highlighting the importance of 
institutional support (e.g., extension, training and information) in reducing transaction costs 
and increasing market participation. The study results imply that policies aimed at reducing 
both fixed and variable transaction costs (such as improved road infrastructure and institutional 
support such as extension, training and organising farmers into groups) should be prioritised to 
increase both rates and levels of smallholder participation in the maize markets. 
The study results indicated that the high levels of dependency on social grants inhibit farm 
entrepreneurship development. This implies that social grants, especially in households where 
they are more important, have created disincentives that have hindered the entrepreneurial 
attitudes of rural households. Given that the entrepreneurial competencies can be learned and 
changed, the study identified the policy variables to enhance farm entrepreneurship. The study 
recommends that government should prioritise the provision of support services such as 
training, extension and credit support, in order to establish entrepreneurial rural households. A 
greater emphasis should be on identifying the gaps in the farmers’ entrepreneurship skills set 
and then training the farmers according to their needs. 
To sum up, the study found that rural households who depended more on social grants had 
fewer of their members participating in smallholder farming; used less chemical fertiliser; were 
less entrepreneurial and less likely to be market-oriented. Although access to social grants had 
a positive effect on the level of chemical fertiliser use, it had negative effects on the proportion 
of household members that engage in smallholder farming activities and market participation 
levels. The findings imply that social grants are spilling over to unintended household 
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members, creating a dependency syndrome among recipient households. Since social grants 
are important in addressing extreme poverty, the study recommends that their provision should 
continue, but policy-makers should be particularly cognisant of their possible unintended and 
adverse consequences on smallholder farming. The study recommends that policy-makers 
should synchronise the objectives of social grants and smallholder farming so that the 
disincentive effects are reduced. The study presents policy options to address both the social 
grants side as well as the smallholder farming side, arguing that dealing with the social grants 
alone is not enough to ensure the viability and success of smallholder farming. Policy options 
include increasing smallholders’ assets in order to grow their risk-bearing capacity, addressing 
imperfections in the rural credit markets, improving the expected profitability of smallholder 
farming as well as introducing focussed training to motivate rural households to invest part of 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
While there is general consensus on the need to reduce poverty and food insecurity in Africa, 
there is also considerable debate on the effectiveness of transfers (such as food aid and social 
grants) in attaining these goals (Devereux, 2002; Samson et al., 2004; Abdulai et al., 2005; 
Barrett, 2006; Samson, 2009). The core of the controversy is related to the unintended 
consequences of such programmes on the behaviour of the beneficiaries. The concern is that 
these transfers may affect people’s social and economic behaviour negatively and entrench a 
culture of dependency and entitlement (Devereux, 2001; Barrett and Maxwell, 2005; Barrett, 
2006). Even though assisting individuals to meet basic needs, when they otherwise could not 
do so on their own, is desirable, the undesirable dependency culture occurs when assistance 
provision undermines the incentives of the poor to participate in economic activities such as 
farming (Lentz et al., 2005; Barrett, 2006). This negative dependency results in loss of future 
independent capacity to sustain well-being (Lentz et al., 2005). 
Several studies (e.g., Abdulai et al., 2005; Bezu and Holden, 2008; Mabuza et al., 2009; 
Tadesse and Shively, 2009; Sharaunga and Wale, 2013) have investigated the potential 
disincentive impacts of food aid on farming activities in Africa. The results have been 
by-and-large mixed. Some studies (e.g., Tadesse and Shively, 2009; Sharaunga and Wale, 
2013) have found evidence that food aid has created disincentive effects. Other studies (e.g., 
Abdulai et al., 2005; Bezu and Holden, 2008; Mabuza et al., 2009) found little evidence of the 
disincentive effects. While the connection between food aid and smallholder agriculture has 
been investigated extensively in Africa, there is a dearth of literature on the potential linkage 
between social grants and smallholder agricultural production, technology adoption and 
commercialisation at the household level. This is in spite of the growing interest in cash 
transfers among governments and donors in Africa, with many countries having piloted and/or 
introduced social grants since the mid-1990s (Vincent and Cull, 2009; Garcia and Moore, 2012; 
Handa et al., 2012; Ulriksen, 2013; Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015). As noted by Handa et al. 
(2012), social cash transfers are gaining popularity as a tool for reducing inequality, social 
exclusion and chronic poverty in Africa.  
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Social grants are very important in South Africa, where they directly benefited an average of 
over 16 million poor people monthly in 2014 (SASSA, 2014). This represents more than 30% 
of the country’s population and more than 50% of the households (Mabugu et al., 2014). 
Despite being targeted to specific vulnerable groups (such as the young, old or chronically 
sick), the social grants generally benefit households as a whole (Klasen and Woolard, 2008; 
Abel, 2013). This implies that the impact of social grants extends further than the intended 
beneficiaries. While the spill-over effects of social grants to unintended household members 
has some positive impacts, in that they increase the reach of social grants in alleviating poverty, 
considerable uncertainty remains about some of the behavioural incentive effects (Samson, 
2009; van der Berg et al., 2010; Devereux, 2013). On top of the doubtful long-term financial 
sustainability of rising expenditure on the current social grants system in South Africa 
(Surender et al., 2010; Brockerhoff, 2013; Midgley, 2013), what is of concern is that the 
incentive structure of social grants may have the effect of keeping recipients from taking steps 
that would help them escape poverty. In other words, households which could and should be 
self-reliant might choose free support from the state instead (Devereux, 2013). 
This concern has been raised not only by academics, but also by politicians and the South 
African government. Surender et al. (2010) reported that, even though political debates with 
regards to social grants have been prominent since 1994, there has been a change in the 
discourse during the last decade. Whereas poverty alleviation and redistribution dominated the 
discourse in the first decade since 1994, the second decade has been increasingly characterised 
by the language of welfare dependency and concerns about rising expenditure on social 
assistance (Surender et al., 2010; Potts, 2012). As highlighted in Surender et al. (2010), the 
ruling African National Congress (ANC) has raised concerns that social grants may be creating 
negative dependency on the state. Among its resolutions from the 2007 Polokwane conference, 
the ANC emphasised the need for the development of strategies that capacitate households and 
communities to empower themselves, so that they graduate out of dependency on social grants 
(Surender et al., 2010).  
The NPC (2012) highlighted in the National Development Plan (NDP) the apprehension in 
government that social grants may have weakened smallholder agriculture, micro-enterprises 
and artisanship. According to the NPC (2012), these activities should not be allowed to decline 
as they are shock-absorbers for extreme poverty, are platforms for self-employment, and have 
the potential to serve as stepping stones for economic advancement. Smallholder farming is 
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especially important in the rural areas of South Africa, where poverty and household food 
insecurity are more prevalent (Perret, 2002; Sishuta, 2005; Vink and van Rooyen, 2009). 
Even though South Africa is considered an upper-middle income country, on the basis of per 
capita income, most of its socio-economic indicators are comparable to those of the world’s 
poorest countries (Samson et al., 2006; Whitworth and Wilkinson, 2013; Mabugu et al., 2014). 
For example, the official unemployment rate has been over 26% in the past 10 years, its poverty 
incidence is over 50%, and it has a Gini coefficient that ranges between 0.63 and 0.70, one of 
the highest in the world (Samson et al., 2006; Stats SA, 2012; Barrientos et al., 2013; 
Herrington et al., 2015). The country faces considerable challenges in addressing poverty, 
household food insecurity, hunger, inequality and unemployment, especially in the rural areas. 
It is against such a background that social grants and smallholder farming are key among rural 
households. 
1.2 Research problem 
According to the NPC (2012), South Africa has the potential and capacity to eliminate poverty 
and food insecurity at the household level, especially if it can harness the potential of 
smallholder farming. The government has identified increased smallholder production and 
commercialisation as part of the strategies of reducing rural poverty and stimulating rural 
economic development (DAFF, 2012; NPC, 2012). The importance of smallholder farming is 
underscored by the high unemployment rates and limited opportunities of employment growth 
in the non-farm sector (Eastwood et al., 2006; Aliber and Hall, 2012). According to Eastwood 
et al. (2006), rural poverty cannot be adequately dealt with without considerable absorption of 
labour into smallholder agriculture.  
However, several anecdotal and descriptive reports (e.g., White and Killick, 2001; Aliber and 
Hart, 2009; Aliber and Hall, 2012; Tshuma, 2012) have stated that the poor are turning away 
from smallholder agriculture due to their dependency on social grants. According to Tshuma 
(2012), the rural households have become reliant on social grants for their income, such that 
they cultivate small pieces of land just for subsistence. The result of this trend, the studies 
argue, has been the decline of agriculture, particularly smallholder agriculture, and that this is 
happening before other productive sectors have developed sufficiently to offer alternative 
employment-based livelihoods to sustain rural populations. Eastwood et al. (2006) and Neves 
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et al. (2009) termed this phenomenon ‘premature deagriculturalisation’ and 
‘deagrarianisation’, respectively. 
Whereas in most developing countries those unable to find employment in the urban or formal 
sectors engage in informal activities such as smallholder farming, the same is not true for South 
Africa (Stats SA, 2012; Burns et al., 2013). According to Stats SA (2012), rural South African 
households have increasingly become net consumers rather than producers of food, despite the 
fact that, historically, they were able to produce most of their own food. Andrew et al. (2003) 
agreed with this assertion, reporting that large areas of land, even that previously cultivated, 
now lie abandoned in rural areas of South Africa, particularly in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. Abandoning farming is seldom considered as a viable solution to problems of 
low income in developing countries (World Bank, 2008; Hazell et al., 2010; McElwee and 
Bosworth, 2010). Against the background that the South African government has prioritised 
the expansion of the smallholder sector as part of its broader job creation strategy (DED, 2011; 
Aliber and Hall, 2012; DAFF, 2012; NPC, 2012), the reported negative impact of social grants 
on smallholder farming is a cause for concern.  
The connection between declining farming activity and social grants, however, has not been 
based on detailed econometric research, but limited descriptive statistics and anecdotal 
evidence. Therefore the purported decline in smallholder farming activity, as a result of social 
grant-dependency among rural farming households, should be taken with a pinch of salt. This 
is because the conceptual linkages, empirical evidence and impact pathways that link social 
grants and smallholder farming activities among rural households have not been adequately 
addressed. The reports of social grants causing declining farming activity might be due to the 
simultaneous existence of the two, rather than a demonstrable causality. Food aid studies, such 
as that of Abdulai et al. (2005), Barrett (2006) and Lentz et al. (2005), have highlighted the 
importance of in-depth econometric analysis before concluding that these transfers have 
resulted in negative dependency and declining agricultural production. 
While in-depth studies focusing on the incentives of the social grants beneficiary households 
to engage in non-farm job opportunities are available (Bertrand et al., 2003; Williams, 2007; 
Ardington et al., 2009; Abel, 2013; Ardington et al., 2013), the evidence has been inconclusive. 
On one hand, some studies (e.g., Posel et al., 2006; Williams, 2007; Ardington et al., 2009; 
Ardington et al., 2013) have concluded that additional income from social grants has a positive 
impact on employment, by easing the constraints associated with the job search. On the other 
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hand, others (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2003; Abel, 2013) have concluded that social grants reduce 
incentives to work, as the additional income from social grants causes household members to 
work less and take additional leisure. The contradictory results in the non-farm labour supply 
literature suggest the need for more studies which use different methods, focusing at specific 
groups or regions or sectors, to understand the potential disincentive effects of social grants.  
The present study seeks to contribute to literature by investigating the incentives of rural 
households to engage in smallholder farming, invest in their farms, commercialise their 
smallholder farming activities as well as their entrepreneurship attitudes. Literature addressing 
these issues in South Africa is scarce. Given South Africa’s high unemployment rate and the 
structural constraints of the non-farm labour market (Surender et al., 2010; Aliber and Hall, 
2012), the incentive impacts of social grants cannot be fully captured by just looking at the 
non-farm job sector and ignoring the farming sector. According to Surender et al. (2010), it is 
the structural conditions of the labour market that are reducing people’s chances of finding 
employment, not the motivational characteristics of the unemployed. However, the question of 
whether the social grants have reduced the motivation of the unemployed rural household 
members to engage in smallholder farming activities has not been sufficiently examined. 
Moreover, previous studies have generally investigated the impact of mostly one of the social 
grants, in particular, the old age or child support grants, without looking at the total contribution 
of social grants to household income.  
There are several government initiatives that have sought to intensify, modernise and 
commercialise smallholder agriculture (DAFF, 2011; DAFF, 2012; DAFF, 2013). For 
example, the New Growth Path set a target of establishing 300,000 additional market-oriented 
smallholder producers by 2020 (DED, 2011). In line with these targets, the national Department 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) has been implementing the Strategic Plan for 
Smallholder Support (SPSS), aimed at supporting smallholder farmers to improve production 
and/or productivity levels and help them graduate to commercial status (DAFF, 2013). 
However, despite the concerted government efforts in the past, the smallholder agriculture 
sector is characterised by declining proportion of cultivated land area, low uptake of improved 
farm inputs and weak links to markets (Andrew et al., 2003; Senyolo et al., 2009; Ortmann and 
King, 2010; Tshuma, 2012; van der Heijden and Vink, 2013; Hlongwane et al., 2014; Maponya 
et al., 2015; Raleting and Obi, 2015).  
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Among other reasons, liquidity constraints have been identified as a major factor limiting 
smallholder farmers’ adoption of improved farm inputs in South Africa (Odhiambo and 
Magandini, 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010). This is exacerbated by the fact that these technologies, 
e.g., chemical fertilisers, are costly and have risky returns (Odhiambo and Magandini, 2008; 
Murovhi et al., 2011). Given that the liquidity-constrained smallholder farmers operate under 
pervasive market imperfections that result in missing credit markets (Bezu and Holden, 2008), 
a relevant question to ask is the extent to which social grants encourage technology adoption 
by reducing the cash constraints of these households. Evidence from other countries, such as 
Bolivia (Martinez, 2004), indicate that cash transfers to the poor and liquidity-constrained 
households can result in households increasing their productive potential through investment 
in household-level economic activities such as smallholder farming. Is this the case in South 
Africa, or is the negative dependency syndrome more prevalent, leading to less interest in 
farming investments? To begin with, do smallholder farmers have any incentives to farm, or 
have they become dependent on social grants, as has been reported? 
A range of constraints and barriers reducing the incentives for market participation among 
smallholder farmers have been identified, with most of the studies highlighting the role of 
transaction costs in this regard (Makhura, 2001; Biénabe and Vermeulen, 2011; Jari and Fraser, 
2013; van der Heijden and Vink, 2013; Hlongwane et al., 2014). While there are efforts to 
address the challenges related to transaction costs, the issue that is largely unknown is whether 
social grants have impacted on the incentives of smallholder farmers to commercialise their 
production activities. The commercialisation of smallholder agriculture requires that push 
factors (e.g., good transport and communication infrastructure and input subsidies) and pull 
factors (e.g., incentives and empowerment) be addressed. In other words, the success of 
government’s rural poverty reduction strategy depends upon the extent to which the rural 
households have the incentives and motivation to adopt modern farming techniques and 
produce for markets. As highlighted in Alsos et al. (2003) and Kahan (2013), there is little 
future for rural households unless they become more entrepreneurial in the way they run their 
farms by developing a business mind-set. The question, therefore, pertains to the extent to 
which access to social grants inhibit or enhance farm entrepreneurship development among 




1.3 Research objectives 
The main research objective of the study is to examine the impact of South Africa’s social 
grants on rural households’ incentives to farm, technology adoption, market participation and 
farm entrepreneurship. Specifically, the study seeks to achieve the following research 
objectives: 
1) To assess the extent to which access to, and level of dependency on, social grants affect 
rural households’ incentives to farm; 
2) To investigate the impact of access to, and level of dependency on, social grants on 
smallholder farmers’ investment in modern technologies; 
3) To examine the effect of access to, and level of dependency on, social grants on the 
market participation levels of the farmers; and 
4) To investigate the extent to which access to, and level of dependency on, social grants 
influence rural households’ entrepreneurship levels. 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. This includes the introductory and concluding 
chapters, a brief literature review chapter and four empirical chapters.  The introductory chapter 
has given the general study background, motivated the research problem and presented the 
objectives of the study. The second chapter provides a brief overview of the literature on 
smallholder farming and social grants in South Africa. After defining smallholder farming, the 
chapter discusses the history and current state of social grants in South Africa. A brief 
discussion of the empirical literature that has investigated the various dimensions of social 
grants impacts is presented in the same chapter. Chapter 2 also presents the site description, as 
well as the sampling and data collection tools. Since all the empirical chapters depend on the 
same data set that was collected in four districts in the KwaZulu-Natal province, the study area 
description was only presented in Chapter 2 and all the other empirical chapters refer to it. 
Chapters 3 to 6 comprise the four empirical chapters of the thesis. The detailed descriptive 
summary of the households was given in Chapter 3 while other chapters presented brief 
discussions. This was done to reduce repetition across the chapters. It must be noted, however, 
that, while efforts were made to minimise repetitions, the nature of the thesis presentation is 
such that repetition is inevitable. 
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Chapter 3 investigates the impact of social grants on the incentives to farm, using two proxies. 
The chapter discusses the agricultural household model as the theoretical basis of the analysis. 
Several econometric methods (such as the logit transformation technique, Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) model and the propensity score matching method) used for robustness 
checks are presented in this chapter. The chapter then presents the results on the extent to which 
social grants affect the proportion of land area cultivated by the farmers and on the proportion 
of working age household members that participate in smallholder farming activities. The focus 
of Chapter 4 is on the extent to which social grants relieve liquidity constraints and improve 
chemical fertiliser use among smallholder farmers. Grounded on the random utility framework, 
the chapter analyses data using the double-hurdle model and presents the results and 
discussions.  
Chapter 5 deals with the potential disincentives of social grants on smallholder 
commercialisation and is informed by the theory of farm household decision-making under 
imperfect markets. The last empirical chapter, Chapter 6, focuses on the question of whether 
or not social grants enhance or inhibit farm entrepreneurship development among rural 
households. The chapter adopts the competency approach and highlights the level and 
determinants of entrepreneurship in the rural areas. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a 
presentation of the main findings of the study, policy recommendations and implications for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 AN OVERVIEW OF SMALLHOLDER FARMING AND 
SOCIAL GRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a literature review on the empirical link between smallholder farming 
and social grants. The chapter begins by outlining the characteristics of smallholder farming in 
South Africa. It presents a definition of social protection and gives an overview of social 
protection globally, but with a focus on Sub-Saharan African (SSA). The review indicates that 
there is a growing interest in social grants in SSA and that South Africa has the biggest cash 
transfer-based social security system in the region. After presenting the historical background 
and current state of social grants in South Africa, the chapter presents empirical studies that 
have linked social grants to different outcomes (e.g., poverty, nutrition and schooling). While 
there is general consensus that social grants play a significant role in poverty reduction, the 
review demonstrates that there is no such agreement on whether social grants have created 
negative incentives on people’s economic behaviour in South Africa. In general, the review 
presented in this chapter indicates that the potential linkages between social grants and 
smallholder farming activities have not been adequately addressed. The chapter also presents 
the study area description as well as the sampling and data collection tools. 
2.2 The nature of smallholder farming in South Africa 
The agricultural sector in South Africa consists of three distinct groups: the large-scale 
commercial, the emerging and the smallholder farmers (Stats SA, 2012c). The large-scale 
commercial farming sector is well-developed and connected to markets and farmers in the 
sector often have large land holdings, human capital, finance and modern technology (Aliber 
and Hart, 2009). At the other extreme, the smallholder farming sector is predominantly 
subsistence-based, characterised by lack of productive assets, poor access to markets and use 
of out-of-date technology (Senyolo et al., 2009; Ortmann and King, 2010; DAFF, 2012; van 
der Heijden and Vink, 2013; Thamaga-Chitja and Morojele, 2014; Aliber and Mdoda, 2015). 
Terms used to describe smallholder farmers in South Africa include small-scale farmers, 
resource-poor farmers, peasant farmers, food deficit farmers and household food security 
farmers (Machethe et al., 2004; Aliber and Hall, 2012; DAFF, 2012; Aliber and Mdoda, 2015).  
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The emerging farming sector is sandwiched between the commercial farming and smallholder 
farming sectors, is slightly more advanced than the smallholder farmer and holds more 
production assets (Stats SA, 2012c). This group, which is made up of mostly black land reform 
beneficiaries, struggles to scale up production and has difficulty in getting connected to markets 
(van Schalkwyk et al., 2012). The emerging farming category is generally referred to as a sub-
category of smallholder farmers (Machethe et al., 2004; Aliber and Hall, 2012; Aliber and 
Mdoda, 2015). In South Africa, the criteria to classify farmers into different categories are not 
only based on land size, purpose of production (subsistence or commercial) and income level 
(whether poor or rich), but also on the racial group of the farmer (Fanadzo, 2012). For example, 
black farmers remain known as emerging, even though they might have reached commercial 
level status (Aliber and Hall, 2012; Aliber and Mdoda, 2015).  
It is generally accepted that the divide between large-scale commercial farms and smallholder 
farms in South Africa is a legacy of the racially discriminatory policies of the past (van 
Averbeke, 2008; Vink and van Rooyen, 2009). The policies during the apartheid era were 
biased towards the white-dominated large-scale farms, while inhibiting agricultural growth and 
development among the black-dominated smallholder farms (Vink and van Rooyen, 2009). 
Smallholder agriculture, involving both crop and livestock production, forms the basis of rural 
people’s livelihood and plays a significant role in the welfare of the poor. Smallholder farmers 
generally produce crops such as maize, beans, cabbages, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, beetroot, 
spinach and butternut and sell very little of their produce. Post-harvest losses are relatively 
great. Most of the crops are grown under dryland conditions, while other farmers are members 
of smallholder irrigation schemes scattered around the country’s provinces.  
The fact that the market-oriented part is dominated by white farmers and the subsistence part 
by black farmers is a cause for concern from a political perspective (Backeberg, 2006). There 
is a political desire to improve the productivity, profitability, commercialisation and 
sustainability of smallholder agriculture in South Africa (Backeberg, 2006; Denison and 
Manona, 2007; DAFF, 2013). However, the success of government support depends upon 
whether the farmers respond positively to the stimuli from policy interventions. Social 
protection measures, such as social grants, may reduce the motivation of the farmers. The next 
section defines social protection and provides a brief discussion of it in the SSA region.  
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2.3 Overview of social protection programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Social protection may be described broadly as initiatives, public or private, that provide income 
or consumption support to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance 
the social status and rights of the marginalised (Ellis et al., 2009; Ulriksen, 2012). In other 
words, social protection involves targeted transfers aimed at fulfilling the basic needs of the 
poor, vulnerable and marginalised, as well as empowering them (Ulriksen, 2012). There are 
three forms of social protection that are usually implemented. These are social insurance, social 
grants and informal insurance (van der Berg et al., 2010). Social insurance describes the 
contributory funds that are organised by the state and funded by contributions by employers 
and employees. Social grants, or assistance, on the other hand, are non-contributory transfers 
that are usually targeted to the most needy. Informal insurance refers to the cash or in-kind 
assistance from social networks such as extended families or friends.  
Spending on social protection programmes is larger, in both absolute and relative terms, in the 
developed countries compared to developing countries (World Bank, 2006). According to the 
World Bank (2006), industrialised countries redistribute a large share of their Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) through social protection programmes (about 19% of GDP in the European 
Union, and 9% of GDP in the United States). Social insurance is the most dominant form of 
social security in the developed countries. The World Bank (2006) reported that 85% of total 
social security expenditure among industrialised countries is social insurance, with the 
remaining 15% being social grants. To discourage dependency on social grants, the 
industrialised countries have not only reduced the amounts and duration of benefits from social 
grants, but have also introduced stringent requirements on the beneficiaries (for example, 
beneficiaries should seek work actively to qualify for the support) (van der Berg et al., 2010). 
In the developing countries, in general, and Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, the issue of 
social protection is now firmly on the development agenda. Several countries having 
introduced or extended social protection policies since the mid-1990s (Handa et al., 2012; Patel 
et al., 2013b; Ulriksen, 2013). These developing countries have introduced or extended social 
assistance programmes, be they safety nets, poverty targeted transfers or categorical provisions 
such as social pensions (Ulriksen, 2013).  
As highlighted in Hidrobo et al. (2012), several design questions should be answered when 
planning social transfer interventions, e.g., Who should receive benefits? How much should be 
given and with what frequency? How should targeting mechanisms be designed and enforced 
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to make sure that unintended beneficiaries are excluded? How long benefits should be 
provided? What form of assistance should be provided? What conditions should be attached? 
What are the cost effectiveness of different design options? The form of social assistance, i.e., 
whether to provide assistance in the form of cash transfers or deliver physical quantities of food 
or other in-kind services, has been subject to debate in literature (Devereux, 2006; Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; Grosh et al., 2008; Hidrobo et al., 2012). The use of cash transfers, 
conditional or unconditional, is gaining popularity as an effective intervention among the 
developing countries to reduce inequality, social exclusion and chronic poverty as well as to 
enhance the poor’s participation in economic development (Garcia and Moore, 2012; Handa et 
al., 2012).  
According to Garcia and Moore (2012), over 30 countries in the developing world have 
implemented cash transfer schemes as the cornerstone of poverty reduction and social 
protection efforts. The cash transfers are preferred to in-kind (food) transfers not only because 
they generate the largest welfare gains because they allow beneficiaries to use these transfers 
as they see fit but because they are also less costly to administer (Devereux, 2006; Hidrobo et 
al., 2012). Moreover, in-kind (food) transfers may distort the market adversely for smallholder 
farmers. For example, the increased supply of food may result in decreased local prices, dis-
incentivising the smallholder farmers to produce. On the other hand, the cash transfers may 
have a positive effect when food markets are not integrated because the injection of cash may 
cause food prices to rise. It should be noted that these arguments would be reversed if one is 
talking about non-beneficiary consumers who benefit when local food prices are low and lose 
when prices are high. However, targeting is easier when providing in-kind transfers than when 
cash is used. According to Hidrobo et al. (2012), whereas it is difficult or very costly to identify 
beneficiaries, in-kind transfers are advantageous because only those truly in need will take up 
these in-kind benefits. 
Popular examples of conditional cash transfers include Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly 
PROGRESSA), and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola. Both of these programmes allocate monthly 
transfers to poor families with children, conditional on household health-related behaviour 
(Case et al., 2005). The random roll-out of these transfers has made them very popular among 
academic analysts, as they have afforded them purposefully randomised treatment and control 
groups (Case et al., 2005; Garcia and Moore, 2012). For example, Progresa was implemented 
by randomly selecting rural areas to receive the cash transfer treatment, making it possible to 
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use solid study methodology and rigorous analysis (Agüero et al., 2007; Garcia and Moore, 
2012). However, use of the experimental or randomised designs is not applicable when 
studying social grants in South Africa because the social grants are not randomly distributed 
but are a targeted intervention (Patel et al., 2013a). The social grants in South Africa are 
targeted to households with assets and income values below a certain threshold (Patel et al., 
2013a). The assignment of social grants to households reflects the purposive placement due to 
the administrative requirements as well as the choices made by those eligible, such that 
assuming that they are random is untenable (Ravallion, 2008; Patel et al., 2013a).  
There has been a growing body of quality evaluations of the randomised programs in Latin 
America (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005; de Janvry et al., 2006; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; 
de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011). This literature demonstrates the outcomes and identifies 
challenges in implementation and documenting the need for linking programmes to other safety 
nets (Garcia and Moore, 2012). The impact of these conditional social cash transfer 
programmes on different outcomes, such as school attendance, nutrition and health, has been 
found to be very positive (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005; de Janvry et al., 2006; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2006; de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011). Consequently, a number of the studies (e.g., 
de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011) have suggested that conditional 
cash transfer programmes are more effective than unconditional transfers.  
According to de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005), a number of other countries, especially in Africa, 
are considering adoption of the conditional transfer approach due to the reported successes. 
However, the choice of the approach should be informed by the objective of the transfer 
programme (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005). According to the study by de Janvry and Sadoulet 
(2005), unconditional transfers should be implemented if the main objective is reducing 
immediate poverty, while conditional transfers should be introduced for long-term outcomes. 
In South Africa, Woolard and Leibbrandt (2010) argued against imposing behavioural 
conditions to social grants, stressing that these would be too costly to monitor and enforce. 
There is a growing interest in cash transfers among governments and donors in SSA. Many 
countries in SSA have piloted and/or introduced social cash transfers (Vincent and Cull, 2009; 
Ulriksen, 2013). A review by Garcia and Moore (2012) identified more than 120 cash transfer 
programmes that were implemented between 2000 and mid-2009 in SSA. These programmes 
vary significantly in terms of their objectives, targeting, scale, conditions and technologies 
(Garcia and Moore, 2012). Swaziland and Lesotho introduced a non-contributory, universal 
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and government-funded old age pension in 2005, despite both countries having limited social 
protection legislations (Vincent and Cull, 2009; Ulriksen, 2013).  
Namibia has the child maintenance grant, disability grant and old age pensions, which have 
been expanded significantly in the past decade. For example, the child maintenance grant has 
increased 10-fold since 2003 in Namibia (Ulriksen, 2013). Botswana has an old age pension 
which benefits the elderly (Ulriksen, 2012). South Africa has the most comprehensive state-led 
system of cash transfer-based social protection in SSA, followed by Ethiopia’s Productive 
Safety Net Programme (Devereux, 2001; Zibagwe et al., 2013). In fact, Brazil and South Africa 
have the largest non-contributory pension programmes in the world (Barrientos, 2003). 
Countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have donor-driven social assistance, while 
other countries fund their social grant systems using government revenue from natural 
resources or taxes (Garcia and Moore, 2012; Ulriksen, 2013).  
A characteristic of the social assistance system in SSA is that it is generally aimed at vulnerable 
individuals such as the old, young or chronically sick. Mauritius is the only SSA country that 
caters for the working age with a government-funded and strictly targeted unemployment 
benefit (Ulriksen, 2013). The cash transfers in the SSA region generally benefit a few people, 
with the exception of South Africa and Namibia. For example, social transfers are of little 
relevance to most people in Botswana, as the old age pension is insufficient to cover monthly 
costs, such that even the elderly must find additional resources to survive (Ulriksen, 2012). The 





2.4 The historical background, nature and coverage of social grants in South Africa 
The social security system in South Africa is made up of two pillars: (1) a state revenue-funded 
social assistance programme (social grants) and (2) a contributory social insurance  
(Brockerhoff, 2013). This study focuses on the non-contributory social grants system, as the 
contributory social insurance pillar of social security benefits only those who are formally 
employed (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010; Brockerhoff, 2013). The following subsections 
discuss the historical background, objectives, types and coverage of the social grants in South 
Africa. 
2.4.1 Historical background of social grants in South Africa 
Social grants were introduced in the early 1900s in South Africa. These social grants were 
racially differentiated, and were meant to meet only the needs of the white minority (van der 
Berg, 1997; Bertrand et al., 2003; Triegaardt, 2005; Brockerhoff, 2013). The Old Age Pensions 
Act of 1928, for instance, introduced to provide social security for the elderly, explicitly 
excluded blacks. Similarly, grants for the blind (1936), grants for the disabled (1937), pensions 
for war veterans (1941) and family allowances for large poor families (1947) were largely 
implemented on the basis of race (van der Berg et al., 2010). When social grants were extended 
to include blacks from the 1940s, the blacks were awarded very smaller amounts compared to 
whites (Barrientos, 2003).  
The desire by the apartheid government to give credibility to their highly discredited separate 
development policies resulted in social assistance moving towards equality in the 1980s (van 
der Berg et al., 2010). The apartheid government was making efforts to legitimise the homeland 
system and the three-chamber parliament (which consisted of white, coloured and Indian 
chambers) (van der Berg, 1997; van der Berg et al., 2010). To close the gap, the benefits of the 
whites were decreased, while those of blacks were increased, especially with regards to the old 
age pension. As a result, the size of the old age state pension was almost equal among racial 
groups by 1993, a year before democratic elections (Bertrand et al., 2003; Case et al., 2005). 
Policy reforms to eliminate discrimination in eligibility and benefit levels, completed in 1996 
with the introduction of non-discriminatory regulations, resulted in a gradual move towards 
parity in benefits (Barrientos, 2003; Barrientos et al., 2013).  
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The advent of the democratically elected government in 1994 came with the challenge to 
address the mandate of the new constitution. The constitution explicitly stated that everyone 
had the right to have access to social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance (Armstrong and Burger, 2009). 
The challenge in meeting the constitutional mandate was that the benefit levels previously 
given to the white minority were high and universalising them was not fiscally sustainable 
(Brockerhoff, 2013). Therefore the current social grants system is a result of several stages of 
adaptation and reforms of the apartheid era programmes inherited by the democratic 
government. The apartheid-era roots of South Africa’s social security system, where the 
objective was to protect only the white minority, has led to a comprehensive social assistance 
system, which is huge, even by middle-income standards (Armstrong and Burger, 2009; van 
der Berg et al., 2010).  
South Africa’s social security system is well-developed, and compares very well with the those 
of developed countries (Armstrong and Burger, 2009). However, it must be highlighted that, 
despite being comprehensive, the current system of social grants does not meet the 
constitutional obligation to provide social assistance to those who are unable to help themselves 
and their dependents. The constitutional obligation requires progressive realisation or 
movement towards universal coverage (Brockerhoff, 2013). 
2.4.2 Objectives of the social grants programme 
The government’s White Paper for Social Welfare of 1997 (RSA, 1997) outlines the main 
objectives of the social grants system in South Africa. The main objective of social grants is to 
reduce poverty among vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, those with disabilities and 
children (RSA, 1997; Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010). These groups are not expected to 
participate fully in the labour market and are thus vulnerable to low income. The other stated 
objective of social security is to increase investment in health, education and nutrition, to 
increase economic growth and development (RSA, 1997; Samson et al., 2006). Social grants 
are also seen as a viable mechanism for active redistribution. In fact, according to the White 
Paper, poverty and inequality reduction are the key agenda for the social welfare policies and 
programmes in South Africa (RSA, 1997).  
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The White Paper emphasised the importance of creating human capacities and the concept of 
developmental social welfare. The main feature of developmental social welfare is that social 
development and economic development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
(Brockerhoff, 2013). This development approach is not just concerned with the transfer of 
resources from the productive economy to the welfare services, but also prioritises the 
contribution of social policy to development (RSA, 1997; Brockerhoff, 2013). It is against this 
background that studies such as those of Devereux (2002) and Mabugu et al. (2013) have 
reported that social grants are no longer considered as just livelihood protection interventions, 
but as livelihood promotion measures. The expectation is that social grants would promote 
livelihoods and enhance economic activities by easing the financial constraints facing the poor 
-the so-called ‘irrigation function’ of social security (Lund, 2002; Woolard, 2003). This enables 
a longer-term and more sustainable improvement in living standards (Woolard, 2003; Mabugu 
et al., 2013). The next sub-section presents the current social grant types and the extent of their 
coverage. 
2.4.3 Types and coverage of social grants in South Africa 
The social assistance programme in South Africa currently comprises seven different grants: 
the Old Age Grant (OAG), Child Support Grant (CSG), Disability Grant (DG), War Veterans’ 
Grant (WVG), Foster Care Grant (FCG), Care Dependency Grant (CDG), and Grant-in-Aid 
(GIA) (RSA, 2004b). The OAG provides support to old people who are over the age of 60, 
while the DG provides support to adults with disabilities. The CSG provides support to 
households with children under the age of 18, and the FCG provides support to households 
taking care of foster children. The CDG provides additional support to families with disabled 
children who are below the age of 18. The WVG supports people who are disabled or older 
than 60 who served in the Second World War or the Korean War. The GIA is for people 
receiving the OAG, DG or WVG who require full-time care because of physical or mental 
disability. 
There are no explicit behaviour conditionalities associated with these social grants, unlike the 
conditional cash transfer programmes in other developing countries, such as Mexico and Brazil 
(Samson et al., 2006). Not only do the transfers come with no strings attached, but they are 
also without any in-kind transfers (Agüero et al., 2007). The unconditional cash transfer 
programmes are premised on the ideal that people know best how to spend resources to 
23 
 
maximise their welfare and that setting conditionalities results in increased administrative, 
monitoring and enforcement costs (Abel, 2013; Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015). The social grants 
in South Africa are financed through general tax revenues, collected on a national basis. 
Eligibility for social grants is currently dependent on an income and asset-based means test, 
which varies according to the grant, the marital status of the beneficiary and other 
characteristics (Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015). However, in practice, only the income criterion 
is used in the means test, due to difficulties with the evaluation of assets (Abel, 2013). While 
the benefit entitlements are means tested on the income of the individual beneficiary, and 
his/her partner if married, the income of other household members is not considered. 
These social grants are paid to each qualifying individual, meaning that some beneficiary 
households may receive several grants, while others receive only one. Since there are 
differences in the number of people in households across the population, the absolute and 
relative magnitude of the social grants income varies substantially across households (Samson 
et al., 2008). The social grants are delivered each month in cash at specific pay point locations 
or via electronic deposit if the recipient has a bank account. There were over 16.4 million 
beneficiaries of these different grants by the end of 2014 (SASSA, 2014). Table 2.1 shows the 
total number of beneficiaries by grant type as of 31 December 2014. The amounts paid to 
individual beneficiaries per month are also presented in the table. 
Table 2.1: Total number of social grant beneficiaries and amounts paid per individual 
beneficiary by grant type, as at 31 December 2014 
Grant type Number of beneficiaries Amount paid per beneficiary per 
month  (Rands) 
OAG 3 053 440 1 350* 
CSG 11 574 493 320 
DG 1 127 867 1 350 
WVG 353 1 370 
FCG 455 946 830 
CDG 126 010 1 350 
GIA 105 087 320 
Total 16 443 196 - 
Notes: * Beneficiaries older than 75 received R1,370 per month  
Source: SASSA (2014) 
Table 2.1 shows that at the end of 2014, the CSG was the largest social assistance programme 
in South Africa in terms of the number of beneficiaries. However, the CSG paid the least 
amount to individual beneficiaries, paying an amount of R320 per month to the main caregiver 
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of a child who is 18 or younger. To qualify, the caregiver needed to earn less than R38 400 (if 
single) or R76 800 (combined income if married) per year. The CSG has expanded markedly 
in recent years. While it was only available to children aged 0 to 14 years in 2009, the age of 
eligibility was increased to include children up to the age of 18 years from 2010 (Tiberti et al., 
2013). Table 2.1 indicates that the second largest social grant in terms of number of 
beneficiaries was the OAG. The OAG paid an amount of R1 350 per month for people over 60, 
and R1 370 per month for beneficiaries older than 75. In order to access the grant, a recipient 
was required not to individually earn more than R61 800 a year or not to have a combined 
household income of R123 600 a year if married.  
Despite these income-based means tests, more than 90% of black South Africans are eligible 
to receive the grant once they turn 60 years old (Abel, 2013). According to Abel (2013), the 
OAG is as good as an universal, unconditional cash transfer programme targeted at seniors. 
Table 2.1 also shows a significant number of DG beneficiaries. The DG has the same means 
test as the OAG. However, DG recipients must also pass the medical eligibility criteria. There 
are no means tests for FCG and GIA, as the means tests were removed in 2012 (Brockerhoff, 
2013). The means tests for WVG and CDG vary slightly from those of the OAG. Table 2.1 
shows that most of the social grants are generous in terms of amounts, even by international 
standards (Case et al., 2005; Abel, 2013). Even though the social grant amounts are modest 
when compared to the white’s average incomes, they are significant when measured against 
black incomes (Case et al., 2005). For example, the amount for the OAG is almost twice the 
median per capita income for Africans (Abel, 2013).  
The social grants are implemented and administered by a separate national government agency, 
the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). Initially, provincial governments were 
responsible for the implementation and administration of social grants. However, a government 
review identified a number of problems associated with provincial administration, including 
fraudulent grants, delays in approving grant applications and difficulties in accessing payment 
(DSD et al., 2012). As a result, SASSA was established in 2004 to implement and administer 
social grants (RSA, 2004a). The SASSA is monitored and evaluated by the national 
Department for Social Development (DSD). 
Several studies (e.g., Woolard, 2003; Armstrong and Burger, 2009; van der Berg et al., 2010) 
have reported that government spending on social grants in South Africa is well-targeted. For 
example, Woolard (2003) reported that about 70% of the total income of the poorest 20% of 
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the South African population was social grants, while less than 1% of the income of the richest 
20% of the population was social grant income. In terms of coverage, the increase in the number 
of social grants beneficiaries over the past decade has been remarkable. The number of 
recipients increased from 2.4 million in April 1998 to approximately 16.4 million in 2014, a 
percentage increase of over 580% in 16 years (van der Berg et al., 2010; SASSA, 2014). The 
child support grant has been driving this increase, as the age group was increased from 0-7 
years in 1998 to the current 0-18 years (Tiberti et al., 2013). 
The level of social assistance spending in South Africa at present is high. In 2014, social 
assistance spending in South Africa amounted to about 3.5% of GDP (National Treasury, 
2015). This is a large proportion, even when compared to that of Western European countries 
in the 1980s, during the height of the welfare state (Armstrong and Burger, 2009). According 
to Midgley (2013), the costs of social cash transfers will increase in the near future. The wisdom 
of this consumption expenditure will be severely questioned, very soon (Midgley, 2013). Given 
the government’s constitutional obligation of ensuring that every citizen has social security, 
some discussions (Samson et al., 2006; Noble et al., 2008) have focused on the possibility of 
introducing a universal income grant for working-age adults in South Africa. 
Introducing a basic income grant (BIG), as a means of providing social security to all and 
alleviating poverty, was one of the key proposals of the Taylor Committee (Taylor, 2002). The 
Taylor Committee recommended that the BIG should benefit everyone in the country, rich and 
poor. The idea was that the BIG would function as a mechanism to include the unemployed 
and those working in the informal economy in the social security system (Brockerhoff, 2013). 
Since the means test would have been removed, it was argued that the BIG would reduce the 
administrative resources as well as eliminate the economic costs arising from the distortionary 
nature of the means test (Taylor, 2002; Samson et al., 2006).  
The BIG would reduce the current pressure on social grants and would result in these social 
grants benefitting the specific groups they were designed for (Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015). It 
has been reported that people are moving into households in which grants are received (Klasen 
and Woolard, 2008; Armstrong and Burger, 2009), resulting in increased pressure on social 
grants in alleviating poverty. This spill-over of social grants to unintended members is a cause 
for concern, because cash transfers influence the behaviour of recipients and potential 
recipients in a variety of ways, not all of which are necessarily good (Neves et al., 2009; Handa 
et al., 2012). The government rejected the BIG on the grounds that it would be too costly to 
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the fiscus and that they feared it would create a dependency culture (Makino, 2004; 
Brockerhoff, 2013). The next sub-section presents evidence from literature of the impacts of 
social grants. 
2.5 The impacts of social grants in South Africa: Evidence from the literature 
The impact of social grants, some intended and some unintended, on different outcomes have 
been investigated extensively in South Africa. A wide range of literature has assessed many 
dimensions of the impact of social grants, such as their intended direct impacts on poverty and 
income inequality (Barrientos, 2003; Maitra and Ray, 2003; Woolard, 2003; Samson et al., 
2004; Armstrong and Burger, 2009; Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010; Potts, 2012; Ulriksen, 
2012); and development outcomes for children such as school attendance (Case et al., 2005; 
Yamauchi, 2005; Edmonds, 2006; Williams, 2007; Samson et al., 2008; DSD et al., 2012) and 
nutrition or anthropometric status (Duflo, 2003; Yamauchi, 2005; Agüero et al., 2007; Leroy 
et al., 2009).  
The literature has also investigated the unintended impacts of social grants on outcomes such 
as non-farm labour supply (Bertrand et al., 2003; Williams, 2007; Ardington et al., 2009; 
Surender et al., 2010; Abel, 2013; Ardington et al., 2013); attitude towards work (Noble and 
Ntshongwana, 2008; Noble et al., 2008; Surender et al., 2010); household formation (Posel et 
al., 2006; Klasen and Woolard, 2008; Whitworth and Wilkinson, 2013); gender and dignity 
issues (Goldblatt, 2005; Holmes and Jones, 2010; Patel et al., 2012; Patel et al., 2013a; Wright 
et al., 2015); and teenage pregnancy (Makiwane and Udjo, 2007; Mokoma, 2008; Makiwane, 
2010). 
2.5.1 The intended impacts of social grants 
Armstrong and Burger (2009) investigated the impact of social grants on poverty and inequality 
in South Africa. They found that social grants had a considerable impact on poverty. However, 
Armstrong and Burger (2009) found that social grants had a negligible impact on income 
inequality. This, according to Armstrong and Burger (2009), is because inequality is largely 
driven by the upper end of the income distribution, a group that does not receive social grants. 
Even though Armstrong and Burger (2009) found that social grants were effective in pushing 
poor people closer to the poverty line, they warned that social grants were unable to guarantee 
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sustainable access to higher levels of income. Therefore, Armstrong and Burger (2009) 
highlighted the need for alternative strategies in order to achieve a long-term reduction in 
poverty and inequality in South Africa. 
Woolard and Leibbrandt (2010) agreed that social grants had a positive impact on poverty 
reduction. They found that the reduction in poverty over the post‐apartheid period in South 
Africa was strongly associated with the expansion of social grants. Similarly, Barrientos 
(2003), after investigating the impact of old age grants on poverty in South Africa and Brazil, 
concluded that they had a positive impact on poverty reduction in both countries. Maitra and 
Ray (2003) found that old age grant recipient households had higher expenditure shares, not 
only on food, but also on education. Maitra and Ray (2003) reported that the old age grant 
beneficiaries had lower expenditure shares on alcohol, tobacco and entertainment than other 
households, implying that social grants had not increased expenditure on these adult goods.  
With regards to children’s outcomes, Agüero et al. (2007) estimated the impact of the child 
support grant (CSG) on child nutrition (measured by child height-for-age). Agüero et al. (2007) 
showed that social grants payments had strengthened early childhood nutrition, as signalled by 
child height-for-age. They used the continuous treatment method (Hirano and Imbens, 2004), 
arguing that binary treatment overlooks the fact that the extent of CSG treatment varies 
significantly across the treated population. Case et al. (2005) examined the impact of the child 
support grant on children’s school enrolment. Based on parents’ characteristics and household 
assets, they reported that the grant was reaching those children living in the poorer households.  
Case et al. (2005) found a positive and significant association between grant receipt and school 
enrolment. The children who received the grant were significantly more likely to be enrolled 
in school in the years following grant receipt than are equally poor children of the same age. 
According to Case et al. (2005), this result suggests that the grant may help to overcome the 
impact of poverty on school enrolment. Edmonds (2006) analysed the impact of the old age 
grant on schooling decisions, as well as on child labour, and found that access to the grant 





2.5.2 The unintended impacts of social grants 
Wright et al. (2015) explored women’s accounts of how the CSG serves to protect dignity 
among women and the study results were mixed. The CSG was found to protect dignity in 
certain important respects. However, other aspects, such as the application process, the low 
amount of the grant and negative discourses associated with the status of being a CSG recipient 
were viewed as erosive of dignity. The studies on the impact of the CSG on teenage pregnancy 
(Makiwane and Udjo, 2007; Mokoma, 2008; Makiwane, 2010) have not found any significant 
positive association between the grant and teenage pregnancy. The studies have argued that, 
despite the widespread public perception based on moral and cultural concerns which argues 
that teenage fertility has increased as a result of the introduction of the CSG, there is no 
empirical evidence supporting this perceived association. 
Whitworth and Wilkinson (2013) and Klasen and Woolard (2008), found that social grants 
income influenced household formation, with poor people joining social grants recipient 
households.  This suggests that for the poor, household formation may, at least in part, be an 
active response to economic need in the context of high unemployment and a partial system of 
social grants (Whitworth and Wilkinson, 2013). While there is consensus that social grants 
have potential spill-over effects between household members, due to the prevalence of 
multi-generational households in South Africa (Klasen and Woolard, 2008; Abel, 2013; 
Whitworth and Wilkinson, 2013), there is no agreement on the impact of social grants on 
household labour supply.  
Some studies (e.g., Posel et al., 2006; Williams, 2007; Ardington et al., 2009; Ardington et al., 
2013) have concluded that additional income from social grants has a positive impact on 
employment by easing the constraints associated with job search. Other studies (e.g., Bertrand 
et al., 2003; Abel, 2013) concluded that social grants reduce incentives to work, as the 
additional income from social grants causes household members to work less and take 
additional leisure. In general, most of these labour supply studies have focused on the impact 
of the old age grant due to its relatively high amount and wide coverage.  
For example, Abel (2013) analysed the impact of the old age grant on labour supply in South 
Africa, using a nationally representative panel data set. Abel (2013) found that old age grant 
recipient households were less likely to supply labour. According to Abel (2013), the old age 
grant operates through an income mechanism, resulting in the prime-aged adults withdrawing 
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from the labour force and increasing their reservation wage if a household gains an eligible 
grant beneficiary. The employment effect of the old age grant was found to be robust to a range 
of sensitivity tests. Bertrand et al. (2003) found that the prime-aged members, especially men, 
in households eligible for the old age grant, were less likely to participate in the labour market. 
Bertrand et al. (2003) concluded that at least some of the pension income that is, in theory, 
targeted towards the elderly ends up being redistributed towards or captured by the working-
age members of the household. The income and/or incentive effects associated with this intra-
family redistribution resulted in a significant reduction in the number of working-age members 
that are employed in the households that receive old age grant income (Bertrand et al., 2003).  
In contrast, Ardington et al. (2013) found that young men were significantly more likely to 
supply more labour when someone in their household became age‐eligible for the old‐age 
grant. This study by Ardington et al. (2013), which focused on the question of whether the state 
old age grant enhances the ability of young men in rural areas to seek better work opportunities 
elsewhere, also reported that the old age grant impact was most pronounced among those who 
had successfully completed high school. This evidence suggests that binding credit constraints 
limit young men from poorer households from seeking more lucrative work elsewhere, such 
that access to social grants relaxes this financial constraint (Ardington et al., 2013). Similarly, 
Ardington et al. (2009) and Posel et al. (2006) found that social grants had positive employment 
effects. According to these studies, this is because social grants facilitate labour migration by 
alleviating financial and child care constraints. 
Studies (e.g., Noble and Ntshongwana, 2008; Noble et al., 2008; Surender et al., 2010) that 
have sought to investigate the attitudes of social grant beneficiaries towards work have found 
that unemployed South Africans and social grant recipients have a positive attitude towards 
work. These studies have shown that there is no evidence that social grants have created a 
dependency syndrome, as the attitudes of the poor and those receiving grants were not different 
from the non-recipients, all of whom demonstrated a strong commitment to work. According 
to these studies, it is not access to social grants or the motivational characteristics of the 
unemployed that are mainly reducing people’s employment chances, but the structural 
conditions of the labour market and the wider economy. However, these studies have not 




2.5.3 The impact of social grants on smallholder farming activities: Theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence 
The linkages between social grants and smallholder farming outcomes can be explored using 
several theoretical frameworks, such as the unitary agricultural household model, the random 
utility framework and the theory of farm household decision-making under imperfect markets. 
According to the agricultural household model, semi-subsistent agricultural households seek 
to maximise household utility, and do not necessarily aim to maximise profit (Singh et al., 
1986). The unitary model of households postulates that households operate as a single 
utility-maximising entity. The implication of this theory is that social grants, although targeted 
to individuals, benefit households as a whole, not just the specific individual.  
According to micro-economic theory, changes in unearned income (such as social grants 
income) affect household behaviour though their effect on total household income (shifting of 
the household budget line). If, for example, unearned income increases, the budget line shifts 
to the right. Assuming normal goods, the parallel shift in the budget line results in an increase 
in consumption goods and leisure. The increase in recipients’ welfare as a result of the income 
effect generated by transfers discourages recipients from working (Binger and Hoffman, 1998; 
Barrett, 2006). In other words, increases in social grant income can potentially reduce farming 
households’ incentives to put more land under cultivation, supply more labour to farming 
activities, commercialise or adopt modern farming technologies as they can maintain their 
utility level through the unearned income, ceteris paribus. The theoretical rationale is that, as 
household income rises, the additional benefit to the household from working for further 
income falls and work incentives are dampened (Binger and Hoffman, 1998).  
While micro-economic theory predicts a negative relationship between unearned income and 
smallholder farming outcomes, the theory of farm household decision-making under imperfect 
markets predicts a positive relationship. The imperfect or missing credit markets in the rural 
areas are such that the income from social grants may relieve the liquidity constraints of farm 
households, enabling them to purchase more inputs or bear the transaction costs. Moreover, the 
predictable and guaranteed monthly income from social grants enables rural households to take 
more risks in their farming businesses. In other words, access to social grants may increase the 




Even though literature has investigated varied dimensions of the impact of social grants in 
South Africa, there has been generally less focus on the potential linkages between social grants 
and smallholder farming. Only anecdotal or descriptive evidence is available (e.g., White and 
Killick, 2001; Samson et al., 2008; Aliber and Hart, 2009; Aliber and Hall, 2012; Tshuma, 
2012). For instance, while their primary focus was to investigate the impact of the CSG on 
child hunger and school attendance, Samson et al. (2008) highlighted anecdotally that 
households receiving the CSG were significantly more likely to continue farming activities. 
Samson et al. (2008) reported that the proportion of CSG recipient households that had stopped 
farming activities between 2002 and 2004 was lower than that of non-recipients. Most of the 
descriptive studies (e.g., White and Killick, 2001; Aliber and Hart, 2009; Aliber and Hall, 2012; 
Tshuma, 2012) have sought to infer causality based on observations that smallholder farming 
activity is declining while social grants are increasing without controlling for confounding 
factors.  
The paucity of literature linking social grants and smallholder farming is international. While 
studies linking cash transfers and different outcomes, such as school attendance, nutrition and 
health, are extensive (e.g., de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005; de Janvry et al., 2006; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2006; de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011), only a few (e.g., Martinez, 2004; Bezu and 
Holden, 2008) have linked cash transfers to smallholder farming activities. Martinez (2004) 
found that cash transfers were being invested in smallholder agriculture in Bolivia. According 
to Martinez (2004), the impact of the investment was an increase in food consumption by twice 
the amount of the transfer received. The cash transfers were found to also reduce detrimental 
risk coping strategies, such as the selling of productive assets, as they enhance the ability of 
recipients to save and invest.  
Bezu and Holden (2008) found that food-for-work positively influenced the decision to adopt 
fertilisers and that there was no evidence of disincentive effect in Ethiopia. According to Bezu 
and Holden (2008), social transfers can help improve agricultural production by relieving 
liquidity constraints and thereby improving input use in agriculture. This is in agreement with 
views held by some studies in Africa (e.g., Diao et al., 2012; Proctor, 2014) which have argued 
that social transfers and smallholder agriculture have potential for complementarity as options 
for rural livelihoods.  
Several studies (e.g., Isham, 2002; Croppenstedt et al., 2003; Freeman and Omiti, 2003; Asfaw 
and Admassie, 2004; Chianu and Tsujii, 2004; Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2005; Chirwa, 2005; 
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Waithaka et al., 2007; Alene et al., 2008; Bezu and Holden, 2008; Thuo et al., 2010; Zhou et 
al., 2010; Akpan et al., 2012; Mapila et al., 2012; Yirga and Hassan, 2013; Lambrecht et al., 
2014; Martey et al., 2014; Ogada et al., 2014; Thuo et al., 2014; Diiro et al., 2015) have 
investigated the factors affecting chemical fertiliser adoption among smallholder farmers in the 
developing countries. With the exception of Bezu and Holden (2008), these studies have not 
investigated the potential impact of social transfers on chemical fertiliser adoption, arguably 
missing an important variable. Similarly, the literature on smallholder market participation or 
commercialisation (e.g., Key et al., 2000; Poulton et al., 2005; Alene et al., 2008; Mendoza 
and Thelen, 2008; Markelova et al., 2009; Hazell et al., 2010; Jagwe et al., 2010; Mmbando et 
al., 2015) has not focussed on the possible effects of social grants on the incentives of the 
farmers to commercialise their farming activities.  
Moreover, the vast and growing literature on rural or farm entrepreneurship (e.g., McElwee, 
2005; Meccheri and Pelloni, 2006; de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; McElwee, 2008; Vesala, 
2008; Clark, 2009; Ghiasy et al., 2009; Hosseini et al., 2009; McElwee and Bosworth, 2010; 
Nafukho and Muyia, 2010; Onyebinama and Onyebinama, 2010; Vesala and Vesala, 2010; 
Rajaei et al., 2011; Baumgartner et al., 2012; Díaz-Pichardo et al., 2012; Rijkers and Costa, 
2012; Pyysiäinen and Vesala, 2013; Rijkers and Söderbom, 2013) has not directly addressed 
the conceptual and empirical linkages between social grants and farm entrepreneurship among 
rural households. Consequently, an unambiguous answer to how social grants affect rural 
farming households’ incentives to farm, input use, and commercialisation of their farming 
activities as well as their entrepreneurial attitudes is absent. This study seeks to contribute to 
the pertinent questions by investigating rural farming households in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
province. The next sub-section presents a brief description of the study area.  
2.6 Study area description 
The study was conducted in four districts of the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province of South 
Africa. In terms of land size, KZN is the third-smallest province of the nine provinces in SA, 
with a total land size of about 94 400 km2, about 7.6% of South Africa (Stats SA, 2012a). 
Despite being the third-smallest in terms of land size,  KZN has the second largest population 
after Gauteng, housing about 10.6 million people, about 19.8% of SA’s population (Stats SA, 
2012a; Stats SA, 2014). This translates to a population density of 113 people per km2. The 
province is characterised by high poverty levels and a lack of economic opportunities, 
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particularly in the rural areas (KZNPPC, 2011). KZN has a high unemployment rate (33%), 
and the youths are the worst affected, with 42% of them unemployed (Stats SA, 2012b). 
Social grants and smallholder farming play important roles in the livelihoods of rural dwellers. 
KZN has the largest number of households benefitting from social grants (SASSA, 2014), and 
social grants are the second largest source of income after salaries/wages in the province (Stats 
SA, 2015). Farming is not a large source of income in KZN, as it is the sixth important source 
after salaries/wages, social grants, remittances, non-farm businesses and pensions. However, 
most of the rural people in the province are employed or self-employed in smallholder 
agriculture, producing mainly for subsistence purposes. Over 796 000 (28%) of the 2 802 000 
households in KZN are directly involved in agriculture (Stats SA, 2012b). Stats SA (2012b) 
reported that, while wage employment is the preferred option for many people, household 
members who fail to secure employment in urban areas go back to the rural areas and engage 
in informal activities such as smallholder farming.  
KZN is generally characterised by good, reliable rainfall (more than 1 000 mm a year) and 
fertile soils, making agriculture central to its economy (KZNDAE, 2012). Even though the 
economy of KZN has a huge potential in agriculture, current production is below the province’s 
agricultural potential (KZNDAE, 2012). According to the KZNDAE (2012), conservative 
estimates suggest that agricultural output could be increased significantly if the natural 
resources were optimally managed for agriculture. In particular, there is much uncultivated 
land in the rural areas of KZN (KZNPPC, 2011; Tshuma, 2012), though shortage of other 
economic options still makes smallholder agriculture more important in these areas. 
2.7 Sampling and data collection tools 
The data were collected between June and November 2014, using a pre-tested structured 
questionnaire administered by trained and experienced enumerators. These enumerators had 
good knowledge of the rural farming systems and could speak the local IsiZulu language. Key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions with knowledgeable audiences were done to 
supplement data from questionnaires. Questionnaire pre-testing, involving 15 rural households, 
was done before the main survey. The survey was conducted using a multistage sampling 
technique. First, four districts were chosen out of the 11 districts in KZN. Figure 2.1 shows the 
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location of the four districts (Umzinyathi, Uthukela, Umkhanyakude and Harry Gwala1 
districts) that were selected for this study. The districts that were selected have a significant 
number of rural communities engaged in farming activities. 
Secondly, a total of 984 households were randomly selected from the four district 
municipalities. In Harry Gwala and Umkhanyakude districts, lists of farmers were obtained 
from the extension offices. The extension officers also helped direct the enumerators to the 
farmers’ households. In Uthukela district, the enumerators were assisted by the local farmer 
association chairpersons. There was no complete list for the Umzinyathi district. While the list 
of irrigators was sourced from the extension office in Msinga, no list was found for 
non-irrigators. The snowballing method was thus used to select non-irrigators in Umzinyathi. 
The study did not consider ‘backyard’ farmers, i.e., those small farmers who plant a few rows 
of maize or vegetables for own consumption in their back gardens and have no access to arable 
allotments. This is because these farmers have limited access to land, such that their incentives 
or disincentives cannot be adequately captured. 
Out of the total sample, 239 households were from Umzinyathi, 191 from Uthukela, 143 from 
Umkhanyakude and 411 from Harry Gwala districts. The questionnaire, attached as Appendix 
A, included several modules, which include information on basic household head 
characteristics, such as sex, age, marital status and education level, measures of household 
wealth endowment (such as household assets, livestock and land); agricultural production 
activities; household income amounts and sources. Institutional and organisation support issues 
such as farmer associations, market access, credit and extension support were relevant. The 
questionnaire also captured how household members allocate their labour, the use of chemical 
fertilisers as well as the crop marketing behaviour of the households. Lastly, the questionnaire 
sought to capture the farmers’ self-assessments of their entrepreneurship skills or 
competencies. While some modules such as basic household characteristics are relevant to all 
the empirical chapters, some modules are only relevant to specific chapters. This will be 
indicated in the individual empirical chapters. 
 
                                                 




Figure 2.1: Map of the KwaZulu-Natal province showing the four districts selected 
 
2.8 Summary  
The empirical literature, using different methods and data sets, has widely agreed that social 
grants have a positive impact on outcomes such as poverty reduction, school attendance and 
nutrition outcomes. However, the evidence on the labour supply impact of social grants in 
South Africa has been mixed. The literature is inconclusive in terms of both the theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence on the work incentives impacts of social grants. The review 
presented in this chapter has revealed that that the potential linkages between social grants and 
smallholder farming activities have not been adequately addressed. The next four empirical 
chapters seek to fill this gap by investigating the potential impact of social grants on the rural 
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households’ incentives to farm, adopt improved modern technology and commercialise as well 
as their entrepreneurial attitudes. 
To achieve the study objectives, a total of 984 households were randomly selected in four 
districts of the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province of South Africa. The KZN province is 
characterised by high poverty levels, high unemployment rates and a lack of economic 
opportunities, especially in the rural areas. Social grants and smallholder farming play 
important roles in the livelihoods of rural dwellers. However, though the shortage of other 
economic options makes smallholder agriculture more important in these areas, the province 
has experienced declining smallholder farming activity in recent years. This, coupled with the 
fact that KZN has the largest number of households benefitting from social grants, makes it a 
suitable study area to for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL GRANTS ON RURAL 
HOUSEHOLDS’ INCENTIVES TO FARM: EVIDENCE FROM KWAZULU-
NATAL 
3.0 Abstract 
This chapter aimed to investigate the impact of social grants on rural households’ incentives to 
farm. The incentives to farm were captured by two variables: (1) the proportion of land area 
cultivated by the farmers; and (2) the proportion of prime-aged, able-bodied household 
members that participate in smallholder farming activities. Using a sample of 984 rural 
households selected across four districts of KwaZulu-Natal, data were analysed using the logit 
transformation procedure, the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) model and the propensity score 
matching method. The econometric results indicated that access to, and dependency on, social 
grants did not influence, either positively or negatively, the proportion of land under 
cultivation. This result suggests that the declining land under cultivation among rural 
households is not due to social grants. Instead, the study identified several other constraints 
that policy-makers should focus on to improve the proportion of cultivated land in rural areas. 
In terms of the household members’ participation in farming activities, the results were in line 
with the disincentive hypothesis. The empirical results indicated that access to, and increasing 
levels of dependency on, social grants led to a significant reduction of the number of the 
household members that participate in smallholder farming activities. The implication of this 
result is that, although social grants are aimed at the vulnerable groups, they also reach the 
unintended household members, creating disincentive effects. Since social grants are important 
in addressing rural household poverty, the study recommends that they should continue, but 
policy-makers should be particularly cognisant of their possible adverse consequences on 
smallholder farming. The study also identified other variables that affect land area cultivated 
and participation by household members in smallholder farming, highlighting the importance 
of expectations of farming success as a key motivator. Policy options are presented for making 
agriculture more viable and become attractive to those who are opting out of agriculture and 
relying on social grants. 
Keywords: Social grant-dependency, incentives to farm, rural areas, logit transformation, 




There has been considerable debate in South Africa on the potential unintended incentive 
effects of social grants on people’s economic behaviour. Despite being targeted at specific 
vulnerable groups, the prevalent multi-generational households in South Africa mean that there 
is potential for spill-over effects among household members (Klasen and Woolard, 2008; Abel, 
2013; Devereux, 2013). According to Devereux (2013), the spill-over effects results in many 
unemployed or underpaid adults depending on these grants, i.e., becoming dependent on social 
grants beneficiaries. Since social grants add significant resources into the hands of the poor 
households, this intra-household redistribution raises a concern that social grant receipt may 
have negative effects on the working-age individuals’ incentives to work (Williams, 2007; 
Mabugu et al., 2014). 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, the debate on the impact of social grants impact on 
non-farm labour supply has been inconclusive. Some studies (e.g., Posel et al., 2006; Williams, 
2007; Ardington et al., 2009; Ardington et al., 2013) have found that social grants have a 
positive impact on economic activities by easing the household’s financial constraints. In 
contrast, several other studies (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2003; Samson et al., 2004; Abel, 2013) 
have reported that social grants reduce households’ economic activities and that social grants 
reduce incentives to work. The small difference between the social grant amounts and available 
labour-market wages offers little incentive for the poor to seek or take up paid work, especially 
casual and temporary jobs (Johannsmeier, 2007; Mabugu et al., 2014). For example, the 
average minimum monthly wage across sectors in South Africa was about R2 000 in 2014 
(Department of Labour, 2014), compared to the R1 350 per month for the old age grant (OAG) 
or disability grant (DG).  
According to Klasen and Woolard (2008), not only are many of those households with 
unemployed members located in rural areas, but some people are leaving urban areas to depend 
on social grants in the rural areas. This has the adverse effect that it may attract the prime-aged 
household members away from job markets to rural areas, where employment opportunities 
are scarce (Klasen and Woolard, 2008). However, the social grants are inadequate and the 
sharing of social grants income with unintended members pulls many households supporting 
them into poverty (Klasen and Woolard, 2008; Armstrong and Burger, 2009; Mabugu et al., 
2013). It is against this background that smallholder farming remains key in the reduction of 
rural poverty and household food insecurity (Eastwood et al., 2006; Aliber and Hall, 2012).  
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Despite its importance, several authors (e.g., White and Killick, 2001; Aliber and Hart, 2009; 
Aliber and Hall, 2012; Tshuma, 2012) have reported a decline in smallholder farming activity 
in the rural areas of South Africa. This decline has been largely attributed to dependency on 
social grants (Neves et al., 2009; Tshuma, 2012). Given that smallholder agriculture has been 
put forward as a viable option for the absorption of labour in the rural areas, the reported large 
areas of previously cultivated land that now lie abandoned is a cause for concern for both 
academics and policy-makers (Andrew et al., 2003; Eastwood et al., 2006; DED, 2011; Aliber 
and Hall, 2012). However, the studies linking declining farming activity and social grants have 
been based on limited descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence. As explained in the 
previous chapters, these inferences should be regarded with caution, as the authors have not 
controlled for other relevant factors.  
This chapter, therefore, aimed to contribute to literature on impacts of social grants, by 
investigating the extent to which social grants affect rural households’ incentives to farm in 
KwaZulu-Natal, using advanced econometric techniques. As previously noted, literature on the 
potential disincentive effects of the social grants have mainly focused on non-farm labour 
supply. However, the farming sector should also be considered, so as to enrich the social grants 
impact literature. Moreover, the literature has found contradictory results, which necessitates 
the need for more studies using different data sets and methods focusing on specific sectors. 
The incentives to farm in this study were captured using two variables: (1) the proportion of 
land area cultivated by the farmers; (2) the proportion of prime-aged, able-bodied household 
members that participate in smallholder farming activities. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, there are few studies, if any, that have linked social grants and these variables to 
capture households’ incentives to farm.  
The chapter’s other novel contribution is in the way the influence of social grants was handled. 
Two variables were used to capture the influence of social grants: (1) a dummy variable 
showing whether or not a household has a member who receives any of the social grants was 
created; (2) while other studies have simply focussed on the impact of, mostly, one or a few of 
the social grants, the proportion of income from all the social grants to household income was 
used. The proportion variable was introduced to capture the importance of all the social grants 
to household income.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The following section presents the 
research methodology adopted, where the study area, sampling approach and empirical models 
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are discussed. The results are presented and discussed in the subsequent section, while the final 
section of the chapter presents conclusions and policy implications of the chapter. 
3.2 Research methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
The data for this chapter includes all the 984 households that were randomly selected from the 
four district municipalities of the KZN province, as described in Chapter 2. The relevant 
questionnaire modules for this chapter include information on basic household head 
characteristics, such as sex, age, marital status and education level. Also relevant were 
measures of household wealth endowment (such as household assets, livestock and land); 
agricultural production activities; household income amounts and sources. Institutional and 
organisation support issues such as farmer associations, market access, credit and extension 
support were relevant. The questionnaire also captured how household members allocate their 
labour, asking questions on the household size, the number of prime-aged, able-bodied 
members as well as the number of dependants (below 15 years; over 65 years and the 
permanently sick). Of the prime-aged, able-bodied members, the questionnaire included 
questions on how many were employed off-farm, how many were unemployed and reside at 
home and how many members participated in farming activities.  
3.2.2 Conceptual framework 
This chapter is based on the unitary agricultural household model and micro-economic theory. 
The agricultural household model postulates that, while semi-subsistent agricultural 
households are rational, they do not necessarily aim to maximize profit, but they seek to 
maximise household utility (Singh et al., 1986). The unitary model of households views the 
household as a single utility-maximising entity. According to the unitary model, the household 
finds ways to act together as an entity, despite comprising members with individual and 
heterogeneous preferences (Samuelson, 1956). The implication here is that social grants, 
although targeted to individuals, benefit households as a whole, not just the specific individual. 
As in consumer theory, the household acts as a utility-maximising individual, whose 
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indifference curves and utility are homothetic and identical for all members of the household 
(Binger and Hoffman, 1998). 
The agricultural household model assumes that households control a bundle of assets or 
endowments such as land, labour, livestock and financial capital, which they allocate across a 
number of livelihood activities (e.g., farming, wage employment and other non-farm activities) 
(Vance and Geoghegan, 2004; Barrett, 2006). A summary of the model, as adapted from Singh 
et al. (1986) for use in this study, assumes that the household seeks to maximise utility subject 
to the budget, production and time constraints, as presented below:    
Max U = U(Xa, Xm, Xl)   utility maximisation, s. t. 
PmXm ≤  pa(Qa-Xa) –pl(L-F) -pvV + Yg  cash income constraint,  
Qa = Q(L, V, A, K)          production constraint, 
Xl + F ≤ T            time constraint,  
Xa, Xm, Q ≥ 0       non-negativity constraints (3.1) 
The model indicates that rural households, as rational agents, aim to maximise household 
utility, which is a function of consumption of agricultural goods (Xa) and consumption of 
market-purchased goods (Xm) and leisure (Xl). Utility is maximised subject to a cash income 
constraint, in which the cost of market purchased goods, determined by price Pm, is less than 
or equal to household income. Total household income comprises earned household income 
(pa(Qa-Xa) –pl(L-F) –pvV) and unearned household income Yg. Earned household income 
includes profits from agricultural and non-agricultural activities, while unearned income is 
from sources such as social grants and remittances. Pa are the prices of the agricultural goods; 
Qa is the household's production of the agricultural goods, meaning that Qa - Xa is its marketed 
surplus.  
Moreover, pl is the market wage; L is total labour input and F is family labour input, meaning 
that L - F, if positive, is hired labour and, if negative, is off-farm labour. V in the cash income 
constraint equation is a variable input (for example, fertiliser) and pv is the variable input's 
market price. The household also faces a production constraint that depicts the relationship 
between inputs and farm output. A is the fixed quantity of land and K the fixed stock of capital.  
Household choices are further restricted by a time constraint, which implies that a household 
cannot allocate more time to leisure, on-farm production, or off-farm employment than the total 
time available to the household. T is the total stock of household time. Finally, it is assumed 
that Xa, Xm and Q are non-negative values. Further assumptions are that only one crop is 
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produced, family and hired labour are perfect substitutes, production is riskless and that 
households are price takers. 
The production and time constraints can be substituted into the cash income constraint to 
produce the following single constraint: 
pmXm + paXa + plXl = plT + [paQa (L, V, A, K) - plT- pvV] + Yg   (3.2) 
 
The left-hand side shows total household expenditure on the market-purchased commodity 
(pmXm), the household's "purchase" of its own output (paXa), and the household's "purchase" 
of its own time in the form of leisure (plXl). The right-hand side is the household’s full income, 
which includes the value of the stock of time (plT), farm profits (paQa (L, V, A, K) - plT- pvV) 
and unearned income (Yg). 
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Equations 3.3a and 3.3b indicates that households equate the marginal revenue products for 
labour and variable inputs to their respective market prices. The maximised value of profits can 
be substituted into equation 2 to yield:  
pmXm + paXa + plXl = Y*       (3.5) 
Where: Y* is the value of full income associated with profit-maximising behaviour. Equations 
3.4a, 3.4b, and 3.5 can be thought of as the first-order conditions of a second maximisation. 
That is, having first maximised profits (Equations 3.3a and 3.3b), the household then 
maximises utility subject to its (maximised) value of full income. 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of social grants (unearned income) on 
the proportion of land area cultivated and proportion of household labour involved in farming 
activities. Land area cultivated and household labour are studied as the main determinants of 
agricultural production, represented by the variable Qa. A change in unearned income (Yg) 
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changes total household income, shifting the budget line. If, for example, unearned income 
increases, the budget line shifts to the right. Assuming normal goods, the parallel shift in the 
budget line results in an increase in consumption goods and leisure. According to the 
micro-economic theory, the increase in recipients’ welfare as a result of the income effect 
generated by transfers discourages recipients from working (Binger and Hoffman, 1998; 
Barrett, 2006).  
In other words, increases in social grant income can potentially reduce farming households’ 
incentives to put more land under cultivation, or supply more labour to farming activities, as 
they can maintain their utility level through the unearned income, ceteris paribus. The 
theoretical rationale is that, as household income rises, the additional benefit to the household 
from working for further income falls and work incentives are dampened (Binger and Hoffman, 
1998). The recipients reduce work effort simply because even hard-working people prefer more 
leisure to less (Barrett, 2006; Sharaunga and Wale, 2013). Therefore, it is expected a priori 
that there is a negative relationship between social grants and proportion of land area under 
cultivation or proportion of household labour involved in farming activities. 
3.2.3 Dependent and independent variables 
The incentive to farm in this chapter was captured by the proportion of land cultivated by a 
household in the previous season, before the survey, and the proportion of the proportion of 
unemployed family labour (able-bodied adult household members) who participated in farming 
activities on a regular basis last season. The proportion of cultivated land, instead of total crop 
production, was preferred, since it is the decision that better reflects farmers’ incentives or 
disincentives (Sharaunga and Wale, 2013). This is because agricultural production is affected 
by other technical inputs, as well as by natural factors than can be controlled for in a model. 
Attributing lower agricultural production to disincentive effects of social grants would be 
inaccurate, to the extent that other technical inputs are the constraints and natural factors are 
random (Sharaunga and Wale, 2013). Since smallholder farmers rarely use hired labour, but 
rely on family labour (Gollin, 2014), their incentives to farm can also be captured by the extent 
to which family members engage in agricultural activities. 
To generate the proportion of land area cultivated, the land that was cultivated in the previous 
season was divided by the total farm land that the household has access to, either through 
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allocation, inheriting or leasing. The variable excluded land that was not cultivated for rational 
agronomic and/or economic reasons, such as fallowing. Since this variable focuses on 
incentives for crop farming, livestock farming was controlled for by including livestock size as 
one of the explanatory variables in the model. The proportion of unemployed family labour 
(able-bodied adult household members) who participated in farming was generated by dividing 
the number of unemployed able-bodied adult household members who participated in farming 
by the total prime-aged, able-bodied unemployed household members. The prime-aged, 
able-bodied household members were defined as those who are aged between 16 and 64. Those 
who are invalids or too sick to work were excluded.  
This study used a dummy variable, showing whether or not a household has access to grants or 
not, and the proportion of household income from social grants. The weakness of the dummy 
is that it would classify all social grants recipient households in the same way, regardless of  
the level of social grant support (Agüero et al., 2007). The proportion variable, on the other 
hand, captures the variation in the social grants’ contribution to household income, accounting 
for the relative importance of social grants. Treating a household that receives just 10% of its 
income from social grants the same as a household that receives more than 50% of its income 
from grants seems likely to understate the potential effect of social grants. Total household 
income included the incomes that the household received from different sources, which 
included employment, remittances, social grants, farming, micro-businesses and arts and 
culture. To capture the amount of social grants income, the household were asked the social 
grant types that any member of the household received and when each member had begun 
receiving the grant. 
The econometric models included other variables that were hypothesised to influence 
households’ decision-making processes and incentives to farm. These included household head 
demographics (captured by age, gender and marital status), wealth endowment (captured by 
farm size, asset values and livestock size), human capital (captured by education level and 
farming experience) and social capital (captured by farmer association membership). The 
model included labour endowment (captured using the number of able-bodied adult household 
members) as well as farmer support services (captured by access to extension, agricultural 
training, credit, markets and tillage). Off-farm and non-farm commitments were included, 
captured as off-farm employment and non-farm business ownership. The perceptions of 
rainfall, soil quality and tenure were also included, as these are important motivators for 
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households to farm. District dummies were introduced to capture the political, social and agro-
climatic variations in these areas that may impact on farming incentives, but were not captured 
in the model. The Harry Gwala district was chosen as the base category because it has the 
largest number of farming households. Moreover, smallholder farming plays a major role in 
the Harry Gwala district compared to what it does in other districts. The next subsection 
presents the empirical models that were used to achieve the objectives of this chapter. 
3.2.4 Empirical methods 
To assess the potential disincentive effects of social grants on farming, the logit transformation 
procedure, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) model and propensity score matching methods were 
used. These different econometric techniques were used together for robustness checks. These 
models, as well as the estimation issues such as testing and/or correcting for endogeneity, are 
described in the following sub-sections. 
3.2.4.1  Logit transformation 
Since the dependent variables are proportion responses, ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
inappropriate, as the predicted values from the regression can never be guaranteed to lie in the 
unit interval (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). The logit transformation procedure is commonly 
used to handle proportion response outcomes (Baum, 2008; Wale, 2010; Sharaunga and Wale, 
2013). Therefore the logit transformation procedure was adopted in this study to transform the 
proportion response variable (Y) as follows: 
Y*= log ( 𝑌
1−𝑌
)         (3.6) 
Where: Y is the proportion response before transformation, and Y* is the transformed response 
variable. 
This procedure, however, is only directly appropriate when the values of the response variables 
are strictly within the unit interval, i.e., it cannot be directly used if Y takes on the boundary 
values of zero and one (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Baum, 2008). Since a large number of 
households, for example, either did not cultivate their land at all (88 households) or  cultivated 
all their land (298) in this study, the boundary values were substituted with close 
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approximations, following Wale (2010). OLS is appropriate to model the transformed variable, 
Y*. 
3.2.4.2 The Papke and Wooldridge model 
The logit transformation approach described above has two main drawbacks. Firstly, it would 
not be straightforward to recover regression function for the proportional variable, meaning 
that it is not easy to interpret the coefficient estimates (Ramalho et al., 2011). Secondly, the 
transformed dependent variable is not well-defined for the boundary values zero and one of Y, 
requiring ad hoc adjustments, as was done in this study. Therefore, for robustness checks, the 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) model, hereafter the PW model, was also estimated.  
The PW model makes use of simple quasi-likelihood estimation methods and, compared with 
the logit transformation procedure, there is no difficulty in recovering the regression function 
for the proportion variable, and there is no need to use ad hoc transformations to handle data 
at the extreme values of zero and one (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). For detailed discussions 
of this model, interested readers may consult studies such as those of Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996), Hoff (2007) or Ramalho et al. (2011). The PW model was estimated in Stata, as 
suggested by Baum (2008). 
3.2.4.3 Estimation and selection bias issues  
Evaluating the impact of social grants on the incentives to farm involved estimation of the 
following equation: 
Y*i = βxi + δ1Gi + δ2GDi + εi        (3.7) 
Where: Y*i is the proportion response variable after logit transformation; Gi is a dummy 
variable showing whether or not a household has access to social grants; GDi is the proportion 
of household income from social grants; xi is a vector of household characteristics, β’s and δ 
are parameters to be estimated and εi is the residual term.  
Estimating the parameter δ1 using OLS offers an unbiased estimate of the impact of access to 
social grants on the transformed proportion variable, provided that it is uncorrelated with εi 
(Maddala, 1991; Greene, 2003). This would be true, for example, if social grants were 
randomly distributed, or if only observed characteristics are believed to affect selection 
(Khandker et al., 2010). However, assuming that social grants are random is untenable, since 
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they are targeted at households with assets and income values below a certain threshold (Patel 
et al., 2013). If selection was only based on observed characteristics, then introducing them all 
in the model would remedy the selection bias problem. However, assuming that selection on a 
national voluntary programme such as social grants is unrelated to unobserved factors that, 
themselves affect the outcomes is hard to sustain (Agüero et al., 2007). 
The present study corrected for selection on unobservables through the Heckman’s two-step 
procedure (Heckman, 1979). This procedure involved: (1) generating the inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR) using access to social grants as the dependent variable in the selection equation; (2) 
adding IMR to Eq. 3.7 and estimating the equation using OLS. In order to estimate the selection 
equation, assume that access to social grants (Gi) is a linear function of the exogenous 
covariates (zi) and the residual error ui.  
Specifically, assume that access to social grants is modelled as follows: 
G*i = γzi + ui ,  
Gi = 1 if G*i > 0, and 0=Otherwise.      (3.8) 
Where: G*i is the latent endogenous variable, such that Gi takes a value of 1 when G*i is greater 
than zero; zi is a vector of household characteristics that influence a household’s access to 
grants; γ are the coefficients to be estimated; and ui is the residual term. 
A binary probit model was used to estimate the selection equation. Using the selection equation 
(Eq. 3.8), the IMR was constructed as follows: 
λi = ϕ(γzi) / Φ(γzi)        (3.9) 
Where: λi is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), ϕ is the density function of a standard normal 
variable, Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, zi and γ 
are as defined above.  
The IMR was added to Eq. 3.7, which was then estimated using OLS, as follows: 
Y*i = βxi + δ1Gi + δ2GDi + βλλi + εi      (3.10) 
Where: Y*i is the proportion response variable after logit transformation; xi is a vector of 
household characteristics; Gi is a dummy variable showing whether or not a household has 
access to social grants; GDi is the proportion of household income from social grants; λi is the 
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IMR, β’s and δ are parameters to be estimated and εi is the residual term. A non-significant 
coefficient of the IMR (as was the case in this chapter) indicates that there is no self-selection 
problem, while a significant coefficient term implies sample selection problem. Due to the 
inclusion of the selectivity term, the impact coefficient δ in Eq. 3.10 is unbiased. 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was done to test for potential endogeneity of dependency 
on social grants (GDi) in the models. For example, the proportion of land area under cultivation 
may, in fact, affect dependency on social grants, since increased land area under cultivation 
can potentially lead to increased output and farm income, ceteris paribus. The increased farm 
income would result in decreased dependency on social grants.  
The Hausman test was implemented by firstly regressing social grants dependency (GDi) on 
the exogenous explanatory variables, as follows: 
GDi = mγ + wi         (3.11) 
Where: GDi means dependency on social grants, m is a vector of exogenous variables, γ are the 
estimated coefficients and wi is the residual term. 
The second step involved obtaining the residuals (wi) and then adding these residuals in Eq. 
3.7. A statistically significant estimated coefficient of the residuals would mean endogeneity 
problems, while a statistically insignificant estimate (as was the case in this study) means no 
evidence of the endogeneity problem. 
3.2.4.4 Propensity score matching (PSM) method 
The propensity score matching (PSM) method was used to provide further robustness checks 
on the estimated impact parameters. According to Hoff (2007), it is important to make 
comparisons among different models when estimating proportion response variables to check 
whether or not results are robust. PSM has been used by a number of studies (e.g., Samson et 
al., 2008; Neves et al., 2009; DSD et al., 2012) to estimate the impact of social grants on 
different outcomes (e.g., nutrition, school attendance and hunger) in South Africa. However, 
unlike this study, these studies did not first test for selection bias due to unobservables. Use of 
PSM depends on the critical statistical assumption that treatment (receipt of social grants in 
this case) is unrelated to unobserved factors that themselves aff ect the outcomes (the 
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conditional independence or the unconfoundedness assumption) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Khandker et al., 2010).  
PSM produces biased estimates if this assumption is violated (Khandker et al., 2010). The PSM 
method would result in unbiased and robust impact estimates in this study because there was 
no evidence of selection bias due to unobservables (Table 3.6). The advantage of PSM is that 
it is does not depend on a specific functional form of the outcome (Baker, 2000; Blundell and 
Costa-Dias, 2000). It avoids the linearity imposition, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity 
issues (Cuong, 2007; Peel, 2014). Whereas the regressions described above employ all 
observations in the treatment and control samples, PSM uses only matched sub-samples (Jalan 
and Ravallion, 2003a; Abebaw et al., 2010). Compared to estimates based on full samples, the 
impact estimates based on matched samples are less biased and more reliable (Rubin and 
Thomas, 2000; Abebaw et al., 2010). 
To apply PSM in this study, assume that our dependent variable of interest is the proportion of 
land area cultivated. It should be noted that the same explanations apply for the other2 
dependent variable, the proportion of working age household members who participate in 
farming activities. Further assume that, for example, the proportion of land area cultivated by 
social grant beneficiary household i was Y1i. The proportion of land area cultivated by a social 
grant non-beneficiary household is then assumed to be Y0i. Also assume that Gi denotes access 
to social grants by household i; and that it can take two values; namely Gi = 1 if the household 
is a social grant beneficiary; and Gi = 0 if the household is a non-beneficiary. Therefore the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on the whole sample would be estimated as follows: 
ATE = E[Δi] 
                     = E[Y1i -Y0i] 
                     = E[Y1i -Y0i ׀Gi=1] Pr(Gi=1) + E[Y1i -Y0i ׀Gi=1] Pr(Gi=0)  (3.12) 
 Where: E[Δi] is the expected impact on household i; Pr is the probability and other variables 
are as defined above. The ATE is the weighted average, which tells us what the expected effect 
of the access to social grants would be on the average proportion of land area cultivated for the 
entire population (Cobb-Clark and Crossley, 2003).  
                                                 
2 It should also be noted that PSM was used in other chapters for other outcomes. The same explanations as given 
here apply, with the only variations being the dependent variable of interest.  
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The interest of this study, however, was to evaluate the impact of social grants on those 
households that are actually social grant beneficiaries. The focus was on estimating the 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT), the expected treatment effect over the sample 
of social grant beneficiaries, which is estimated as follows:  
ATT = E[Δi׀Gi=1] = E[Y1i,t ׀Gi=1] – E[Y0i,t ׀Gi=1]     (3.13) 
Where: E[Δ׀Gi=1] is the expected treatment effect; E[Yi1׀Gi=1] is the proportion of land area 
cultivated by the social grants beneficiary households and E[Yi0׀Gi=1] is the proportion of land 
area that would have been cultivated by the social grants beneficiaries had they not been social 
grant beneficiaries. The ATT tells us what change in the proportion of land area cultivated 
(outcome) was realised by those households which are social grant beneficiaries subject to their 
access to social grants status. 
The fundamental evaluation problem is that of missing data problem (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
This is because the proportion of land area cultivated for the social grant beneficiary 
households, had they not been social grant beneficiaries, cannot be observed. Similarly, the 
proportion of land area cultivated by the non-beneficiary households, had they been social grant 
beneficiaries, cannot be observed. In other words, the treatment indicator takes either one or 
zero, but not both. Therefore the propensity score matching procedure was used to generate the 
missing data (Baker, 2000; Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003b; 
Ravallion, 2008; Khandker et al., 2010). PSM uses survey data to construct a comparison group 
by matching households with access to social grants to non-grant recipient households over a 
set of socio-economic variables. The main purpose of matching is to re-establish the conditions 
of an experiment when no such data are available (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Blundell and 
Costa-Dias, 2000).  
PSM is able to estimate the causal social grant impact, for example, as the difference between 
the proportions of land area cultivated for the beneficiaries and what would have been the case 
if this group had not received the social grants. Estimating the propensity score, which is simply 
the probability that a household is a social grant beneficiary, is a crucial step in using matching 
as an evaluation strategy. The probit model, as specified in Eq. 3.8, was used to generate the 
propensity scores. According to Becker and Ichino (2002), an estimate of the propensity score 
is not enough to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), since the 
probability of observing two units with exactly the same value of the propensity score is, in 
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principle, zero. Various matching algorithms have been proposed in the literature to determine 
the region of common support. The most widely used are the nearest neighbour matching, 
radius matching, Kernel matching and stratification matching (Heckman et al., 1997; Becker 
and Ichino, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005).  
A matching estimator is considered good if, on the one hand, it does not eliminate too many of 
the original observations from the final analysis, while, on the other hand, it yields statistically 
equal covariate means for households in the treatment and control groups (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2005; Abebaw and Haile, 2013). The nearest neighbour matching and Kernel 
matching were reported in this study. The nearest neighbour was chosen because it is generally 
used in practice due to its ease of implementation, while Kernel matching is a recently 
developed technique that is gaining popularity in non-experimental literature (Smith and Todd, 
2005; Dillon, 2011). The balancing property was selected in estimating the propensity scores. 
The use of the balancing property ensures that a comparison group is constructed with 
observable characteristics distributed equivalently across quintiles in both the treatment and 
comparison groups (Smith and Todd, 2005).  
In constructing the matching estimates, the common support was imposed. The treatment 
observations with weak common support were dropped, since inferences can be made about 
causality only in the area of common support (Heckman et al., 1997). All the standard errors 
were bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions, as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005). The 
sensitivity of the estimated average welfare effects to hidden bias was tested, using the 
Rosenbaum (2002) bounds test. This test indicates how strongly an unobservable variable must 
influence the selection process to undermine or reverse the findings based on matching on 
observables (Rosenbaum, 1991; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rosenbaum, 2005). The test was 
implemented in Stata using an ado file (rbounds) provided by DiPrete and Gangl (2004). While 
the ado file by DiPrete and Gangl (2004) implements sensitivity test for continuous outcome 
variables, Becker and Caliendo (2007) have provided an ado file (mhbounds) which focuses on 
binary outcome variables. 
To estimate the impact of the level of dependency on the outcomes of interest, two approaches 
were used. The first involved converting the level of dependency on social grants into two 
classes: the low and high social grant-dependency levels categories. The low social grant-
dependency category comprised of those households with access to social grants, and social 
grants contributed less than 50% of total household income. The high social grant-dependency 
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category were those households where social grants contributed more than 50% of total 
household income. To apply PSM, as explained above, the low social grant-dependency 
category was assumed to be the control group, while the high social grant-dependency category 
was assumed to be the treatment group. The second approach used to estimate the impact of 
the level of social grants dependency on the outcomes was the continuous treatment method 
developed by Hirano and Imbens (2004). The next sub-section provides a brief description of 
this method. 
3.2.4.5 The generalised propensity score (GPS) method 
The generalised propensity score (GPS) method was used to estimate the impact of the level of 
social grant dependency on outcomes3, such as the proportion of land area cultivated and 
proportion of the unemployed working age household members who participated in 
smallholder farming activities.  The PSM approach described in the previous subsection only 
works when the treatment variable is binary. Essentially, the GPS method extends the PSM 
method described above to deal with a setting where the treatment is not binary but continuous. 
This GPS method was implemented using a Stata programme developed by Bia and Mattei 
(2008). In summary, the implementation of the GPS method consisted of three steps (Bia and 
Mattei, 2008). This study presents a brief summary of the three steps, and interested readers 
may consult studies such as those of Agüero et al. (2007); Bia and Mattei (2008); Bia and 
Mattei (2012); and Hirano and Imbens (2004), for detailed discussions of the GPS method. 
In the first step, the score was estimated. To estimate the conditional distribution of the level 
of dependency on social grants, GDi, given the covariates, it was assumed that that the level of 
dependency on social grants follows a normal distribution, conditional on the covariates: 
g(GDi)|mi ~N[h(γ, mi), σ2]       (3.14) 
Where: g(GDi) is a suitable transformation of the level of dependency on social grants variable 
(the treatment variable), and h(γ, mi) is a function of covariates with linear and higher-order 
terms, which depends on a vector of parameters, γ. The higher-order terms were included in 
order to obtain an estimate of the GPS that satisfies the balancing property (Bia and Mattei, 
                                                 




2008). The tests for normality and the balancing property were done to ensure that these 
assumptions were met before estimating the GPS. 
The GPS was estimated as follows: 





 g(GDi)- h(γ̂, mi)]      (3.15) 
Where: R̂i is the estimated score; and other variables and parameters are as defined before. 
The second step involved estimating the conditional expectation of the outcome Yi, say 
proportion of land area cultivated, given the level of dependency on social grants (GDi) and the 
GPS (Ri). The conditional expectation of the outcome was estimated as a function of the two 
scalar variables, GDi and Ri, as follows: 
 φ[E(Yi|GDi, Ri)] = ψ(GDi, Ri, α)      (3.16) 
Where: φ(.) is a link function that relates the predictor, ψ(GDi, Ri, α) to the conditional 
expectation; α are the parameters to be estimated using the polynomial approximations; and 
other variables are as defined before. Following Bia and Mattei (2008), the polynomial 
approximations of order higher than three were not used. 
The final step involved estimating the dose-response function. The estimated regression 
function was averaged over the score function and evaluated at the desired level of the 
treatment. The average potential outcome (dose response function) for each level of 
dependency on social grants was estimated as follows: 
 E[Ŷ(t)] = 1
𝑁





∑ 𝜑−1𝑁𝑖=1 [?̂?(𝑔𝑑, 𝑟 (𝑔𝑑,𝑚𝑖), ?̂?)] (3.17) 
Where: α̂ is the vector of the estimated parameters in the second stage and other variables and 
parameters are as described above. The outcomes investigated in this chapter were the 
proportion of land area cultivated and the proportion of the unemployed working age household 
members that participate in smallholder farming activities. However, it should be noted that 
the GPS approach was used in other chapters where different outcomes were investigated. The 
next section presents the chapter’s empirical results and discussions. 
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3.3 Empirical results and discussions 
3.3.1 Household demographics and socio-economic characteristics 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the demographics and socio-economic characteristics of the sampled 
984 households. Table 3.1 presents the continuous variables and their means, while Table 3.2 
presents the categorical variables and their proportions. Most of the figures presented in the 
two tables are comparable to those reported for the KZN province in the latest census (2011) 
by Stats SA (2012b). This suggests that the study data is somewhat representative of KZN, 
particularly the rural areas. Table 3.1 indicates that the average age of household heads (AGE) 
was above 50, implying that the rural farming households are headed by aged people. This is 
expected, since the much younger generation generally move to urban areas in search of more 
lucrative and higher paying ventures in non-farm sectors. The result is consistent with other 
studies in South Africa (e.g., Aliber and Hart, 2009; Sinyolo et al., 2014a; Maponya et al., 
2015) which have reported this apparent disdain of the youth for agriculture. This has 
implications on the future of smallholder agriculture, as it suggests the lack of a clear 
succession plan. 
Table 3.1 indicates that the heads of rural households interviewed attained low levels of 
education (EDUCAT), as indicated by a small average number of schooling years. In fact, as 
shown in Table 3.2, over 30% of the household heads had no formal schooling (SCHOOLNG) 
at all. This figure, which is higher than the 10% reported by Stats SA (2012a) for the KZN 
province, is representative of the older age groups residing in the rural areas. More people have 
no formal schooling in the rural areas compared to urban areas, as has been reported by studies 
such as that of Gardiner (2008). The rural households had bigger families (HHSIZE), bigger 
than the average sizes reported for the KZN province in the 2011 census by Stats SA (2012a). 
However, it is consistent with the figures reported by several studies (Aliber and Hart, 2009; 
DSD et al., 2012; Sinyolo et al., 2014a) for rural areas and social grant recipient households in 
KZN. The results in Table 3.1, even though showing big household sizes, indicate moderate 
levels of dependency (INVDEP), with an average of 0.59 active household members per non-
active member. The inverse dependency ratio in this study was closely comparable to that 




Table 3.1: Description and means of continuous variables 
Variable code Variable name and description Mean SD 
AGE Household head age (years) 56 13 
AGESQ Household head age square (years) 3325 1469 
EDUCAT Household head education level (years of schooling) 4.67 4.17 
HHSIZE Household size (numbers) 7.04 3.60 
INVDEP Inverse dependency ratio 0.51 0.37 
GRANTBEN No. of grant beneficiaries per household (hh) 3.18 1.81 
CSG No. of child support grant beneficiaries per hh 2.28 1.81 
OAP No. of old age pension beneficiaries per hh 0.67 0.70 
DG No. of disability grant beneficiaries per hh 0.15 0.41 
FCG No. of foster care grant beneficiaries per hh 0.08 0.43 
CDG No. of care dependency grant beneficiaries per hh 0.01 0.15 
LANDSZE Land size household has access to (ha) 1.90 4.47 
LANDCULT Land cultivated (ha) 0.91 1.35 
LANDALOC Land allocated (ha) 0.85 1.52 
LANDINH Land inherited (ha) 0.57 1.12 
LANDRNT Land leased or rented (ha) 0.21 0.78 
LANDBOT Land bought (ha) 0.27 0.67 
CULTPROP Proportion of total land area cultivated 0.59 0.36 
TOTLAB No. of able-bodied, prime-aged hh members 3.61 2.30 
HMEMP No. of working age hh members employed 0.97 1.32 
HMEMPROP Prop. of working age hh members employed 0.32 0.35 
HMUNEMP No. of working age hh members unemployed 2.64 2.46 
FLAB No. of working age hh members engaged in farming 1.43 0.88 
FLABPROP Prop. of unemployed working age hh members 
engaged in farming activities 
0.51 0.31 
TLU Livestock size per household (TLUs) 3.53 17.40 
ASSETS Value of assets (R) 82105 38937 
TOTINC Total annual household income (R) 46757 32707 
GRANTINC Annual income from grants (R) 16916 15877 
FARMINC Annual income from farm activities (R) 6553 12438 
OTHERINC Annual income from other non-grant and non-farm 
economic activities (R) 
23617 26374 
NOGRNTINC Total income from non-grant sources [farming and 
other economic activities (FARMINC + 
OTHERINC)] 
30170 19406 
TOTINC/CA Total annual household income per capita (R) 8498 8344 
NOGRNTINC/CA Total annual household income from non-grant 
sources per capita (R) 
4537 6508 
GRANTPROP Proportion of income from social grants 0.38 0.26 
FARMPROP Proportion of income from farming activities 0.13 0.14 
GRANTUSE% Prop. of social grant income spent on farming 
activities 
0.30 0.24 
ROADDIST Distance to the nearest all-weather road (km) 17.75 39.93 
FARMEXP Household head farming experience (years) 18.70 13.28 
Notes: n=984 
Source: 2014 household survey 
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As shown in Table 3.2, the majority (84%) of the sampled households had access to social 
grants (GRANTS), showing the wide coverage of social grants among rural households. Table 
3.1 shows that on average, each household had about three social grants beneficiaries 
(GRANTBEN), highlighting the important role of social grants among rural households, in 
view of a household size of seven. The results indicate that without social grants, the average 
household income per capita would be 47% less (TOTINC/CA and NOGRNTINC/CA), 
indicating the important role of social grants among the rural households. 
In terms of the breakdown of social grants, Table 3.1 indicates that the child support grant 
(CSG) was the most common per household, followed by the old age grant (OAG). There were 
few foster care grant (FCG) and care dependence grant (CDG) beneficiaries per household. 
These figures are generally consistent with other studies (e.g., DSD et al., 2012), and the pattern 
is generally consistent with national figures in South Africa (SASSA, 2014). There were no 
beneficiaries of the War Veterans Grant and Grant-in-Aid among the sampled households. The 
breakdown of social grants suggest that, on average, a household gets a predictable and 
guaranteed monthly income of about R2 000 per month from social grants. This is a generous 
amount, especially in comparison to the minimum wage (=R2000) and medium income among 
Africans (=R800) in South Africa. However, as explained by Ulriksen (2012), social grants 
beneficiary households remain poor and this implies the need for complementary economic 
activities for them to escape poverty. 
In terms of land size (LANDSZE), the farmers reported that they have access to about 2 ha, on 
average. Table 3.1 shows that, on average, most of the land was allocated to the household by 
the traditional leader (LANDALOC). The second largest source of land to the household was 
inheritance (LANDINH). The results indicate that there is a sizable amount of land that 
households source through renting or leasing (LANDRNT) and buying (LANDBOT). This 
demonstrates that there is a small illegal land market that is growing in the rural areas, 
particularly in the irrigation schemes as reported by other studies (e.g., Mnkeni et al., 2010; 
Sinyolo, 2013). Table 3.1 shows that a significant amount of land was not cultivated last season 
(LANDCULT), with the farmers only managing to put just over 50% of their land under 
cultivation. This supports other studies (Andrew et al., 2003; Eastwood et al., 2006; Tshuma, 
2012), which have reported that there are large areas of arable land that is not cultivated by 
rural households in South Africa. 
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Table 3.1 highlights high levels of unemployment among the prime-aged, able-bodied 
(working age) household members (HMEMPPROP) in the rural areas. The results show that 
only 32% of the prime-aged, able-bodied household members were employed, indicating the 
lack of economic opportunities in the rural areas. Similarly, Table 3.2 shows that only 20% of 
the household heads had non-farm employment. This figure is comparable to that of Eastwood 
et al. (2006), who reported that 29% of the respondents from the Limpopo province were 
employed non-farm. The fact that few household members were employed underscores the 
importance of smallholder farming among the rural households. However, the results show that 
only 54% of the unemployed active members participated in farming activities (FLABPROP). 
The results also show that the rural households own some moderate livestock (TLU) and assets 
(ASSETS). Table 3.1 also indicates that, on average, social grants contribute 38% to household 
income (GRANTPROP), which is almost three times the 13% contribution of farming 
(FARMPROP). This is in line with what has been reported by other studies (e.g., Eastwood et 
al., 2006; Tshuma, 2012), that social grants have become one of the main sources of income 
for rural households, having overtaken smallholder agriculture’s contribution. Table 3.1 
indicates that rural households get most of their income from other economic activities 
(OTHERINC), such as wages, remittances and small businesses. The low average non-social 
grant income and asset values indicate that most of the sampled rural households generally 
qualify for the social grants. While the threshold amounts differed for individual social grant 
types in 2014, beneficiaries needed to have incomes of less than R40 000 per year to qualify 
for social grants.  
Discussions with the farmers indicated that income from social grants is used to settle a range 
of short-term expenses, from purchasing groceries and food to contributing to health and 
education. The majority of the households (78%), as shown in Table 3.2 (GRANTUSE), 
reported that they had used social grant money on agricultural activities the previous season. 
Table 3.1 shows that the households indicated that they spend about 30% of their social grant 
money on agricultural activities (GRANTUSE%). Several other studies (e.g., Samson et al., 
2008; Midgley, 2013) have also reported that money from social grants is used to fund 
agricultural activities and other microbusinesses in the rural areas. The fact that some income 
from social grants is spent on farming activities suggests that access to social grants can 
potentially have a positive influence on smallholder farming. This is because money from 
social grants may help farmers access farming inputs by easing financial constraints. 
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The farmers indicated that the roads were generally poor and inaccessible in the rural areas, 
with many rural households found about 18 km from the nearest all-weather road 
(ROADDIST). The roads connecting the rural households to the major roads were generally 
inaccessible by car. Consequently, the households use wheelbarrows or bicycles to get to the 
all-weather roads in most rural areas. On average, the household heads have been involved in 
farming for about 20 years (FARMEXP), indicating a good wealth of farming experience 
among rural households. 
Table 3.2 indicates that male-headed households made up less than 50% of the interviewed 
rural farming households (GENDER). The fact that female-headed households dominate 
smallholder farming activities in South Africa is consistent with the prevalent stereotype of 
rural agriculture and has been reported by other studies (e.g., Feynes and Meyer, 2003; Aliber 
and Hart, 2009). Men generally migrate to towns in search of employment, while women 
remain in the rural areas, practising smallholder agriculture and looking after children and other 
family members who need assistance. The results show that 46% of the household heads were 
married, while the remainder were either never married, divorced or widowed (MARRIED).  
As expected, the majority of the farmers perceived their soils to be fertile (SOILQUAL) and 
rainfall to be good (RAINFALL). KZN is characterised by good soils and rainfall patterns. A 
sizable proportion (45%) indicated that they had access to tractors or draught power for tillage 
services (TILLAGE). The tractors from government play a significant role in terms of 
improving access to tillage services farmers in the rural areas who would otherwise have no 
access to these services. Most of the farmers felt that their access to land was insecure 
(TENURE), especially among female-headed households. There were indications during 
discussions that female-headed households, in particular, may lose their land to their deceased 
husbands’ male relatives. 
The survey results indicate poor access to markets (MARKET) and support services such as 
training (TRAINING), extension (EXTENSION) and credit (CREDIT). The results show low 
levels of non-farm entrepreneurship among the interviewed households, as only a small 
proportion of households owned some non-farm micro-businesses (BUSINESS), such as 
weaving, handicrafts or tuck shops. A significant proportion of the households practised some 
form of irrigation (IRRIGAT). Some were members of smallholder irrigation schemes, while 
others watered their crops using cans and hosepipes.  
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Table 3.2: Description and proportions of categorical variables 
Variable code Variable name and description Proportion 
GENDER Household head gender (1=Male) 0.47 
MARRIED Household head marital status (1=Married) 0.46 
SCHOOLNG Household head formal schooling (1=Yes) 0.69 
GRANTS Access to social grants (1=Yes) 0.84 
GRANTUSE Use social grants income for farming activities 0.78 
HIREDLAB Hiring in farm labour (1=Yes) 0.37 
RAINFALL Perceived rainfall (1=Good) 0.67 
SOILQUAL Perceived soil quality (1=Good) 0.55 
TENURE Secured land tenure (1=Yes) 0.37 
TILLAGE Tillage access (1=Yes) 0.45 
MARKET Market access (1=Yes) 0.20 
ASSOC Farmer association member (1=Yes) 0.42 
CREDIT Access to credit (1=Yes) 0.36 
EXTENSION Access to extension (1=Yes) 0.46 
TRAINING Access to agricultural training (1=Yes) 0.41 
HHEMPLOY Household head off-farm employment (1=Yes) 0.20 
BUSINESS Small off-farm business ownership (1=Yes) 0.08 
IRRIGAT Access to water for watering crops (1=Yes) 0.46 
HGWALA  Harry Gwala district (1=Harry Gwala) 0.42 
UMZINYAT  Umzinyathi district (1=Umzinyathi) 0.24 
UTHUKELA  Uthukela district (1=Uthukela) 0.19 
UMKHANYA  Umkhanyakude (1=Umkhanyakude) 0.15 
Notes: n=984 
Source: 2014 household survey 
To further explore the importance of social grants to rural households, the Foster, Greer 
Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indices (Foster et al., 1984) were calculated. A comparison was 
made between the poverty situation where household income includes social grant income 
(TOTINC/CA) as well as the poverty situation excluding social grant income 
(NOGRNTINC/CA). In other words, a comparison is made of what would have happened had 
the households not received income from social grants. The poverty line used was R6 528 per 
capita per annum. This poverty line was derived from the lower-bound poverty line of R443 
per capita per month suggested by NPC (2012) in 2011 prices. The figure was adjusted to the 
2014 prices using the consumer prices index (CPI) (Stats SA, 2014b). Table 3.3 presents the 
FGT poverty indices for the with and without social grant income scenarios.   
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Table 3.3: Poverty level comparisons of with and without social grant income scenarios 
FGT poverty index Poverty level with social 
grant income 
Poverty level without 
social grant income 
Poverty headcount index 0.54 0.83 
Poverty gap index 0.21 0.53 
Poverty severity index 0.11 0.37 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Table 3.3 shows that the current poverty levels are high among the rural households of KZN, 
as 54% of the households were below the poverty line. This headcount poverty rate is 
comparable to the 46% and 57% for South Africa and KZN, respectively, as reported by Stats 
SA (2014b). The results in Table 3.3 indicate that poverty levels would be very high, at 83%, 
without social grants. Moreover, the table indicates that the poverty gap and severity indices 
would have been worse without social grants, further reinforcing that social grants have a 
significant impact on poverty, as has been reported by a number of studies (Armstrong and 
Burger, 2009; Potts, 2012; Ulriksen, 2012). 
In summary, descriptive analysis has shown that most of the sampled households were 
female-headed. The analysis has highlighted modest levels of land cultivation, a small 
contribution of farming to household income, low levels of household members’ participation 
in farming as well as inadequate support services. The households were characterised by low 
levels of formal education, generally poor and dependent on social grants. Moreover, the FGT 
indices highlighted that poverty levels are high in the rural areas of KZN and that the poverty 
situation would have been worse without social grants. The next section presents mean 
comparisons of land area cultivation and household members’ farming participation levels 
between social grant beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
3.3.2 Mean comparisons of land area cultivation and household members’ 
farming participation levels according to social grant status 
Table 3.4 presents the simple land and labour mean comparisons between grant beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries. The table shows that only 155 of the total sampled households were not 
recipients of any type of social grant, representing 16% of the sample. The table indicates that 
the households with access to grants have access to smaller land sizes compared to non-
beneficiaries. This can be explained in two ways. Firstly, it could be that the social grant 
beneficiaries, because of their access to grants, have less incentives to increase their land size 
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compared to non-beneficiaries. The total land size included the land that is borrowed or leased, 
and there were indications during discussions with key informants that the social grant 
beneficiaries were more likely to lease out land.  
Table 3.4: Land and labour mean comparisons according to social grant access status 
Variables No grant (N=155) Grant access (N=829) t-test 
Mean SD Mean SD 
LANDSZE 2.74 9.24 1.79 2.87 2.42** 
LANDCULT 0.96 1.39 1.10 1.44 -1.12 
CULTPROP 0.63 0.38 0.70 0.36 -2.17** 
TOTLAB 3.44 2.34 3.65 2.30 -1.03 
HMEMP 0.94 1.13 0.98 1.35 -0.30 
HMEMPROP 0.46 0.42 0.31 0.35 2.63** 
FLAB 1.48 1.00 1.43 0.88 0.67 
FLABPROP 0.57 0.33 0.51 0.31 2.15** 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Whereas there is no statistical difference between cultivated land sizes of the two groups, the 
results suggest that grant beneficiaries put most of their land under cultivation. A logical 
explanation is that because the social grant recipient households have small land sizes, ceteris 
paribus, they are more likely to put more under cultivation compared to the non-beneficiaries 
who have more land. However, it may also suggest, in contrast to the disincentive hypothesis, 
that access to grants has a positive effect on the proportion of land cultivated. 
While showing no significant statistical difference in terms of the total household labour 
(number of primed-aged, able-bodied members) between the social grant beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries, Table 3.4 indicates that a lower proportion of working age members are 
employed among social grant beneficiary households compared to non-beneficiary households. 
The mean comparison indicates that fewer members of social grants beneficiary households 
participate in farming activities. In line with the disincentive hypothesis, these results suggest 
that social grants have a negative effect on labour participation, both on and off-farm. 
To further the exposition, Table 3.5 presents mean comparison among households at three 
levels of social grant contribution to household income.  ‘No income from grants’ means those 
households who received zero income from grants in the 12 months prior to the survey; whereas 
‘Low income from grants’ means households who received income from social grants and 
social grants income contributed below 50% of total household income. ‘High income from 
grants’ are those households with 50% or more of their total income from social grants.  
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Table 3.5: Land and labour mean comparisons according to level of social grant dependency 
Variables No income from 
grants (n=155) 
Low income from 
grants (n=478) 
High income from 
grants (n=351) 
F test 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
LANDSZE 2.75 9.24 1.85 3.46 1.70 1.76 3.09** 
LANDCULT 0.97 1.39 1.07 1.47 1.15 1.40 0.82 
CULTPROP 0.63 0.38 0.70 0.36 0.71 0.35 2.46* 
TOTLAB 3.51 2.36 3.62 2.40 3.65 2.15 0.19 
HMEMP 0.97 1.14 0.91 1.32 1.05 1.39 1.19 
HMEMPROP 1.50 1.01 1.45 0.88 1.39 0.82 0.93 
FLAB 0.55 0.34 0.53 0.31 0.49 0.30 3.86** 
FLABPROP 0.46 0.42 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.36 4.13** 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Table 3.5 shows that a significant proportion (36%) of the total sampled huseholds derived 
more than 50% of their income from social grants. Table 3.5, just like the preceding table, 
indicates that households who mostly depend on social grants have less land and cultivate most 
of their land. Households less dependent on grants have access to more land and cultivate less 
proportion of their land. Table 3.5 indicates a statistically significant progressive decline in the 
proportion of household members supplying their labour (whether on-farm or off-farm), as 
households become more dependent on social grants. 
The mean comparisons have produced conflicting results with regards to the two proxies of 
incentives to farm. On the one hand, the results seem to suggest that social grants are positively 
associated with the proportion of land area cultivated, that is, positive incentive effects. This 
result is plausible. As previously highlighted, social grants help reduce the cash constraints 
among the rural households, enabling them to buy inputs in time. On the other hand, the results 
are consistent with the disincentive effect hypothesis when the incentives to farm are captured 
using the proportion of household members who work. These results imply that social grant 
beneficiary households are likely to reduce their labour supply to farming, even though they 
cultivate more of their land. However, before dwelling much on these descriptive results, it is 
important to control for the influence of other confounding factors. The succeeding 
sub-sections make use of econometric techniques to achieve this. Before presenting the results 
on the impact of social grants on the incentives to farm, the next sub-section presents the 
determinants of access to social grants. 
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3.3.3 Factors affecting access to, and level of dependency on, social grants 
The binary probit model was estimated to examine the socio-economic characteristics and 
resource endowments that predict a household’s access to social grants. Table 3.6 presents the 
results of the binary probit model. The results indicate that, collectively, the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant, since the LR statistic has a p-value less than 1%. The 
model also correctly predicted about 85% of the cases, confirming that the model fits the data 
reasonably well.  
The results show that the bigger the household (HHSIZE), the higher the chances of accessing 
social grants. Table 3.6 indicates that an increase in the household size by one member 
increases the probability of a household being a social grant beneficiary by 1.5%. This could 
be because bigger families have higher chances of having a member or two who qualify for 
social grants than smaller families. This could also be indicative of the fact that access to social 
access influence household formation. It has been reported by researchers (e.g., Agüero et al., 
2007; Klasen and Woolard, 2008; Armstrong and Burger, 2009) that people move into 
households in which social grants are received.  
The negative coefficient on non-grant income (NOGRNTINC) indicates that income increases 
from other sources are associated with decreasing likelihood of receiving social grants. Table 
3.6 shows that a rand increase in non-grant income decreases the chances of a household 
accessing social grants by 12.7%. This is expected, as the qualification to social grants is based 
on income levels, among other criteria. The results indicate that the targeting mechanism of the 
income criterion in the means test is working properly, since it excludes the high income 
households. As a means tested programme, the social grants are meant for the poorest members 
of society. The insignificant estimated coefficient of asset values (ASSETS) indicates that the 
asset criterion of the means test is not being used. As reported by Abel (2013), the difficulties 
with asset valuation have resulted in asset values being not used in practice.  
As expected, the household head’s education level (EDUCAT) was negatively associated with 
receipt of social grants. An additional year of the household head’s education was associated 
with 1.2% decrease in the chances of access to social grants. Higher levels of education imply 
more livelihood options and opportunities of generating income and hence less chance of 
applying for social grants. There was a negative relationship between livestock size (TLU) and 
74 
 
access to social grants. This result suggests success in targeting, as those households with 
bigger livestock size, a measure of wealth, are likely to be excluded from social grants. 
Table 3.6: Determinants of access to social grants, Probit results 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effects 
Value Std. Err. Value Std. Err 
AGE  -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
GENDER  -0.183 0.123 -0.036 0.026 
MARRIED -0.050 0.119 -0.010 0.024 
EDUCAT -0.059*** 0.015 -0.012*** 0.003 
HHSIZE  0.075*** 0.018 0.015*** 0.004 
NOGRNTINC -0.633*** 0.087 -0.127*** 0.019 
ASSETS -0.123 0.083 -0.025 0.015 
LANDSZE  -0.060 0.051 -0.012 0.010 
TLU -0.003* 0.003 -0.001* 0.000 
ASSOC -0.200 0.139 -0.040 0.029 
CREDIT  0.191 0.121 0.038 0.023 
ROADDIST -0.003** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 
HHEMPLOY -0.359** 0.146 -0.072** 0.030 
BUSINESS -0.325* 0.199 -0.065 0.044 
UMZINYAT  -0.085 0.158 -0.017 0.032 
UTHUKELA  0.479*** 0.183 0.096** 0.037 
UMKHANYA  -0.240 0.196 -0.048 0.041 
CONSTANT -3.862*** 1.170   
     
Correctly predicted 0.85    
LR χ2(17) 143.6***    
Pseudo R2 0.16    
N 984    
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Moreover, those households with employed household heads (HHEMPLOY) had lower 
chances of receiving social grants. The results show that the households with employed head 
had a 7.2% probability of accessing social grants compared to the households where the heads 
are not employed. This is because households with employed heads depend on the wages and 
are less likely to be interested in accessing the social grants. The same applies to those who are 
owners of small businesses (BUSINESS). Given that social grants may result in erosion of 
dignity due to some discourses associated with being a social grant recipient (Wright et al., 
2015), those who have alternative livelihood options such as the educated, employed and 
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owners of thriving microbusinesses may decide not to apply for social grants, even when they 
qualify to receive social grants.  
The results indicate that those households far from good, all-weather roads (ROADDIST) are 
less likely to receive social grants compared to those with closer access to roads. This is because 
isolated households have less access to information, and often are without the important 
requirements such as identity cards (DSD et al., 2012). This is unfortunate, as it results in the 
exclusion of the poorest members of society who need the social grants the most. The results 
indicate that rural households from Uthukela district (UTHUKEL) were more likely to access 
social grants than those in Harry Gwala district. This result is surprising, as one would expect 
no location influence with regards to social grant access. The result may be suggestive of 
efficiency of the social welfare department in reaching out to the people in Uthukela more than 
to those in the Harry Gwala district. 
For comparison purposes, an ordered logit model was estimated to determine the factors that 
influence the level of dependency on social grants. The dependent variable was the three levels 
of social grant contribution to household income that were generated in the previous 
sub-section and presented in Table 3.5. The ordered model results are presented in Table 3.7. 
In Table 3.7, GDL=0 means zero dependency on social grants i.e., no income from grants. 
GDL=1 and GDL=2 mean low and high dependency levels on social grants, respectively. The 
model was significant, as the LR value was significant at the 1% significance level. The brant 
test was insignificant, indicating that the parallel regression assumption was not violated. 
The results were largely consisted with expectations and support those presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.7 indicates that bigger households and those headed by older people were likely to 
depend more on social grants than those headed by younger household heads. The table shows 
that an additional year on household head’s age increases the chance that a household will be 
in the group highly dependent on social grants (GDL=2) by 0.4%. The same additional year 
decreases the probability of belonging to both the medium and less grant dependent groups by 
0.2%. The results show that households with higher non-grant income, and those headed by 
the educated and employed, depend less on social grants. Table 3.7 indicates that increasing 





Table 3.7: Factors affecting the level of dependency on social grants, ordered logit results 
Variables Coefficients Marginal effects 
 Value Std. Err. GDL=0 GDL=1 GDL=2 
AGE 0.017*** 0.006 -0.002** -0.002*** 0.004*** 
GENDER -0.183 0.154 0.020 0.021 -0.040 
MARRIED -0.135 0.148 0.015 0.015 -0.030 
EDUCAT -0.041** 0.018 0.004** 0.005** -0.009** 
HHSIZE 0.105*** 0.019 -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.023*** 
NOGRNTINC -0.499*** 0.114 0.053*** 0.057*** -0.110*** 
ASSETS -0.326*** 0.098 0.035*** 0.037*** -0.072*** 
LANDSZE -0.078 0.061 0.008 0.009 -0.017 
TLU -0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
ASSOC 0.055 0.167 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 
CREDIT 0.202 0.139 -0.021 -0.024 0.045 
ROADDIST -0.005*** 0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
HHEMPLOY -0.581*** 0.189 0.071*** 0.049*** -0.120*** 
BUSINESS -0.402 0.277 0.049 0.034** -0.083 
UMZINYAT -0.398** 0.188 0.046** 0.039** -0.085** 
UTHUKELA 0.482** 0.196 -0.046*** -0.065** 0.111** 
UMKHANYA -0.738*** 0.245 0.096** 0.050*** -0.146*** 
      
/cut1 0.729 1.491    
/cut2 3.416 1.497    
      
N 984     
LR χ2 (17) 192.77***     
Pseudo R2 0.10     
Brant test (χ2 (17)=27.13, p=0.25) 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that social grants seem to be efficiently targeted at the poor households 
that they are intended to reach. Social grant beneficiary households were found to be those 
which are not only poor, but have less alternative livelihood options (such as the less educated, 
unemployed, smaller livestock size owners and non-owners of non-farm microbusinesses). The 
significance of variables such as education level and small business ownership implies that, on 
top of the income based means test, the stigma associated with being a social grant recipient 
may be leading to some qualifying households opting out, especially if they have other options. 
The result is that the social grants are benefiting the poorest of the poor among the rural 
households. Studies such as those of Abel (2013), Armstrong and Burger (2009) and DSD et 
al. (2012) also reported that social grants in South Africa are well-targeted, in as far as they 
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benefit members of the relatively poorer households. However, the problem is that the non-
beneficiary, unintended household members, may also benefit from the social grants, resulting 
in their decreased incentives to work. The question is, to what extent do access to, and level of 
dependency on, social grants affect the proportion of land area that rural farming households 
cultivate? The next sub-section presents results answering this important question. 
3.3.4 The impact of social grants on the proportion of land cultivated 
Table 3.8 presents the results of the PW and the logit transformation models. There was no 
evidence of selection bias at the conventional 10% significance level, as the IMR was 
insignificant in both models. This demonstrates the possible insignificant effect of 
unobservable factors. The Hausman test indicated that the level of dependency on social grants 
was not endogenous in the two models. The results from both models are largely similar, 
implying that they are robust. Only access to extension (EXTENSION) and credit (CREDIT) 
vary in statistical significance in the two models. Henceforth, the interpretations that follow 
apply to both models, although emphasis is placed on the PW results due to PW model’s 
advantages described in the previous sections. 
Both models indicate that access to social grants (GRANTS) was insignificant. This implies 
that access to social grants does not influence, whether positively or negatively, the proportion 
of land cultivated by a household. The insignificance of estimated coefficient of the proportion 
of income from social grants (GRANTPROP) indicates that the level of dependency on social 
grants also had no significant impact on the proportion of land cultivated by the rural 
households. While several studies (e.g., White and Killick, 2001; Aliber and Hart, 2009; Aliber 
and Hall, 2012), relying on limited descriptive statistics, have reported that the rural households 
in South Africa no longer put much land under cultivation because they receive social grants, 





Table 3.8: The impact of social grants on the proportion of land cultivated, logit transformation 
and PW model results  
Variables PW model  Logit transformation model 
Coeff.  Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err 
GRANTS  -0.105 0.201 -0.033 0.329 
GRANTPROP 0.447 0.302 0.562 0.470 
AGE  -0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.008 
GENDER  -0.002 0.126 -0.096 0.206 
EDUCAT -0.017 0.015 -0.028 0.024 
MARRIED 0.091 0.119 0.229 0.197 
HHSIZE  -0.038*** 0.015 -0.060** 0.024 
LANDSZE  -0.394*** 0.054 -0.484*** 0.081 
RAINFALL -0.124 0.138 -0.080 0.229 
SOILQUAL 0.247** 0.112 0.394** 0.176 
TENURE  0.183 0.119 0.240 0.186 
TILLAGE  -0.026 0.107 -0.112 0.169 
MARKET 0.318** 0.137 0.382* 0.205 
TLU -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
ASSETS -0.098 0.078 -0.150 0.121 
ASSOC 0.305** 0.137 0.384* 0.210 
CREDIT  0.190 0.120 0.314* 0.187 
EXTENSION  0.206* 0.113 -0.200 0.177 
TRAINING  0.368*** 0.127 0.612*** 0.202 
ROADDIST -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
FARMEXP 0.009* 0.005 0.015** 0.007 
IRRIGAT  0.033 0.116 -0.056 0.184 
HHEMPLOY 0.262 0.169 0.336 0.254 
BUSINESS -0.886*** 0.229 -1.035*** 0.354 
UMZINYAT  -0.708*** 0.161 -1.078*** 0.273 
UTHUKELA  1.272*** 0.177 1.659*** 0.210 
UMKHANYA  -0.937*** 0.205 -1.649*** 0.356 
CONSTANT 1.259 0.918 1.993 1.404 
IMR  0.707 1.01 1.14 0.771 





Hausman test  (F=1.43, 
p=0.23)                                    









(F=2.18, p=0.13)  
   
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 




The results of the study imply that the potential complementarity between social grants and 
smallholder farming has not materialised in South Africa. This is despite the fact that 
researchers such as Devereux (2002) and Mabugu et al. (2013) in South Africa and other 
African studies (e.g., Diao et al., 2012; Proctor, 2014) have indicated that social grants and 
smallholder farming have potential for complementarity as options for rural livelihoods in 
Africa. Although the social grants were not designed to promote smallholder farming, they 
have potential to ease the financial constraints facing rural households. In the non-farm job 
sector, for instance, the complementarity between social grants and employment has been 
reported by several scholars (e.g., Posel et al., 2006; Williams, 2007; Ardington et al., 2009; 
Ardington et al., 2013). These studies have concluded that additional income from social grants 
has a positive impact on employment, by relaxing the constraints associated with job search. 
The results in Table 3.7, however, suggest that social grants have not relaxed the financial 
constraint of the farmers as social grants do in the job sector. 
The results indicate a negative relationship between household size (HHSIZE) and the 
proportion of land area cultivated. The explanation of this result is that bigger households are 
less dependent on farming compared to smaller households, as their bigger families demand 
that they instead engage in other economic activities. This is because farming can only absorb 
a certain amount of labour. Increasing family size beyond that reduces labour returns, hence 
bigger families tend to look for other opportunities that have higher returns for their labour. As 
expected, the results indicate a negative relationship between land size (LANDSZE) and 
proportion of cultivated land. This is because the households with less land are better able to 
manage it and secure enough inputs to cultivate most of their land. The bigger the land, the 
harder it is to put most of it under cultivation.  
As expected, perceived soil fertility (SOILQUAL) was positively associated with increased 
proportion of land cultivated. This is because putting more land under cultivation comes at a 
price, such that only those farmers with good land quality, expecting better yields, would put 
more land under cultivation than those with poor soils. The farmers with access to good soils 
face lower production costs because they do not have to apply as much fertiliser as those with 
poor soils, meaning they can afford to put more of their land under cultivation. The importance 
of market access as a motivator for rural households to increase their farming activities is 
demonstrated by a positive estimated coefficient of market access (MARKET). The households 
with better access to markets cultivated more of their land than those with poor market access. 
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This result is consistent with other studies in South Africa (e.g., Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; 
van der Heijden and Vink, 2013) that have highlighted the important role played by access to 
markets in the success of smallholder farming. Market access speaks of opportunities of 
making good profits out of farming activities and it is these prospects that encourage farmers 
to put most of their land under cultivation.  
The results also show that members of farmers’ associations (ASSOC) put more land under 
cultivation than those who are not members. This is because association membership may help 
the individual farmers through pooling of resources and sharing of knowledge and experiences. 
The positive role of farmer organisation in smallholder farming success has been reported by 
several authors (e.g., Hellin et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009; HLPE, 2013; Sinyolo et al., 
2014b). The significant credit access (CREDIT) estimate highlights the importance of credit 
support to the success of smallholder producers, as has been reported by others (Louw, 2013; 
Rahman and Smolak, 2014). Access to credit reduces the liquidity problem that usually affects 
the farmers during the planting season and this enhances the use of agricultural inputs in 
production, by ensuring that farmers secure the inputs in time. This leads to improved 
agricultural productivity, resulting in increased farm revenues and incentives for the farmers to 
put more land under cultivation.  
Access to agricultural training (TRAINING) was associated with a higher proportion of land 
area cultivated. Access to training improves farmers’ skills, increasing their motivation to put 
more land under cultivation. This is in line with the literature (e.g., Man et al., 2002; de Wolf 
and Schoorlemmer, 2007; Man et al., 2008), which has emphasised the importance of focussed 
agricultural training in improving farm entrepreneurship. Most of the farmers in the rural areas 
use only trial and error, which, in most cases, results in poor yields and losses, discouraging 
the farmers to put more land area under cultivation. Those who have received some form of 
agricultural training have more confidence that they will produce more and incur fewer losses 
and thus put more land under cultivation.   
As expected, contact with extension officers (EXTENSION) was associated with a higher 
proportion of land area under cultivation. This is, in part, because of the advice and 
encouragement the farmers get from extension officers. Farmers with contact with extension 
officers may have access to information on markets and new technologies. It was also 
emphasised by these farmers that contact with extension officers helps them to access 
government support such as tillage and inputs. Therefore, farmers who contact extension 
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officers have access to more resources, resulting in them putting more of their land under 
cultivation.  
The results indicate that those who own non-farm businesses (BUSINESS) put a lower 
proportion of land under cultivation. This is because non-farm business owners are less 
dependent on farming, because of the money from the non-farm business activities. The 
business owners’ commitments in non-farm businesses means they have less time to focus on 
the farming activities compared to non-business owners. Also, since non-farm ventures are 
usually more profitable than farming, the non-farm business owners may prioritise the more 
paying ventures. The significant district dummies capture variations that impact on farming 
incentives, but were not captured in the model (such as the political, social and agro-climatic 
variations in these areas). The results show that rural households in Umzinyathi and 
Umkhanyakude districts cultivate a lower proportion of their land than those in Harry Gwala 
district. Harry Gwala district has higher agro-ecological potential than the Umzinyathi and 
Umkhanyakude districts, due to an abundance of high-quality soils, high altitude and abundant 
water. As a result, the farmers in the Harry Gwala district have more incentives to put more 
land area under cultivation, compared to the two hotter and drier districts.  
Table 3.8 indicates that farmers in Uthukela district cultivated a higher proportion of their land 
than those in Harry Gwala district. While both Uthukela and Harry Gwala districts are regarded 
as higher agricultural potential areas, the difference may be due to differing levels of political 
support for smallholder farming activities in Uthukela district. Smallholder farming is 
prioritised and promoted in Uthukela district, with the local political representatives showing 
keen interest and attending farmer meetings. Conversely, the level of interest and/or 
participation in farmer meetings by the local political representatives is lower in Harry Gwala 
district. 
To check the robustness of the access to social grants impact parameter, PSM was estimated. 
The PSM results presented in Table 3.9 indicate that both the nearest neighbour and kernel 
matching methods supported the conclusion that access to social grants had no significant 





Table 3.9: Impact of access to social grants on the proportion of land area cultivated, PSM 
results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 823 132 0.053 (0.050) 1.055 
Kernel matching method 823 153 0.048 (0.036) 1.332 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
The Rosenbaum (2002) bounds test was done to test the sensitivity of the PSM results to hidden 
bias. It showed that the conclusion would change at Γ=2.65. This implies that the results are 
only sensitive to a hidden bias that would more than double the odds of being a social grant 
recipient. Therefore it is concluded that the results are not very sensitive to hidden bias, since 
it would require more than 160% of bias to reverse the conclusion. 
The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the proportion of land area cultivated 
was estimated using PSM and the generalised propensity score (GPS) methods. For the PSM 
analysis, the low social grant-dependency category was considered as the control group while 
the high social grant-dependency category was considered as the treatment group, as explained 
in the empirical methods section. The PSM results, presented in Appendix B, indicated that the 
social grant-dependency status did not have a significant impact on the proportion of land area 
under cultivation.  
The GPS approach was implemented following Bia and Mattei (2008) and the results are 
presented in Figure 3.1 and Appendix C. The tests for normality and balancing property 
indicated that these assumptions were satisfied. Figure 3.2 shows the average dose-response 
and treatment effect functions and the 95% confidence bands for the proportion of land area 
cultivated. The confidence bands were based on 100 bootstrap replications to account for the 
uncertainty associated with the estimation of the GPS and the parameters, as suggested by 
previous studies (Bia and Mattei, 2008; Bia and Mattei, 2012). In Figure 3.1, E[cultprop(t)] 
means the average proportion of land area cultivated at treatment level t, while treatment level 
means the contribution level of social grants income to total household income, i.e., the level 
of household dependency on social grants. The E[cultprop(t+0.1)]-E[cultprop(t)] shows the 
average effect of a social grant contribution increase of 10% to household income on the 
proportion of land area cultivated. In other words, the treatment effect function shows the 
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marginal effect of an increase in the household’s level of social grant-dependency of 10% on 
the proportion of land area cultivated. 
 
Figure 3.1:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the proportion of land area cultivated 
Figure 3.1 shows that the average proportion of land area cultivated was an increasing function 
of the contribution levels of social grants to household income for each contribution of social 
grants greater than 10% and less than 50% (See also Appendix C). The confidence bands are 
quite narrow in this range, implying that the increase in the contribution of social grants to 
household income has a significant and positive impact on the proportion of land area 
cultivated. The treatment effect function shows that marginal effects are larger at lower levels 
of social grant-dependency. For example, for a household where social grants currently 
contribute 20% to household income, a further 10% increase in social grant contribution would 
result in an increase of 2% in the proportion of land area cultivated. However, the increase of 
the same percentage of social grant contribution would result in a 0.01% increase in the 
proportion of land area cultivated by a household where social grants currently contribute 40%.  
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The figure also shows that there is a decrease in the proportion of land area cultivated for 
dosages greater than 60%. However, the decrease on the proportion of land area cultivated after 
a dosage of 60% should not be interpreted as an indicator that treatment has disincentive effects 
after that level, since this increase coincides with a growth of the width of the confidence 
interval estimator. The wide 95% confidence bands imply a high level of uncertainty on the 
shape of the average dose-response function (Bia and Mattei, 2012) at dosages greater than 
60%.  
The empirical results in this sub-section have indicated that, by and large, neither access to 
social grants, nor the level of dependency on social grants, have an influence on the proportion 
of land area cultivated. Most of the econometric models used confirmed this result, with only 
the GPS approach indicating a positive role of social grants contribution on land area 
cultivation when social grants income contributes between 10 and 50% to household income. 
The next sub-section presents the results on the impact of social grants on the proportion of 
unemployed working age members who participate in smallholder farming activities. 
3.3.5 The impact of social grants on the proportion of working age household 
members who participate in farming activities 
Table 3.10 presents the results showing the impact of access to, and dependency on, social 
grants on the proportion of the unemployed working age household members that participate 
in farming activities. There was no evidence of selection bias at the conventional 10% 
significance, since the IMR was insignificant. This demonstrates the possible insignificant 
effect of unobservable factors, implying that the results from the two models would have been 
unbiased, even without adding the IMR. The results from both models are largely similar in 
terms of statistical significance and signs. The only difference in the results is that the 
employment status of the household head (HHEMPLOY) is significant in the logit 
transformation model, but insignificant in the PW model. The interpretations that follow apply 
to both models. 
Table 3.10 shows that access to social grants (GRANTS) and level of dependency on social 
grants (GRANTPROP) were associated with decreasing proportion of prime-aged, able-bodied 
household members who participate in farming activities. These results are in line with the 
disincentive hypothesis and support other studies in the non-farm sector (e.g., Bertrand et al., 
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2003; Abel, 2013), which concluded that an increase in social grants income increases the 
reservation wage and lowers labour force participation. Similarly, these results support the 
claims by the descriptive and anecdotal evidence in the farm sector (e.g., White and Killick, 
2001; Aliber and Hart, 2009; Aliber and Hall, 2012; Tshuma, 2012), which have reported that 
the poor are shunning smallholder agriculture because they depend on social grants for income. 
The results imply that at least some of the social grant income is being redistributed towards 
the working-age members of the households, even though, in theory, social grants are aimed at 
the elderly, young or sick. As explained in Lund (2002), this is because cash is fungible, i.e., a 
Rand is a Rand, no matter the source. This suggests that the income from social grants is pooled 
with other household income and used as general household income. The result of this intra-
family redistribution is a significant reduction of the number of working-age members that 
participate in smallholder farming activities.  
Table 3.10 indicates that the relationship between the age of the household head and farm 
household labour supply is non-linearly (AGE and AGESQ). This means that up to a certain 
age, household members are less likely to increase their participation in farming activities with 
the increasing age of the household head. However, after the household head reaches a 
particular age, more household members become involved in farming activities. This can be 
explained in terms of the earning opportunities of the household head. At younger ages, 
additional years speak of more experience and more connections, such that the household head 
has more opportunities. It is these opportunities that result in the household becoming less 
reliant on smallholder farming, hence the less commitment of household members to farming. 
However, when household heads are older, the likely loss of income due to household head 
retiring results in household members becoming more involved in farming. Another 
explanation is that at more advanced age, the household head is losing his/ her energy, hence 




Table 3.10: The impact of social grants on the proportion of working age household members 
who participate in farming activities, PW and logit transformation models results 
Variables PW model Logit transformation 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err 
GRANTS -0.052* 0.031 -0.218* 0.128 
GRANTPROP -0.548*** 0.181 -1.533*** 0.516 
AGE -0.076*** 0.022 -0.206*** 0.062 
AGESQ 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 
GENDER 0.100 0.092 0.233 0.255 
EDUCAT -0.010 0.011 -0.008 0.032 
MARRIED 0.072 0.090 0.306 0.251 
INVDEP 1.293*** 0.308 1.889** 0.854 
LANDSZE 0.047 0.039 0.042 0.110 
RAINFALL -0.045 0.106 -0.030 0.293 
SOILQUAL -0.053 0.083 -0.189 0.232 
TILLAGE -0.190** 0.081 -0.584** 0.227 
MARKET -0.093 0.102 -0.268 0.279 
TLU -0.002** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.002 
ASSETS -0.035 0.054 -0.041 0.155 
ASSOC 0.297*** 0.102 0.835*** 0.284 
CREDIT -0.019 0.086 -0.092 0.239 
EXTENSION 0.281*** 0.084 0.640*** 0.237 
TRAINING 0.027 0.095 0.029 0.263 
ROADDIST 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.003 
FARMEXP 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.009 
IRRIGAT 0.255*** 0.084 0.619*** 0.234 
HHEMPLOY -0.162 0.109 -0.642** 0.306 
HMEMP -0.095*** 0.032 -0.244*** 0.078 
HIREDLAB -0.026*** 0.013 -0.056* 0.030 
BUSINESS 0.297* 0.167 1.041** 0.478 
UMZINYAT -0.158 0.118 -0.127 0.335 
UTHUKELA -0.436*** 0.113 -1.090*** 0.312 
UMKHANYA -0.071 0.156 0.042 0.426 
_CONS 3.446*** 0.839 9.965*** 2.375 
IMR -0.091 0.93 -0.015 0.085 
 Deviance =424 
Pearson =3742 







Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 




The results also show a positive relationship between the inverse dependency ratio (INVDEP) 
and labour supply to farming activities. This is expected, since the higher inverse dependency 
ratio implies a relatively higher number of primed-aged, able bodied household members 
compared to dependents. Therefore, an increase in the number of non-dependents results in 
increased participation in farming activities. Table 3.10 further indicates that access to tillage 
services (TILLAGE) was associated with a decrease in the proportion of household members 
involved in farming. Access to tractors or animals for draught power reduces the work burden 
and/or drudgery. As a result, households with access to tillage services such as tractors require 
fewer people to perform farming activities, such as land preparation, compared to households 
that rely on labour for the same task.  
Table 3.10 demonstrates a negative relationship between livestock size and proportion of 
working age household members who participate in farming activities. As explained in the 
previous sub-section, a bigger livestock size implies a wealthy household and increasing wealth 
is associated with decreasing dependency on smallholder farming. Household members 
become less committed to farming as the household becomes richer. Similarly, the results in 
Table 3.9 show that household members participate less in farming activities if the household 
head is employed (HHEMPLOY), as well as when an increasing number of members are 
employed off-farm (HMEMP). These results are consistent with Anim (2011), who found a 
negative relationship between off-farm employment of household members and a household’s 
supply of farm labour in the Limpopo province. 
As expected, the results demonstrate that those households who depend on hired labour 
(HIREDLAB) have fewer of their members engaged in farming activities. This is because hired 
labour substitutes for family labour, such that increasing hired labour leads to decreased family 
labour. Table 3.9 also shows that access to institutional and/or organisational support motivates 
the household members to participate in farming activities. For example, the results show that 
farmers’ association members (ASSOC) supplied more farm labour compared to non-
members. Access to extension (EXTENSION) is a motivator for more family members to be 
involved in farming. This is because farming is more likely to succeed where households have 
access to support services and more household members are more likely to engage in farming 
when success is expected. The same explanation applies to the positive estimated coefficient 
of irrigation access (IRRIGAT). Access to irrigation speaks of less chances of crop failure, 
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higher productivity and higher expected revenues, hence more family members are likely to be 
involved in irrigation farming.  
A somewhat unexpected result in Table 3.9 is that ownership of non-farm microbusinesses 
(BUSINESS) had a positive estimated coefficient. Whereas one would have expected that 
households who own non-farm businesses would be less committed to farming (as indeed 
implied in Table 3.8), this result implies the opposite. An explanation to this result is that it 
may be indicative of pluri-activity among rural households, as has been reported by several 
studies (Carter, 1998; Alsos et al., 2003; Jacobs and Makaudze, 2012; Tshuma, 2012). 
According to these studies, households diversify into non-farming activities to supplement 
farming, not substitute it. This suggests that starting non-farm businesses may be motivated by 
the need to find ways and means to relax credit constraints in farming, or raise supplementary 
income to augment what they get from farming, especially during lean seasons.  
In other words, ownership of a non-farm business may suggest that the farming household is 
more advanced, with an increasing number of its members engaged in farming activities. A 
comparison of Tables 3.9 and 3.10 suggests that this increasing participation in farming by 
business owners is associated with a decreasing proportion of land area cultivated. Although 
Table 3.9 showed that households in Uthukela district cultivate larger proportions of their land 
than those in Harry Gwala, Table 3.10 indicates that a smaller proportion of household 
members in Uthukela district is engaged in farming. This suggest that, even though smallholder 
farming is important in Uthukela district in terms of the proportion of land area cultivated, it is 
not driven by household labour. 
PSM was used to check the robustness of the access to social grant impact parameters in the 
farm labour proportion models. It was implemented as explained in the previous sub-section, 
with the outcome in this section being the proportion of working age household members who 
participated in farming activities. The results presented in Table 3.11 are consistent with those 
reported in Table 3.10, showing that households with access to social grants were likely to have 
fewer of their household members participating in farming activities. The Rosenbaum (2002) 
bounds test indicated that this conclusion can be questioned at the critical level of Γ=1.75. This 
implies that the results are sensitive to a hidden bias of about 75%. Since this is a large 
percentage (Asfaw et al., 2012), it is concluded that the results are robust and not very sensitive 
to hidden bias. 
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Table 3.11: The impact of social grants on the proportion of working age household members 
who participate in farming activities, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 823 132 -0.061 (0.033) 1.848* 
Kernel matching method 823 153 -0.053 (0.027) 1.963** 
Notes: ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Similar to the previous sub-section, the impact of level of dependency on social grants on the 
proportion of household members who participate in farming activities was estimated using 
PSM and the generalised propensity score (GPS) effect methods. For the PSM analysis, the 
low social grant-dependency category was considered as the control group, while the high 
social grant-dependency category was considered as the treatment group, as explained in the 
empirical methods and the previous sub-section. The PSM results, presented in Appendix D, 
indicated that those households in the high social grant-dependent category had a lower 
proportion of household members participating in farming activities compared to those in the 
low social-grant dependency category. These results support the conclusions made above that 
an increasing level of social grant-dependency is associated with decreasing participation in 
farming activities.  
The GPS results are presented in Appendix E. The graph showing the average dose-response 
and the treatment functions and their respective 95% confidence bands for the the proportion 
of working age member who engage in farming activities is presented as Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 
and the results in Appendix E should be interpreted as explained in the previous sub-section, 
with the only change being the outcome variable. The results show that increasing treatment 
(i.e., increasing dependency on social grants) is associated with decreasing participation by the 
unemployed household members in smallholder farming activities. This result applies for 
dosages of up to 50%. The confidence bands are narrow in this range, implying that the results 
are reliable. Even though the dose-response function appears to suggest that there is an increase 
on the proportion of working age member who engage in farming after a dosage of 60%, this 




Figure 3.2:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the proportion of working age members who engage in farming activities 
The results in this sub-section have indicated that both access to social grants and the level of 
dependency on social grants negatively influence the incentives of the unemployed working 
age members to participate in smallholder farming activities. This result was consistent across 
all the methods that were used. The next sub-section presents the main conclusions and policy 
recommendations of this chapter. 
3.4 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This chapter has examined the impact of access to, and dependency on, social grants on the 
incentives of rural households to farm. The incentives to farm were captured using two 
variables: (1) the proportion of land area cultivated by rural households; and (2) the proportion 
of the unemployed working age household members who participate in farming activities. The 
results indicated that social grants have a wide coverage, benefiting most of the rural 
households that were interviewed. The results also indicated that the social grants are well-
targeted, benefiting the poor with less alternative livelihood options. The descriptive statistics 
indicated high levels of unemployment among the household members in the rural areas of 
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KZN, indicating a shortage of economic opportunities in these areas. While this underscores 
the importance of smallholder farming as a livelihood option, the results indicated low levels 
of land area cultivation and participation by the unemployed household members in 
smallholder farming activities.  
The question answered in this chapter is whether the decline in land area cultivated or low 
participation rates of household members in farming activities is due to the households’ access 
to, or dependency on, social grants. The empirical results indicated that, by and large, there 
was no negative or positive relationship between access to social grants or level of dependency 
on social grants, and the proportion of land area cultivated. Most of the econometric models 
used confirmed this result, with only the GPS approach indicating a positive role of social 
grants contribution on land area cultivation when social grants income contributes between 10 
and 50% of household income. The chapter concludes that neither access to social grants, nor 
level of dependency on social grants, have disincentive effects on the proportion of land area 
cultivated by rural households. This implies that the descriptive reports, suggesting that social 
grants are causing declining land area cultivated by smallholder farmers, are incorrect. In fact, 
the GPS results suggest that social grants may play a positive role in improving land area 
cultivation, especially if the contribution of social grants is maintained at below 50% of total 
household income. 
The chapter found a negative relationship between social grants and the proportion of the 
unemployed working age household members who participate in smallholder farming 
activities. In line with the disincentive argument, the chapter concludes that social grants have 
a negative effect on the proportion of farm household members engaged in farming activities. 
The implication of this result is that, although social grants are targeted to the vulnerable 
household members, they also reach the unintended members, creating disincentive effects. 
Since social grants are important in addressing the poor’s immediate basic needs, the study 
recommends that they should continue, but policy-makers should be particularly cognisant of 
their possible adverse consequences on the participation of the rural households in smallholder 
farming.  
The study also identified other variables that affect land area cultivated and participation by 
household members in smallholder farming. In general, the chapter highlighted the importance 
of expectations of success in motivating household members to participate in farming and put 
more land area under cultivation. For example, households with access to irrigation cultivated 
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more of their land and had more of their unemployed members participating in farming 
activities, because of reduced risk of crop failure under irrigation. Access to institutional and/or 
organisational support such as extension or associations was positively related to both land area 
cultivated and farming participation, as these also increase chances of farming success. It is, 
therefore, recommended that policy should prioritise creating a conducive environment for 
smallholder success (such as introducing irrigation or improving access to extension and input 
supply services), in order for the unemployed rural people to participate in smallholder farming 
and improve land area cultivation. This is especially so in South Africa, where the 
government’s employment strategy puts smallholder agriculture at the core of its rural 
development and employment creation drive. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL GRANTS ON THE ADOPTION 
AND INTENSITY OF CHEMICAL FERTILISER USE AMONG 
SMALLHOLDER FARMERS IN KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA 
4.0 Abstract 
This chapter assesses the extent to which social grants relieve liquidity constraints and improve 
chemical fertiliser use among South African smallholder farmers. A total of 984 rural farming 
households, randomly selected in four districts of KwaZulu-Natal, were analysed using the 
double-hurdle model. The empirical results indicated that, while the decision to adopt chemical 
fertilisers was not influenced by social grants, the level of fertiliser use was affected by both 
access to and level of dependency on social grants. However, the influence of these two 
variables on fertiliser adoption levels was mixed. On the one hand, access to social grants was 
associated with higher levels of fertiliser use, implying that social grants help relax the financial 
constraints facing rural farmers amidst imperfect credit markets. On the other, the results 
showed that increasing levels of dependency on social grants was associated with decreasing 
intensity of fertiliser use, suggesting that increasing income from social grants entrenches a 
culture of dependency and entitlement, creating production and/or investment disincentives. 
The results of this chapter suggest that the disincentive impact of social grants on technology 
adoption is not a question of whether or not a household is a social grant beneficiary but the 
level of household dependency on social grant income. In order to promote self-sufficiency 
and independence among the rural poor, the study stresses the need to find strategies, such as 
introducing subsidies and focussed training, to encourage rural households to invest part of 
their social grants in smallholder farming activities. 
 
Keywords: social grants, chemical fertiliser use, double-hurdle model, smallholder farming, 




The urgent need to increase crop production and/or productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
to address poverty and food insecurity problems has been widely acknowledged (Crawford et 
al., 2006; Diao et al., 2008; Zingore et al., 2014). Even though some progress has been made 
to achieve agricultural productivity growth in the region during the past decades, it is below 
the level required to meet the food security and poverty reduction goals set forth in national 
and regional plans (Kelly, 2006; AU/NEPAD, 2011). Given the poor fertility of soils in the 
region (Dorward et al., 2004; AU/NEPAD, 2011; Zingore et al., 2014), and that intensification 
of crop-based agriculture has been associated with a sharp increase in the use of chemical  
fertilisers in other regions of the world (Kelly, 2006; Zhou et al., 2010), several researchers 
(e.g., Akpan et al., 2012; Yirga and Hassan, 2013; Thuo et al., 2014) agree that reversing the 
problems of low crop productivity in SSA requires increased use of chemical fertilisers and 
other technologies.  
There have been commitments by African governments to increase chemical fertiliser use in 
the continent. For example, the African Union (AU) member states in 2006 resolved to increase 
chemical fertiliser use from 8 kg/ha to 50 kg/ha by 2015 (AU/NEPAD, 2011). The 
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), enacted by African 
Union member states in 2003, promotes, among others, investment in agricultural research, 
technology dissemination and adoption to increase agricultural productivity and economic 
growth on the continent (AU/NEPAD, 2003; Abebaw and Haile, 2013). However, the adoption 
of chemical fertilisers has remained relatively low in SSA compared to other developing 
regions (AU/NEPAD, 2011; Yirga and Hassan, 2013; Diiro et al., 2015; Mwangi and Kariuki, 
2015). The average intensity of chemical fertiliser use in SSA has remained below 10 kg/ha of 
cultivated land since the 1990s (AU/NEPAD, 2011), much lower than the 86 kg/ha in Latin 
America and the 100-135 kg/ha in Asia (Crawford et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2007). Kelly 
(2006) reported that Africa as a whole uses less than 3% of total world chemical fertiliser 
consumption, while SSA applies less than 1%.  
In particular, the use of chemical fertilisers among smallholder farmers has remained very low, 
despite notable improvements in the supply of chemical fertilisers and supporting services such 
as extension and credit in SSA (Yirga and Hassan, 2013). The situation is the same in South 
Africa, which, although it has a well-developed commercial farming sector that uses modern 
technology, its smallholder farming sector is still characterised by the use of out-of-date 
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technology (Diale, 2011; DAFF, 2012). The low rates of chemical fertiliser use among 
smallholder farmers in South Africa pull the country’s average fertiliser intensity to below 50 
kg/ha (AU/NEPAD, 2011), despite that large-scale commercial farmers apply an average of 
over 500 kg/ha (Essa and Nieuwoudt, 2001). The average chemical fertiliser use rates by 
smallholder farmers in South Africa are too low and ineffective for sustaining crop and soil 
fertility and are significantly below the recommended levels for the different agro-ecological 
regions of the country (Mkhabela and Materechera, 2003; Mkhabela, 2006; Fanadzo et al., 
2010; Murovhi et al., 2011). 
Among other reasons, liquidity constraints have been identified as a major factor limiting 
smallholder farmers’ investments in modern technologies in South Africa (Odhiambo and 
Magandini, 2008; Fanadzo et al., 2010). For example, Odhiambo and Magandini (2008) 
reported that 75% of the surveyed smallholder farmers in the Limpopo province could not 
access the required quantities of chemical fertiliser due to lack funds. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that chemical fertilisers are costly and have risky returns (Odhiambo and Magandini, 
2008; Murovhi et al., 2011). On one hand, chemical fertilisers produce variable crop yield 
responses under small-scale conditions, making the technology very risky for smallholder 
farmers (Mkhabela, 2006; Odhiambo and Magandini, 2008). On the other hand, the cost of 
chemical fertilisers is high, and increasing, making it unaffordable to the liquidity-constrained 
smallholder farmers (Mkhabela and Materechera, 2003; Mkhabela, 2006; Fanadzo et al., 
2010). This is especially true of rural farming households who operate under pervasive market 
imperfections that result in missing credit markets (Bezu and Holden, 2008). While organic 
fertilisers such as cattle manure provide a cheaper option , the amount of manure produced is 
never sufficient due to the limited number of animals kept by smallholder farmers (Odhiambo 
and Magandini, 2008; Sikwela, 2013).  
Improving chemical fertiliser adoption rates among poor rural farming households is key, and 
requires strategies that relax the liquidity constraint. Since South Africa has social grants that 
reached an average of over 16 million people per month in 2014 (SASSA, 2014), benefitting 
most of the rural farming households, a relevant question to ask is the extent to which these 
social grants encourage technology adoption by reducing the cash constraints of these 
households. While the specific purpose of these social grants is to reduce poverty, vulnerability 
and inequality, one of their stated purposes is to promote self-sufficiency and independence 
among the poor (RSA, 1997; Mabugu et al., 2014). In other words, the social grants are not 
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just a livelihood protection measure, but are also a key livelihood promotion strategy 
(Devereux, 2002; Mabugu et al., 2013).  
Though smallholder farming is an important livelihood activity among poor rural households 
and social grants benefit most of the poor (Stats SA, 2012b; Gutura and Tanga, 2014), limited 
in-depth research has explored the potential linkages between social grants and investment in 
farming activities in rural South Africa. Only anecdotal evidence (e.g., Samson et al., 2008; 
Neves et al., 2009) is available and it suggests that the poor households use some of their social 
grants income to acquire farming inputs. Evidence from other countries, such as Bolivia 
(Martinez, 2004), indicate that cash transfers to the poor and liquidity-constrained households 
can result in households increasing their productive potential through investment in 
household-level economic activities such as farming.  
Technology adoption in smallholder agriculture is one of the extensively studied topics in 
agricultural economics literature. Several studies (e.g., Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2005; Wale 
and Yalew, 2007; Shiferaw et al., 2008; Ali and Abdulai, 2010; Kafle, 2010; Asfaw et al., 
2011; Diale, 2011; Asfaw et al., 2012a; Asfaw et al., 2012b; Kaguongo et al., 2012; Mal et al., 
2012; Gregory and Sewando, 2013; Jaleta et al., 2013; Abidoye and Mabaya, 2014; Alabi et 
al., 2014; Bezu et al., 2014; Shiferaw et al., 2014; Mabaya et al., 2015) have investigated the 
determinants of the adoption of agricultural technologies such as improved seed varieties, 
genetically modified crops and agrochemicals. Moreover, a plethora of studies (e.g., Isham, 
2002; Croppenstedt et al., 2003; Freeman and Omiti, 2003; Asfaw and Admassie, 2004; Chianu 
and Tsujii, 2004; Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2005; Chirwa, 2005; Waithaka et al., 2007; Alene 
et al., 2008; Bezu and Holden, 2008; Thuo et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2010; Akpan et al., 2012; 
Mapila et al., 2012; Yirga and Hassan, 2013; Lambrecht et al., 2014; Martey et al., 2014; 
Ogada et al., 2014; Thuo et al., 2014; Diiro et al., 2015) have been done on the determinants 
of chemical fertiliser adoption in developing countries in general, and SSA in particular. These 
studies have indicated that chemical fertiliser adoption is influenced by several factors, which 
include the household characteristics (such as household head age, gender and education level), 
factor endowments (such as land, capacity to bear risks, human capital and social capital), 
institutional and organisational support (credit, extension, tenure and group membership) as 
well as the ecological and environmental factors (such as land quality and rainfall). 
The review of the literature on chemical fertiliser adoption revealed a few gaps. Firstly, most 
of the studies have investigated the general determinants of chemical fertiliser adoption without 
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focussing on the impact of one particular factor on chemical fertiliser adoption. This approach 
has resulted in methodological issues such as endogeneity with regards to a number of variables 
not tested and/or corrected for. However, there are a few exceptions. For example, Asfaw and 
Admassie (2004) focussed on the impact of education in Ethiopia, Diiro et al. (2015) assessed 
the impact of gender in Uganda, while Isham (2002) explored the role of social capital in 
Tanzania.  
Secondly, there is a scarcity of literature investigating the potential impact of transfers on 
chemical fertiliser adoption. An exception is Bezu and Holden (2008), who assessed the impact 
of food-for-work on chemical fertilisers adoption in Ethiopia. Bezu and Holden (2008) found 
that food-for-work positively influenced the decision to adopt fertilisers and that there was no 
evidence of disincentive effect. According to Bezu and Holden (2008), the question of whether 
or not transfers have disincentive effects may not be even the right question to ask in the 
developing country context characterised by market imperfections. The more relevant question 
to ask is whether or not transfers help improve agricultural production by relieving liquidity 
constraints, thereby improving input use in agriculture (Bezu and Holden, 2008).  
Thirdly, despite an abundance of literature on chemical fertiliser adoption in the SSA region, 
very few studies (e.g., Essa and Nieuwoudt, 2001; Odhiambo and Magandini, 2008) have been 
done on chemical fertiliser adoption among smallholder farmers in South Africa. As explained 
by Kafle (2010) and Ogada et al. (2014), agricultural technology adoption studies should not 
be generalised, since adoption is context specific. Fourthly, the few studies that have 
investigated chemical fertiliser determinants in South Africa have relied on limited analytical 
approaches. For example, Odhiambo and Magandini (2008) relied on descriptive statistics, 
whereas Essa and Nieuwoudt (2001) used a binary logit model. The present study relies on the 
double-hurdle model, an econometric model popular in adoption studies (Croppenstedt et al., 
2003; Asfaw et al., 2011; Mal et al., 2012; Bezu et al., 2014; Martey et al., 2014). 
This chapter distinguishes itself from other adoption studies in the literature by exploring the 
linkages between chemical fertiliser adoption and social grants among smallholder farmers in 
South Africa, using the double-hurdle model. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study 
has examined the impact of social grants on chemical fertiliser adoption. Most of the fertiliser 
adoption studies have not accounted for the potential linkages of chemical fertiliser use with 
social grants, arguably missing an important variable. Including this variable extends the 
traditional adoption analysis and links it to an important issue that has taken centre stage in the 
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South African rural development discourse. The remainder of this chapter is divided into three 
sections. The next section presents the research methodology, introducing the conceptual 
framework and the empirical models. The subsequent section presents results and their 
discussions, while the main conclusions and policy implications are presented in the final 
section. 
4.2 Research methodology 
4.2.1 Data 
This chapter uses the same data set as the previous chapter. As explained in the preceding 
chapter, a total of 984 households were randomly selected from the four district municipalities 
in the KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. The data was collected using a structured, 
pretested questionnaire. The questionnaire contained a number of modules, some of which have 
been briefly described in the previous chapter. The modules presented in Chapter 2 that are 
relevant to this chapter include the basic demographics and socio-economic characteristics of 
the household, measures of wealth and resource endowment (e.g., assets, land, livestock), 
agricultural production activities, and household income amounts and sources. The module 
specific to this chapter was that capturing the use of chemical fertilisers, asking questions about 
whether the household had used any chemical fertiliser, the types and quantities used in the 
previous agricultural season.  
4.2.2 Conceptual framework and selection of variables 
The adoption decision was modelled in a random utility framework, following other 
agricultural technology adoption studies (e.g., Ali and Abdulai, 2010; Kassie et al., 2011). The 
random utility theory postulates that a utility-maximising farm household will adopt a new 
technology when the utility from choosing the technology (UA) is greater than that of not 
adopting the technology (UN). For example, if the difference between the net benefits from the 
adoption of the technology and non-adoption may be denoted as UDF, then a household would 
adopt fertiliser if UDF=UA-UN > 0.  
The unobservable net utility U* can be expressed as a function of observable elements in the 
following latent variable model: 
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U*i= βxi + εi, Ui=1 if U*i>0       (4.1) 
Where: Ui is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 for household i in case of adoption and 0 
otherwise, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, xi is a vector of household and farm 
characteristics and εi is an error term. 
The selection of variables in the model was based on the theory of farm household decision-
making under imperfect markets (de Janvry et al., 1991). The market failures that are prevalent 
in the rural areas of developing countries imply that input use decisions of farmers cannot be 
reasonably assumed to depend only on market prices (Bezu et al., 2014). Under conditions of 
imperfect markets, household technology choices are influenced by their economic position 
and institutional environment. Since farmers are risk averse, and crop production is subject to 
random shocks, the ability to bear risk, in terms of wealth endowment and social capital, may 
positively influence fertiliser adoption (Alene et al., 2008). In this study, wealth endowment 
was proxied by farm size, livestock size and asset values, whereas social capital was proxied 
by education level and networks or membership in farmer groups.   
It was also hypothesised that, since credit markets are imperfect or missing in the rural areas, 
income from social grants may relieve the liquidity constraints of farm households, and enable 
them to purchase more inputs. This agrees with what is explained in Bezu and Holden (2008), 
who indicated that poor smallholder farmers may fail to adopt improved technology not only 
because of risk or that they are not convinced of the benefits. Instead, the smallholder farmers 
may be unable to secure the funds necessary to purchase such inputs (Bezu and Holden, 2008). 
Social grants ease the liquidity constraints by either making more cash available to buy inputs, 
or by reducing the pressure to use cash from other sources to buy basic household needs as 
these would be covered by social grants.  
It was also taken into consideration that high levels of dependency on social grants would create 
perverse economic behaviour which results in production disincentives. Assuming that leisure 
is a normal good (as explained in the preceding chapter), increasing levels of dependency on 
social grants create possible disincentive effects. This may then cause social grant-dependency 
to be negatively correlated with fertiliser adoption. The influence of social grants was captured 
using two variables: a dummy variable, showing whether or not a household has access to 
social grants, and a proportion variable, showing the percentage of household income that 
comes from social grants.  
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Following previous studies on farmers’ adoption of chemical fertilisers (Bezu and Holden, 
2008; Akpan et al., 2012; Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Yirga and Hassan, 2013; Lambrecht et al., 
2014), the study considered household characteristics (household head age, gender and 
household size), access to information (number of information sources), perception of the 
problem or constraint (soil quality) and institutional factors such as land tenure and access to 
markets. The study also included a variable capturing farmers’ perceptions of whether fertiliser 
prices were high, average or low. Even though the individual prices the households face were 
collected, they were not included as an explanatory variable in the model. The major reason is 
that there was not enough variation in the prices that individual farmers faced. Moreover, if 
household specific prices were used, those households who bought no chemical fertiliser would 
have been excluded from the analysis. The use of farmers’ perceptions is justified because 
farmers make their production and business decisions based on their perceptions (Morgan et 
al., 2010). 
It was hypothesised that increasing age would be associated with decreasing chances of 
chemical fertiliser adoption, as older farmers are less receptive to new ideas and are more risk 
averse than younger farmers. In terms of gender, the expectation was that male-headed 
households would be more likely to adopt chemical fertilisers due to their advantages in 
bargaining, negotiating and enforcing contracts. Bigger households were expected to adopt, 
due to labour availability, while access to more information sources was also expected to be 
positive, as it reduces search costs. Institutional factors were expected to reduce transaction 
costs and enhance the expected profitability of the technology, thus were expected to have 
positive signs. Those who felt that their soils were infertile were expected to adopt and apply 
more fertiliser than those with better soils. The next sub-section discusses the econometric 
model. 
4.2.3 Model choice and specification 
A number of models have been used to investigate the determinants of technology adoption. 
The choice of econometric specification largely depends on the objective of the study and the 
type of data available (Shiferaw et al., 2008). The binary logit or probit models have been used 
when the decision to adopt is modelled as a one-step process (e.g., Essa and Nieuwoudt, 2001; 
Gregory and Sewando, 2013; Jansen et al., 2014). This approach estimates the decision to adopt 
as a dichotomous variable and the level or intensity of adoption is ignored. The Tobit, 
108 
 
double-hurdle and Heckman selection models have been employed when technology is 
modelled as a two-step process: the decision to adopt and the intensity of adoption. A key 
limitation of the Tobit model is that the decision to adopt and the intensity of adoption are 
assumed to be made jointly and factors affecting the probability to adopt and intensity of 
adoption are assumed to be the same (Burke, 2009). 
The double-hurdle and Heckman selection models assume that the decision to adopt and 
intensity of adoption are determined by separate processes.  These two models have the same 
statistical structure that allows factors affecting the probability to adopt and intensity of 
adoption to be independent. However, the two models have some differences. Whereas the 
Heckman selection model assumes that all the zeros are the respondents’ deliberate choices, 
the double-hurdle model considers non-adoption as a corner solution in a utility-maximising 
model. The double-hurdle model accounts for the existence of a significant number of farmers 
with positive desired demand for modern inputs, but are too constrained to adopt them. In other 
words, the double-hurdle considers the possibility of zero outcomes in the second hurdle even 
after first-stage hurdle is passed. In contrast, the Heckman selection model assumes that there 
will be no zero observations in the second stage once the first-stage selection is passed.  
Even though the Heckman selection model has been used by several agricultural technology 
adoption studies (e.g., Alene et al., 2008; Bezu and Holden, 2008; Yirga and Hassan, 2013; 
Lambrecht et al., 2014),  Mal et al. (2012) argued that the assumptions of the Heckman 
selection model are too restrictive in the case of agricultural technology adoption. A discussion 
by Dow and Norton (2003) showed that the double-hurdle model produces superior estimates 
than the Heckman selection model when one is dealing with true zeros. Since a zero amount of 
fertiliser is an actual value, and does not represent missing values, there is no selection bias 
problem (Dow and Norton, 2003). Therefore, this study uses the double-hurdle model, 
proposed by Cragg (1971), to estimate the two-step process of chemical fertiliser adoption. 
However, the Heckman selection and Tobit models were also estimated for comparison 
purposes and to check the robustness of the estimated impact parameters. 
According to the double-hurdle model, a farmer faces two hurdles while deciding on chemical 
fertiliser adoption. The first is to decide whether or not to use chemical fertiliser. The second 
hurdle is related to the level of adoption, i.e., how much fertiliser to apply. The model integrates 
and simultaneously estimates the probit model to determine the probability of fertiliser use and 
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the truncated normal model for fertiliser intensity. The binary variable of chemical fertiliser 
use (w), assumed to follow a probit model, was specified as follows: 
P(w = 1|x) = Φ(xγ)        (4.2) 
Where: P is probability, w is a binary variable of fertiliser use, Φ is the cumulative normal 
distribution, x is a vector of household characteristics that includes indicators of access to social 
grants and dependency on social grants; and γ are the coefficients to be estimated. 
The intensity of fertiliser use, y*, assumed to have a truncated normal distribution with 
parameters that vary freely from those in the probit, was estimated as follows: 
y*= xβ + εi          (4.3) 
Where: y* represents quantity of chemical fertiliser applied in kg/ha; x is a vector of household 
characteristics which included indicators of access to social grant and level of dependency on 
social grants; β’s are parameters estimated and εi is the error term. The double-hurdle model 
was estimated in Stata using the user-written command craggit, that was created by Burke 
(2009).   
A log likelihood test was done to justify the use of the double-hurdle model over the Tobit. 
Based on the log-likelihood values obtained from a separate estimation of the probit, truncated 
regression and Tobit models, the likelihood ratio statistic (γ) was computed as follows: 
γ =2 [LLprobit+LLtrunc  - LLtobit]      (4.4) 
where: LLprobit, LLtrunc  and LLtobit are the likelihood values from the probit, truncated regression 
and Tobit models, respectively. The test statistic has a χ2 distribution, with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of independent variables (including the intercept). The Tobit model is 
rejected in favour of the double-hurdle model if γ exceeds the appropriate χ2 critical value 
(Burke, 2009; Martey et al., 2014). 
As explained in the previous chapter, it was suspected that the estimated models may be 
affected by selection bias, since social grants are not a random intervention but a targeted 
intervention. Selection bias may occur because the farmers with higher intrinsic motivation and 
ability are more likely to have more income and assets, meaning that they are less likely to 
qualify to benefit from social grants. These motivated farmers are also more likely to adopt 
chemical fertilisers, resulting in selection bias. The probit model (Eq. 4.2) was first estimated 
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using the Heckman selection probit model (heckprob command in Stata), with access to social 
grants as the selection variable. The likelihood ratio test of independent equations was done to 
indicate if there was evidence of selection bias at the conventional 10% significance level. 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was used to test for the potential endogeneity of level of 
dependency on social grants in the model. This is because it is possible that causality might 
flow from chemical fertiliser adoption to level of dependency on social grants, since increased 
chemical fertiliser use results in increased crop yields which might lead to increased farm 
income. The increased farm income would result in decreased levels of dependency on social 
grants. The test was implemented by: (1) firstly, regressing social dependency on the 
exogenous explanatory variables, as explained in Chapter 3 (see Eq. 3.6); (2) Obtaining the 
residuals and then adding these residuals in the fertiliser adoption models. This was done for 
both the probit (Eq. 4.2) and truncated regression model (Eq. 4.3). A statistically significant 
estimated coefficient of the residuals would mean endogeneity problems, while a statistically 
insignificant estimate means no evidence of the endogeneity problem (as was the case in this 
chapter). 
The limitation of the double-hurdle model is that it uses all observations in the treatment and 
control samples, resulting in less reliable impact estimates (Rubin and Thomas, 2000; Abebaw 
et al., 2010). Therefore, PSM and GPS were used to provide more accurate causal estimates, 
as explained in the previous chapter. The PSM was used to estimate the impact of access to 
social grants on the likelihood of chemical fertiliser adoption and on the level of fertiliser use. 
The GPS method was used to investigate the impact of the level of dependency on social grants 
on the likelihood of chemical fertiliser adoption as well as the level of fertiliser use. These 
matching techniques were implemented as explained in Chapter 3. The next section presents 






4.3 Results and discussions 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the variables that were used in the chemical fertiliser adoption double-hurdle 
model and their means. The table shows that 56% of the rural farmers used chemical fertilisers 
(FERTUSE), and applied over 70 kg/ha (FERTKGHA). The amount of fertiliser applied per 
hectare is lower than the 151 kg/ha reported by Essa and Nieuwoudt (2001) for three communal 
areas in the same KZN province. However, the amount of fertiliser applied per hectare is higher 
than what other studies (e.g., Bezu and Holden, 2008; Yirga and Hassan, 2013) have reported 
for other SSA countries. The amount is also higher than the 50 kg/ha target agreed upon by AU 
member states as a target for 2015 (AU/NEPAD, 2011), implying that South Africa may have 
met the target. 
However, the levels of chemical fertiliser application are below the recommended application 
rates (Fanadzo et al., 2010). It is against this background that strategies for increasing fertiliser 
adoption rates and as fertiliser use intensity in rural South Africa should be identified. The table 
shows that, on average, the farmers bought a 50 kg bag of chemical fertiliser for about R270, 
which translates to R5400/ ton (PRICE). In line with other studies (e.g., Mkhabela and 
Materechera, 2003; Odhiambo and Magandini, 2008; Murovhi et al., 2011) which have 
reported price as a major issue in chemical fertiliser adoption among smallholder farmers, 72% 
of the sampled households felt that chemical fertiliser prices were too high, with very few 
farmers saying they felt the prices were moderate or low (PRICEPERC).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the results show poor to modest levels of institutional 
and/or organisational support from government. Whereas few households reported having 
access to credit, the table highlights that most of the households had access to social grants. 
Since the income from social grants is unconditional, and households are free to use it as they 
see fit, there is potential that the households may use part of it to alleviate credit constraints. 
The table also shows that the majority of the sampled households were female-headed, and 
were characterised with low levels of formal education, generally poor and more dependent on 
social grants than on farming. The figures in Table 4.1 are generally consistent with other 
smallholder studies in South Africa (e.g., Feynes and Meyer, 2003; Eastwood et al., 2006; 
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Samson et al., 2008; Aliber and Hart, 2009; Fanadzo et al., 2010; Tshuma, 2012; Sinyolo et 
al., 2014). 
Table 4.1: Variables used in the fertiliser adoption double-hurdle model and their means 
Variable code Variable name and description Mean SD 
FERTUSE Fertiliser adoption (1=Adopter 0=Non-adopter) 0.56 - 
FERTKG Amount of fertiliser used (kg) 138 390 
FERTKGHA Amount of fertiliser used per ha (kg/ha) 74 146 
PRICE Price of fertiliser (Rands/ 50 kg) 270 32 
PRICEPERC Fertiliser price perception (1=High) 0.72 - 
AGE Household head age (Years) 56 13 
GENDER Household gender (1=Male) 0.47 - 
EDUCAT Household head education level (Years) 4.67 4.17 
HHSIZE Household size (Numbers) 7.04 3.60 
LANDSZE Land size (ha) 1.90 4.47 
TLU Livestock size (TLUs) 3.53 17.40 
ASSETS Value of household assets (Rands) 82,105 38,937 
GRANTS Access to social grants (1=Yes) 0.85 0.36 
GRANTBEN Number of social grant beneficiaries per household 3.18 1.81 
TOTINC Annual total household income (Rands) 46,757 32,707 
GRANTINC Annual income from social grants (Rands) 16,916 15,877 
FARMINC Annual income from farm activities (Rands) 6,553 12,438 
OTHERINC Annual income from other off-farm activities (Rands) 23,617 26,374 
GRANTPROP Proportion of income from social grants 0.38 0.26 
FARMPROP Proportion of income from farming activities 0.13 0.14 
EXTENSION Access to extension (1=Yes) 0.57 - 
INFORM Number of information sources 2.28 1.10 
SOILQUAL Perceived soil fertility (1=Good) 0.55 - 
TENURE Secure land tenure (1=Yes) 0.37 - 
MARKET Market access (1=Good) 0.20 - 
CREDIT Access to credit (1=Yes) 0.36 - 
TRAINING Access to agricultural training (1=Yes)  0.41 - 
ASSOC Farmer association member (1=Yes) 0.58 - 
ROADDIST Distance to the nearest all-weather road (km) 17.75 39.93 
FARMEXP Household head farming experience (Years) 18.70 13.28 
IRRIGAT Access to water for irrigation purposes (1=Yes) 0.46 - 
HHEMPLOY Household head off-farm employment (1=Yes) 0.20 - 
BUSINESS Ownership of small non-farm business (1=Yes) 0.08 - 
HGWALA Harry Gwala district (1=Harry Gwala) 0.42 - 
UMZINYAT Umzinyathi district (1=Umzinyathi) 0.24 - 
UTHUKELA Uthukela (1=Uthukela) 0.19 - 
UMKHANYA Umkhanyakude (1=Umkhanyakude) 0.15 - 
Notes: n=984 
Source: 2014 household survey 
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Table 4.2 shows the demographics and socio-economic characteristics of the sampled 
households, according to their fertiliser adoption status. The t-test was done to investigate mean 
comparisons for continuous variables while the χ2 test was done to measure associations for 
categorical variables. While their demographics are generally the same, the results show 
significant differences in wealth and institutional support between adopters and non-adopters. 
Households using chemical fertiliser were wealthier (have more land, livestock and valuable 
assets) than non-adopters. This may be indicative of the fact that asset ownership plays an 
important role in technology adoption due to imperfect factor market in the rural areas. 
Wealthier households are more likely to use improved inputs, as they are less liquidity 
constrained to purchase improved inputs and often less risk averse. 
The results show that chemical fertiliser adopters were characterised by better access to support 
services such as extension. Contact with extension officers is an important source of 
information with regards to new technologies. The results also indicate that the adopters have 
more sources of information than non-adopters. Farmers get information not only from formal 
sources (such as extension workers, input dealers and agricultural universities) but also from 
informal sources (such as other farmers and friends). The fact that adopters had more access to 
irrigation than non-adopters is suggestive of complementarity between irrigation and the use 
of improved inputs. The results in Table 4.2 show that almost all the non-adopters (95%) felt 
that fertiliser prices were high, while less than 60% of the adopters felt the same.  
The results show that fertiliser adopters earn more from farming than non-adopters and have 
more off-farm income. Fertiliser adopters were more experienced in farming and closer to all-
weather roads than non-adopters. There were no significant differences between adopters and 
non-adopters in terms of their access to, or level of dependency on, social grants. However, 
these comparisons do not control for other factors. The next section investigates the impact of 
social grants on the adoption and intensity of chemical fertiliser use, controlling for other 




Table 4.2: Socio-economic characteristics of the sampled households according to fertiliser 
adoption status 
Variable name Adopters (n=554) Non-adopters (n=430) T tests (χ2 tests) 
AGE 57 55 1.55 
GENDER  0.47 0.46 0.28 
EDUCAT 4.52 4.86 -1.27 
HHSIZE 6.95 7.16 -0.89 
LAND 2.27 1.50 2.68*** 
TENURE 0.41 0.31 12.83*** 
LIVESTOCK 4.34 2.47 1.68* 
ASSETS 87,142 75,616 4.65*** 
GRANTS 0.85 0.85 0.04 
OFFFARMINC 41,051 39,112 1.08 
FARMINC 7,167 5,763 1.76* 
GRANTINC 16,511 16,685 0.20 
GRANTPROP 0.37 0.39 1.48 
SOILQ 0.57 0.52 3.06* 
PRICE 0.58 0.95 177.35*** 
MARKET 0.21 0.20 0.37 
ASSOC 0.46 0.39 3.86** 
CREDIT 0.36 0.36 0.01 
EXTENSION 0.62 0.49 16.58*** 
INFORM 2.38 2.15 3.22*** 
TRAINING 0.41 0.42 0.68 
ROADDIST 12.29 22 -3.80*** 
FARMEXP 20.53 16.33 4.99*** 
EMPLOYED 0.22 0.18 2.13 
BUSINESS 0.10 0.06 5.49** 
IRRIGATION 0.49 0.42 4.95** 
HGWALA  0.39 0.45 4.03** 
UMZINYAT  0.25 0.23 0.67 
UTHUKEL  0.24 0.14 14.54*** 
UMKHANY  0.12 0.18 6.07** 
 Notes: ***, **, and * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
4.3.2 The impact of access to, and level of dependency on, social grants on the 
adoption and intensity of chemical fertiliser use 
Table 4.3 presents the results from the double-hurdle model. The likelihood ratio test of 
independent equations indicated that there was no evidence of selection bias at the conventional 
10% significance level. Since there was no evidence of selection bias problem, the double-
hurdle model results reported in Table 4.3 do not suffer from selection bias. The tests for 
collinearity were done using VIFs, which indicated that there was no evidence of severe multi-
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collinearity between GRANT and GRANTPROP, and among other variables (Mean VIF = 
1.41, Min VIF = 1.07 and Max VIF = 1.99). A log-likelihood test was done and the test statistic 
λ exceeded the χ2 critical value, indicating that the double-hurdle model performed better than 
the Tobit. This implies that the decision to adopt and the level of fertiliser adoption are 
governed by separate processes. The Hausman tests were insignificant in both equations, 
showing that the level of dependency on social grants was not endogenous in the model. The 
highly significant Wald statistic indicates that, collectively, the variables are significant 
determinants of fertiliser adoption, suggesting good model fit. 
The model results indicate that access to social grants (GRANTS) and the level of dependency 
on social grants (GRANTPROP) were not significant in the decision to use fertiliser. This 
implies that the decision to use chemical fertiliser is not influenced by social grants. However, 
these variables significantly influenced the intensity of fertiliser use. As expected, access to 
social grants had a positive impact on the level of fertiliser use, with social grants beneficiaries 
using 204 kg more fertiliser per hectare than non-beneficiaries. This implies that, in line with 
descriptive and anecdotal evidence from other studies (e.g., Samson et al., 2008; Neves et al., 
2009), social grants do relax the liquidity constraints facing the rural farmers who have a 
positive demand for chemical fertilisers.  
The results imply that for those farmers who would have passed the first hurdle, i.e., developed 
positive demand for chemical fertilisers, access to social grants helps them pass the second 
hurdle. As explained in Vincent and Cull (2009), the regularity and predictability of social 
grants allow beneficiary households to take a longer term perspective and invest to improve 
livelihoods. This augurs well for the country’s social welfare policy, as enunciated in the White 
Paper for Social Welfare of 1997 (RSA, 1997), which emphasised not just poverty reduction 
but also the need to find strategies to increase the poor’s capacity and promote self-sufficiency 
and independence. However, increasing dependency on social grants (GRANTPROP) was 




Table 4.3: The impact of access to and level of dependency on social grants on the adoption 
and intensity of chemical fertiliser use, the double-hurdle model results 
Variables 1st Hurdle (Probit) 2nd Hurdle (Truncated) 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
GRANTS 0.108 0.171 203.7** 104.5 
GRANTPROP -0.019 0.256 -290.8* 177.5 
AGE 0.000 0.004 2.983 2.665 
GENDER -0.040 0.098 25.49 67.50 
EDUCAT -0.024* 0.013 10.01 8.681 
HHSIZE -0.020 0.013 2.277 9.660 
LANDSZE 0.084* 0.044 -472.7*** 73.89 
TLU 0.002 0.006 0.842 3.363 
ASSETS 0.277*** 0.073 148.1** 65.76 
EXTENSION 0.218** 0.111 5.939 70.80 
INFORM 0.062** 0.030 -60.23 36.73 
SOILQUAL -0.692*** 0.114 -300.9*** 109.5 
MARKET -0.130 0.122 127.47* 73.48 
ASSOC 0.306** 0.120 -96.525 72.73 
CREDIT 0.041 0.102 20.372 62.91 
TRAINING 0.206** 0.108 -177.2** 71.62 
ROADDIST -0.005*** 0.002 -1.495** 0.603 
PRICEPERC -1.023*** 0.158 -411.2*** 95.16 
FARMEXP 0.011*** 0.004 1.145 2.533 
IRRIGAT 0.169* 0.101 63.543* 37.86 
HHEMPLOY 0.185 0.137 -213.53* 115.1 
BUSINESS 0.239 0.203 292.01** 140.9 
TENURE 0.385*** 0.104 39.39*** 63.44 
UMZINYA 0.151 0.137 54.645 88.04 
UTHUKELA 0.681*** 0.142 97.527 112.7 
UMKHANYA -0.231 0.182 -54.795 113.2 
_CONS -2.744*** 0.884 -217.2*** 810.4 
     
N 984 
Wald χ2(26) 261.82*** 
  
Hausman tests χ2(1)=2.02, p=0.14 F(1, 956)=0.64, p=0.42 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations: χ2 (1) = 1.52, p = 0.22 
Log-likelihood test: λ=574; χ2 critical value=39 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
The results in Table 4.3 indicate that households that had a higher proportion of their income 
being from social grants, i.e., depend more on social grants, applied less chemical fertilisers 
than those that were less dependent on social grants. An increase of 1% in the contribution of 
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social grants to household income was associated with a decrease of 290 kg in chemical 
fertiliser application. A plausible explanation is that, in line with the food aid literature (e.g., 
Tadesse and Shively, 2009; Sharaunga and Wale, 2013), and some studies on the impact of 
social grants on labour supply in South Africa (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2003; Samson et al., 2004; 
Abel, 2013), increasing income from social grants entrenches a culture of dependency and 
entitlement, creating production disincentives. As explained in other studies (e.g., Samson, 
2009; Gomersall, 2013), the households with higher levels of dependency on social grants may 
be those households whose incentives to produce have been undermined, since social grants 
income reduces the opportunity cost of failing to produce. 
 
The incentives to invest in farming are undermined because investing in farming would mean 
better capacity to generate more extra income, and the social grant-dependent households may 
be afraid that investing in farming may result in them being disqualified from the social grants. 
Even though there are not many reported cases of beneficiaries being disqualified from social 
grants because of their improved income status, the fact that the possibility is there may be 
enough to cause the production disincentives. Mabugu et al. (2014), for example, found that 
social grant recipient households preferred to remain into low productivity subsistence farming, 
since the negligible extra income from these farming activities would not disqualify the 
household from accessing the social grants. Another possible explanation is that households 
that depend more on social grants are the poorer households with fewer other income sources, 
such that social grant income is used to meet urgent household needs such as food and clothing. 
As a result, these poorer households will have less money remaining to invest in production 
activities such as farming. This is unfortunate, as it implies that these households are trapped 
in a vicious cycle of poverty and dependency on social grants which will be difficult to break 
without external intervention. 
The results show that education (EDUCAT) was negatively associated with fertiliser adoption, 
but has no significant influence on fertiliser use intensity. The result is contrary to expectations 
and several other agricultural technology adoption studies (e.g., Asfaw and Admassie, 2004; 
Chirwa, 2005; Akpan et al., 2012; Gregory and Sewando, 2013; Kassie et al., 2013; Yirga and 
Hassan, 2013). The expectation was that education would increase fertiliser adoption since the 
more educated are better at understanding and interpreting new information on technologies. 
A plausible explanation to the negative relationship between education level and fertiliser 
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adoption, a result consistent with Bezu and Holden (2008), is that the most educated household 
heads usually opt out of farming, hence their lower likelihood of adopting farming 
technologies. More educated people have higher opportunity costs of labour, since their time 
may be able to earn higher returns in alternative economic activities, and thus may be less likely 
to invest in labour-intensive technologies and practices such as chemical fertilisers.  
Table 4.3 shows that, consistent with the literature (e.g., Essa and Nieuwoudt, 2001; Chirwa, 
2005; Yirga and Hassan, 2013), households with bigger land sizes (LANDSZE) were most 
likely to use chemical fertilisers. The explanation is that those households with bigger farm 
sizes are better able to bear risks than those with smaller farms. In terms of fertiliser use 
intensity, increasing farm size was associated with decreasing fertiliser amounts per hectare. 
This result is in line with the literature (e.g., Alene et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2010; Akpan et al., 
2012). The explanation is that households with bigger farm sizes incur more total input costs 
than those with smaller farms, such that they have to apply less fertiliser per hectare. The same 
amount of fertiliser results in less intensity for those with bigger farms than for those with 
smaller farms.  
The results also indicate that wealthier households in terms of assets were more likely to use 
chemical fertilisers, and they also applied more fertiliser amounts in a hectare than the poorer 
farmers. This is also because, just like with land, wealthier households are better at bearing 
possible risks associated with adoption of new technologies and practices and may be more 
able to finance purchases of chemical fertilisers. The result is consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Kassie et al., 2013; Lambrecht et al., 2014). The positive role played by information access in 
creating positive demand for chemical fertilisers is highlighted by the positive estimated 
coefficients of access to information (INFORM), extension (EXTENSION) and association 
membership (ASSOC). The higher the number of information sources the household depends 
on for agricultural information, the higher their access to information and the greater the 
likelihood of chemical fertiliser adoption.  
The positive estimated coefficient for access to agricultural extension, which is consistent with 
the literature (e.g., Akpan et al., 2012; Yirga and Hassan, 2013), is because agricultural 
extension officers remain the main sources of information with regards to new technologies 
among the rural households. Regular contact with agricultural extension agents improves the 
awareness of new technologies and their likely benefits, hence the higher chances of adoption. 
In South Africa, access to agricultural extension officers also means higher chances of 
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accessing government free inputs, which include chemical fertilisers. However, the fact that 
access to agricultural extension has no significant impact on the amount of chemical fertiliser 
applied should be a cause for concern, since agricultural extension officers are expected to 
advise farmers on the impacts of fertilisers, how they should be applied and the rates of 
application.  
The results demonstrate that members of associations or groups were most likely to adopt 
fertilisers than non-members. The explanation here is that social networks such as farmer 
groups facilitate the exchange of valuable information and experiences about new technologies 
in environments associated with inadequate information sources and imperfect markets such 
as rural areas. Moreover, group membership increases farmers’ bargaining power, which may 
enable farmers to access inputs cheaper and on schedule. Several other studies (e.g., Mal et al., 
2012; Kassie et al., 2013; Lambrecht et al., 2014) have reported a positive relationship between 
agricultural technology adoption and household membership in collective action associations. 
Such associations reduce transaction costs of accessing input and output markets for 
smallholder farmers. 
Table 4.3 shows that, contrary to expectations, the farmers who felt that their soil quality 
(SOILQUAL) was poor were less likely to adopt chemical fertiliser than those with good soils. 
Moreover, the farmers with poor soils applied less fertiliser per hectare than those with good 
soils. The explanation here is that, because chemical fertilisers are only profitable on moderate 
to good soils (Lambrecht et al., 2014), the better the soils, the higher the chances of adoption. 
The results also show that the farmers that had received some agricultural training 
(TRAINING) were more likely to use chemical fertilisers than those with no training. This is 
expected, as most training modules promote adoption of yield-enhancing inputs such as 
chemical fertilisers. An interesting result in Table 4.3 is that trained farmers applied less 
fertiliser per hectare than the untrained. This may be indicative of the fact that trained farmers 
are less likely to over-apply fertilisers. As reported by Zingore et al. (2014), two problems 
facing smallholder farmers in developing countries are that of low adoption rates and over-
application of fertilisers among the adopters. The results reveal the fact that relevant 
agricultural training can address these two issues simultaneously. 
As expected, the farmers who stay far from all-weather roads (ROADIST) are less likely to 
adopt chemical fertilisers, and also apply less fertiliser per hectare. This is because of higher 
transport expenses and other transaction costs that households associated with poor roads incur 
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to access inputs including fertilisers. These farmers have higher transaction costs for buying 
inputs and selling outputs, which reduces the return of chemical fertiliser application. Other 
studies (e.g., Alene et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2010; Diiro et al., 2015) have reported this negative 
relationship between the difficulty of accessing fertiliser markets and fertiliser adoption. 
Perceptions that fertiliser prices are too high (PRICEPERC) had a negative influence on the 
decision to use fertiliser, and also on the amount applied per hectare. Most of the farmers felt 
that the biggest constraint to their adoption of chemical fertilisers, and applying the 
recommended rates was because they could not afford the fertilisers. This result supports the 
descriptive studies such as Fanadzo et al. (2010) and Odhiambo and Magandini (2008) which 
have reported that financial constraints are the major hindrance of fertiliser use among rural 
farming households in South Africa. 
In line with expectations, the results show that access to a reliable source of water for irrigation 
purposes (IRRIGAT) results in increased chances of chemical fertiliser use and higher amounts 
applied per hectare. This is expected, since access to irrigation reduces the chances of crop 
failure and leads to increased yields. Farmers are more likely to invest in modern inputs, 
including chemical fertilisers, if the prospects of success are higher. As explained in Fanadzo 
et al. (2010), the interaction of moisture supply and nutrient supply is reciprocal such that if 
the farmer cannot irrigate, it is a waste to fertilise; and if a farmer cannot fertilise, it is a waste 
to irrigate. Dorward et al. (2003) and Zezza et al. (2011) have highlighted the importance of 
the joint benefits of resources or technologies, showing that the returns to a particular resource 
or technology are greater if other complementary resources or technologies are also available 
to the household. This has been referred to as ‘bundling of services’ (Zezza et al., 2011). 
The results show that households with more farming experience (FARMEXP) had higher 
chances of adopting fertilisers. This is because experienced farmers are confident in their 
farming abilities and may feel that they would be able to correctly apply the fertilisers. 
However, experience had no significant impact on the level of fertiliser use. Table 4.3 also 
indicates that perceived land tenure security (TENURE) was associated with increases in the 
chances of chemical fertiliser adoption and the level of fertiliser use. This result is consistent 
with the literature (e.g., Brasselle et al., 2002; Chirwa, 2005; Fenske, 2011; Yirga and Hassan, 
2013), which has reported a positive relationship between investments and land tenure security. 
Secure access to land results in farmers having greater incentive to undertake risky investments 
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in productive inputs and technology, since secure land tenure implies their right or ability to 
maintain long-term use of their land.  
The results show that households where heads are employed non-farm applied less chemical 
fertiliser per hectare than households where heads have non-farm employment. A possible 
reason is that households with employed heads depend less on smallholder farming, and are 
thus less reluctant to invest in farming activities compared to their counterparts. This is in 
contrast to the ‘prosperity pull’ hypothesis (Brünjes and Diez, 2012) that suggests that greater 
access to employment should lead to an increase in farm investments because of the higher 
risk-bearing capacity of the employed household heads. However, the result is consistent with 
the ‘recession push’ hypothesis (Brünjes and Diez, 2012) which postulates that increasing 
access to non-farm employment decreases farm investments since people generally prefer to 
work in wage employment and are reluctant to invest in farming because it is risky. Stats SA 
(2012a) reported that people in KZN prefer non-farm wage employment than any other 
livelihood option. 
The results of the present study also indicate that farmers in the Uthukela district are more 
likely to adopt chemical fertiliser than farmers in the Harry Gwala district. The significant 
district dummy implies that there are district-specific attributes (unobserved climatic 
variations, traditional values, attitudes and aspirations) that impact on fertiliser adoption and 
level of use. A possible explanation is that farmers in the Harry Gwala district are less likely to 
use chemical fertilisers than those in the Uthukela district because of the relatively higher agro-
climatic potential in the former compared to the latter.  
For robustness checks, the impact of social grants on chemical fertiliser adoption was estimated 
using the propensity score matching (PSM) and generalised propensity score (GPS) methods. 
The PSM results are presented in Tables 4.4 - 4.7.  
Table 4.4 presents the impact of access to social grants on the probability of fertiliser adoption, 
whereas Table 4.5 shows the impact of access to social grants on the intensity of fertiliser use. 
Table 4.4 shows that households with access to social grants had higher chances of adopting 
chemical fertilisers than those without access to social grants. More specifically, the results in 
Table 4.4 show that the social grant beneficiaries had at least a 23% more chance of using 
chemical fertilisers than non-beneficiary households. The fact that PSM has found a positive 
impact on the chances of using chemical fertilisers, while the regressions found none, 
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emphasises the importance of matching when dealing with treatment and control groups. 
Unlike the regressions, PSM uses only matched sub-samples, resulting in more reliable causal 
estimates. 
Table 4.4: The impact of access on social grants on the probability of fertiliser adoption, PSM 
results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 473 52 0.30 (0.09) 3.42*** 
Kernel matching method 473 55 0.23 (0.09) 2.48** 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: 2014 household survey 
The Rosenbaum (2002) bounds test, implemented in Stata using an ado file (mhbounds) 
provided by Becker and Caliendo (2007) to deal with binary treatment outcomes, indicated that 
the conclusion of a positive impact of access to social grants on chemical fertiliser adoption 
would change at Γ=1.55. This implies that if households with the same covariates differ in their 
odds of being social grants recipients by a factor of 55%, the significance of access to social 
grants on the probability of fertiliser adoption may be questionable. Since this percentage is 
relatively high, it is concluded that the PSM results in Table 4.4 are robust to hidden bias. 
Table 4.5 shows that the social grant beneficiaries applied more fertiliser per hectare than 
non-beneficiary households. Specifically, the results show that the social grant beneficiaries 
applied about 22 kg/ha more chemical fertiliser than non-beneficiary households. The PSM 
results support the conclusions made above that access to social grants has a positive impact 
on the intensity of fertiliser use. The Rosenbaum (2002) test, implemented following DiPrete 
and Gangl (2004) since the outcome is continuous, indicated that the critical level of Γ at which 
the conclusion of a positive effect would be reversed was Γ=2.1. This implies that the results 
are only sensitive to a hidden bias that would more than double the odds of being a social grant 
recipient.  
Table 4.5: The impact of access to social grants on the fertiliser use intensity, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 473 52 22.77 (5.95) 3.83*** 
Kernel matching method 473 55 22.60 (5.99) 3.77*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: 2014 household survey 
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Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the impact of social grant-dependency status on fertiliser adoption 
rates and intensity of fertiliser use, respectively. For this analysis, the low social grant-
dependency category, where social grants contributed less than 50% to household income, was 
considered the control group. The high social grant-dependency category (i.e., households 
where social grants contributed at least 50% to household income) was considered the 
treatment group. This has been explained in previous sections. Consistent with other analytical 
methods, Table 4.6 shows that the level of dependency on social grants (low versus high 
dependency categories) does not influence the decision to adopt chemical fertilisers.  
Table 4.6: The impact of social grant-dependency status on the probability of fertiliser 
adoption, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 264 104 0.09 (0.08) 1.08 
Kernel matching method 264 204 0.06 (0.06) 1.00 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Table 4.7 supports the findings from other econometric methods that high levels of dependency 
on social grants were associated with decreasing intensity of chemical fertiliser adoption. The 
table shows that those households in the high social grant-dependency category applied about 
7 kg/ha less chemical fertiliser than those who are less dependent on social grants. 
 
Table 4.7: The impact of social grant-dependency status on the intensity of chemical fertiliser 
use, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 264 104 -12.47 (7.52) 1.66* 
Kernel matching method 264 204 -7.83 (4.68) 1.67* 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: 2014 household survey 
To further assess the impact of the level of dependency on social grants on the probability of 
chemical fertiliser use and intensity levels, the GPS method was used. The GPS was 
implemented as discussed in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.2.5.5. The outcomes in this case were 
the probability of chemical fertiliser use and the level of fertiliser use in kg/ha. Figure 4.1 
presents the graphs showing the average dose-response and the treatment functions and their 
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respective 95% confidence intervals for the probability of fertiliser use. The table of results is 
presented in Appendix F. The probability of fertiliser adoption was estimated using the logit 
model and the confidence intervals were based on 100 bootstrap repetitions. The normality and 
balancing property assumptions were satisfied at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Figure 4.1 shows that the probability of chemical fertiliser adoption increases at a decreasing 
rate with increasing levels of dependency on social grants up to 50% of social grants 
contribution to total household income. The graph shows a decrease in the chances of chemical 
fertiliser adoption at levels of social grant-dependency higher than 50%, implying that 
increasing levels of social grant-dependency reduce the probability of fertiliser adoption at 
treatment levels above 50%. However, the confidence bands are quite wide in this range, 
particularly after dosages of 80%, implying that the shape of the dose-response curve is not 
reliable after treatment levels of 80%. 
 
Figure 4.1:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the probability of fertiliser adoption 
The results of the impact of social grant-dependency levels on the intensity of fertiliser use are 
presented in Figure 4.2 and Appendix G. The results show a similar trend, indicating that 
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social grant dependency. The graph shows that the relationship changes at the treatment level 
of 50%, implying that increasing contribution of social grants at levels greater than 50% leads 
to a decline in fertiliser use levels.  
 
  
Figure 4.2:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the probability of fertiliser adoption 
Since the confidence bands are also narrow for dosages greater than 50% and less than 80%, it 
can be reliably concluded that there is a decline in chemical fertiliser use intensity when social 
grants contribute more than 50% and less than 80% of household income. However, as 
explained above, the shape of the dose function at dosages greater than 80% is uncertain, since 
the confidence intervals are wide in this range. The next section presents the main conclusions 
of this chapter and their policy implications. 
4.4 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has investigated the extent to which social grants relieve liquidity constraints and 
improve chemical fertiliser use among smallholder farming households in the KZN province, 
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South Africa. A sample of 984 households was analysed using the double-hurdle model. The 
descriptive statistics indicated that the levels of chemical fertiliser application were below the 
recommended application rates, suggesting that the strategies for increasing fertiliser adoption 
rates, as well as fertiliser use intensity in rural South Africa should be identified. The double-
hurdle results indicated that access to and level of dependency on social grants had no 
significant impact on the decision to adopt chemical fertilisers. The variables that had the most 
influence on the decision to adopt chemical fertilisers were soil fertility status, wealth (assets, 
land, etc.), perceived fertiliser prices and security of tenure.  
While access to social grants had a positive impact on fertiliser use level, increasing level of 
dependency on social grants had a negative impact. The positive influence of access to social 
grants on chemical fertiliser use intensity indicates that social grants play a significant role in 
alleviating the liquidity constraints facing rural farmers. This result is consistent with the 
presence of credit constraints that limit poor rural households’ ability to invest in modern 
farming technologies. It supports the hypothesis that social grant beneficiary households use 
some of the grant income to alleviate financial constraints in agricultural production. However, 
the negative association between increasing level of dependency on social grants and fertiliser 
use intensity suggests that increasing incomes from social grants may entrench a culture of 
dependency and entitlement, creating production disincentives.  
The results of this study suggest that the disincentive impact of social grants on technology 
adoption is not a question of whether or not a household is a social grant beneficiary but the 
relative importance of the grant to household income. Specifically, the GPS results indicated 
that social grants contribution of more than 50% to household income creates disincentives to 
adopt chemical fertilisers. As social grants are not enough to pull households out of poverty 
completely if they are not complemented by other livelihood options (such as farming), there 
is a need for strategies to reduce this social grant-dependency and production disincentives. 
This implies the need to prioritise strategies that allow for social grants to play a positive role 
in technology adoption without creating negative dependency and production disincentives. 
The study results suggest that subsidies accompanied by policies that target to increase 
smallholder farmers’ assets to increase their risk-bearing capacity could improve the chances 
of chemical fertiliser adoption. 
To ensure that social grants have the most effect on the adoption of fertiliser and other 
technological innovations, interventions should focus on aspects (e.g., secure land tenure, 
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information access, extension and group membership) that allow households to overcome the 
first hurdle, i.e., decide to use chemical fertilisers. Creating a positive demand for chemical 
fertilisers requires that the farmers be made aware of the technology and its benefits. The 
importance of agricultural extension as a source of information as well as social networks such 
as groups in reducing transaction costs means that they should be utilised to promote chemical 
fertiliser use among smallholder farmers. The study has also highlighted the importance of 
complementary inputs (such as irrigation), as well as public infrastructure (such as roads), in 
encouraging chemical fertiliser adoption in the rural areas. Farmers are most likely to adopt 
new technology if they are confident on the prospective success of the new technology (mainly 
due to the availability of other complementary inputs and a conducive infrastructural 
environment). Thus, one improved technology does not work in isolation and policy-makers 
aiming to promote new technology adoption should address all the other 
production/productivity constraints in the rural areas. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL GRANT-DEPENDENCY ON 
SMALLHOLDER MAIZE PRODUCERS’ MARKET PARTICIPATION IN 
KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA 
5.0 Abstract 
This chapter assessed the impact of access to, and level of dependency on, social grants on the 
incentives of smallholder maize producers to participate in the produce markets. The double-
hurdle model was used to analyse a sample of 774 smallholder maize producers from four 
districts in KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. The results showed that higher social grant-
dependency was associated with decreased probability of market participation. Households 
with access to social grants sold less maize in the market. The study concluded that the 
smallholder farmers who have access to, and depend on, social grants are less likely to be 
market-oriented, as they are more likely to produce only for subsistence purposes and depend 
on social grants for income. This has negative implications on the government’s drive to 
increase commercialisation levels of smallholder farmers and points to the need to address the 
social grants disincentives issue in order to meet its targets. The results identified a number of 
factors that significantly influenced household market participation, highlighting the 
importance of institutional support (e.g., extension, training and information) in reducing 
market transaction costs. The study results imply that policies aimed at reducing both fixed and 
variable transaction costs (such as improved road infrastructure and institutional support like 
extension, training, organising farmers into groups) should be prioritised to increase both rates 
and levels of smallholder participation in the maize markets. 
 
 
Keywords: social grants, maize markets, smallholder producers, double-hurdle model, 




Several studies (e.g., de Janvry et al., 1991; von Braun, 1995; Barrett and Swallow, 2006; 
Carter and Barrett, 2006; Alene et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2013) have long agreed on the 
importance of promoting smallholder market participation as a pathway towards poverty 
reduction, economic growth and development in the developing countries. It has been 
suggested that smallholder agriculture would contribute more to rural livelihoods if it breaks 
out of the subsistence trap into commercial agricultural production (Barrett and Swallow, 2006; 
Hazell et al., 2010; Jagwe et al., 2010). As a result, the transition from low productivity, semi-
subsistence agriculture to high productivity, commercialised agriculture has been a core theme 
of rural development initiatives for many years across the developing countries, in general, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa in particular (Barrett, 2008; Agwu et al., 2012; Poole et al., 2013; Zhou et 
al., 2013). 
Despite growing market opportunities that have been brought about by market liberalisation 
policies, lowering of trade barriers and changes in the global agricultural economy, smallholder 
farmers market participation has not significantly increased in many developing countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Barrett, 2008; Markelova et al., 2009; Minten et al., 
2009; Jayne et al., 2010; Mather et al., 2013; Arinloye et al., 2015; Mmbando et al., 2015). 
Several studies done on smallholder market participation in the region (e.g., Key et al., 2000; 
Poulton et al., 2005; Alene et al., 2008; Mendoza and Thelen, 2008; Markelova et al., 2009; 
Hazell et al., 2010; Jagwe et al., 2010; Mmbando et al., 2015) have emphasised that the major 
constraints to improved market participation of smallholder farmers are the high transaction 
costs, information asymmetries and weak institutions. Transaction costs are the costs associated 
with arranging and carrying out a market transaction (Goetz, 1992; Alene et al., 2008). 
This also applies to South Africa, which on one hand is characterised by well market-connected 
large-scale producers, and on the other hand, has a smallholder farming sector that is 
unprofitable and is characterised by weak links to markets (Makhura et al., 2001; Senyolo et 
al., 2009; Ortmann and King, 2010; Biénabe and Vermeulen, 2011; van der Heijden and Vink, 
2013). The general view is that smallholder farmers’ market participation should be improved 
to reduce rural poverty and household food insecurity in South Africa (Randela et al., 2008; 
Senyolo et al., 2009; van Schalkwyk et al., 2012; Chikazunga, 2013; Khumalo, 2013; 
Thamaga-Chitja and Morojele, 2014; Maponya et al., 2015; Raleting and Obi, 2015). The high 
unemployment rates and limited prospects for labour absorption in the non-farm sector in South 
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Africa has led the government to prioritise the expansion of the smallholder sector as part of 
its broader job creation strategy (Aliber and Hall, 2012; NPC, 2012). An important element of 
such a strategy is that it should promote the graduation of subsistence producers, so that they 
can earn an income as commercial smallholder producers (Aliber and Hall, 2012; van 
Schalkwyk et al., 2012).  
The South African government has identified increased commercialisation of smallholder 
farming as key in reducing rural poverty and stimulating rural economic development (NPC, 
2012; DAFF, 2013). For example, the New Growth Path set a target of establishing 300 000 
additional market-oriented smallholder producers by 2020 (DED, 2011). In line with these 
targets, the national Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) has been 
implementing the Strategic Plan for Smallholder Support (SPSS), aimed at supporting 
smallholder farmers to improve production and/or productivity levels and graduate to 
commercial status (DAFF, 2013). One of the key indicators of commercialisation of 
smallholder farmers is their participation in the marketing of their produce. 
In spite of the noble efforts of the government, smallholder farmers’ market participation has 
not significantly improved in South Africa (van Schalkwyk et al., 2012; Hlongwane et al., 
2014; Jordaan et al., 2014; Maponya et al., 2015; Raleting and Obi, 2015). A range of 
constraints and barriers reducing the incentive for market participation have been identified, 
with most of the studies also stressing the issues of high transaction costs and inadequate assets 
or resources to mitigate the effects of these transaction costs (Makhura, 2001; Biénabe and 
Vermeulen, 2011; Jari and Fraser, 2013; van der Heijden and Vink, 2013; Hlongwane et al., 
2014; Mukwevho and Anim, 2014). However, the question that has not been adequately 
addressed in the literature is the impact of social grants on the incentives of smallholder farmers 
to commercialise their production activities. South Africa has social grants that benefited over 
16 million of the poor in 2014 (SASSA, 2014). The majority of smallholder farming 
households are beneficiaries of at least one of the different social grants.  
The question is, to what extent do smallholder farmers rely on social grants for income and 
tend to engage in farming just for subsistence purposes? Descriptive statistics and anecdotal 
evidence from several studies in South Africa (e.g., White and Killick, 2001; Aliber and Hart, 
2009; Aliber and Hall, 2012; Tshuma, 2012) have highlighted the potential negative effect of 
social grant-dependency on smallholder farming activities. Tshuma (2012) reported that the 
majority of smallholder farmers are reducing the area under cultivation, even for subsistence 
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purposes, as they depend more on social grants for their income. This has resulted in social 
grants becoming the greatest source of income for the majority of rural households in South 
Africa, surpassing that of smallholder agriculture by far (Stats SA, 2012; Tshuma, 2012). As 
noted in Ulriksen (2012), subsistence farming is unlikely to help the poor escape poverty, as it 
does not necessarily make them a contributory part of the economy. 
While this suggests that social grants may have created disincentives among smallholder 
producers to participate in agricultural produce markets, the understanding of the linkages 
between smallholder market participation and social grants have not been based on in-depth 
empirical analyses. Few studies, if any, have explicitly and systematically explored the 
relationship between the two variables in South Africa. This study, therefore, seeks to 
investigate the potential disincentive effect of social grants-dependency on smallholder maize 
producers’ market participation, using the double-hurdle model. Maize was chosen because it 
is the most important grain crop in South Africa and is the main crop grown by the smallholder 
farmers (Akpalu et al., 2010; Biénabe and Vermeulen, 2011; D'Haese et al., 2013). 
This chapter also aims to investigate the nature of transaction costs and other constraints that 
have hindered maize commercialisation among rural farming households. Understanding these 
constraints and how they can be alleviated is central to using smallholder maize production as 
an effective tool to integrate rural households into the commercial agricultural economy and 
improve their livelihoods (Makhura, 2001). As noted by Poole et al. (2013), there is need for 
regular studies that investigate the different local contexts and farmer characteristics and 
attitudes to better inform policy-makers, since there is no guarantee that what has worked in 
other areas would work in other contexts. The remainder of this chapter is organised into three 
sections. The next section presents the research methodology, where the theoretical framework 
and the empirical models are outlined. The succeeding section presents the results and their 




5.2 Research methodology 
5.2.1 Data 
This chapter depends on the same data set that was used in Chapters 3 and 4. A total of 984 
households were randomly selected from the four district municipalities in the KwaZulu-Natal 
province, South Africa. Of the total sample, 774 had planted maize in the previous season (79% 
of the total sample), showing the importance of maize among smallholder farming activities. 
As indicated in the previous chapters, the data were collected using a structured questionnaire, 
which contained several modules. On top of the modules such as the basic demographics and 
socio-economic characteristics of the household, measures of wealth and resource endowment 
(e.g., assets, land and livestock), agricultural production activities, and household income 
amounts and sources, the questionnaire captured the crop production and marketing behaviour 
of the households. The households were asked questions about which crops they had planted 
in the previous season, quantities harvested and volumes sold or consumed for each crop.  
5.2.2 Conceptual framework 
The households’ decision on whether or not to participate in the maize market was considered 
under the random utility framework and the theory of farm household decision-making under 
imperfect markets by de Janvry et al. (1991). The random utility framework postulates that the 
smallholder maize farmers will decide to participate in the market if the perceived utility or net 
benefit from participation (UM) is greater than in the case without participation (UN). If the 
difference between the net benefits from participation and non-participation may be denoted as 
UDF, then a household would participate in the maize market if UDF=UM-UN > 0.  
The unobservable net utility U* can be expressed as a function of observable elements in the 
following latent variable model: 
U*i= βxi + εi, Ui=1 if U*i>0       (5.1) 
Where: Ui is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 for household i in case of participation 
and 0 otherwise, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, xi is a vector of household and 
farm characteristics and εi is an error term. 
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The selection of variables into the model was based on the theoretical work by de Janvry et al. 
(1991), which indicated that a household’s market participation is a function of market 
transaction costs. According to de Janvry et al. (1991), market failure is household specific, 
not commodity specific. This is because households who participate in the market are those 
with market gains that are higher than the transaction costs, while those with market gains less 
than the transaction costs will not participate. Even though in some cases markets do not even 
exist, the majority of the cases of market failure in developing countries are due to high 
transactions costs (de Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992; Staal et al., 1997; Key et al., 2000; 
Alene et al., 2008). In South Africa, these transaction costs are due to the fact that the 
smallholder farmers are located in rural areas which are remote and far away from service 
providers and major consumers of farm products. The rural areas are also characterised by poor 
infrastructure, inadequate information and thin credit markets. 
As explained in de Janvry et al. (1991) and other recent studies (e.g., Alene et al., 2008; Mather 
et al., 2013), the household’s market participation is influenced by its economic position, 
institutional environment and local agro-ecological potential. In particular, studies such as 
Barrett (2008) and Boughton et al. (2007) have shown that it is heterogeneity in household 
resource endowments that mostly explains the variation in the ability of poor farmers to access 
the market. Transaction costs, as well as differential access to assets and services to mitigate 
transaction costs, help explain the heterogeneity of smallholder market participation (Boughton 
et al., 2007; Zezza et al., 2011). In this study, transaction costs were proxied by factors such as 
distance to the market and association membership. Wealth endowment (proxied by farm size, 
livestock size and asset values) and social capital (proxied by education level and networks) 
were also considered significant determinants of market participation.  
It was hypothesised that, since participating in the market is not only difficult but also risky, 
the households who are highly dependent on social grants would have fewer incentives to 
participate. On the other hand, the constant and predictable income from social grants may 
actually have a positive effect on smallholder market participation. Access to social grants may 
help the farmers overcome transaction costs barriers and thus improve their market 
participation. For example, poor farmers may be able to invest in productive assets such as 
bicycles or cell phones (Rocha et al., 2012; Piachaud, 2013), which help reduce transaction 
costs. The influence of social grants was therefore captured using two variables: a dummy 
variable showing whether or not a household has access to social grants and another variable 
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showing the proportion of household income that comes from social grants. The proportion 
variable captured the level of household dependency on social grants. Table 5.1 shows the 
variables that were considered and their description.  
The quantities of maize produce harvested and sold, as well as prices, were based on the recall 
by the farmers. Even though the individual prices the households face were collected, the 
average ward prices were used as an explanatory variable in the model, following Komarek 
(2010). This is because, if household specific prices were used, those households with zero 
sales would have been excluded from the analysis. Therefore, average ward prices were 
calculated and assigned to farmers according to their wards. Total household income included 
the incomes that the household received from different sources, which included employment, 
remittances, social grants, farming and micro-businesses. To capture the amount of social 
grants income, the households were asked the social grant types that any member of the 
household received and when each member had begun receiving the grant 
5.2.3 The empirical model 
The maize output marketing decision was modelled as a two-step decision process: (1) the 
household decides whether or not to participate in the market, and (2) the household decides 
on the volume of transactions. The double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) was used to model this 
two-step decision process, following several other market participation studies (e.g., Holloway 
et al., 2005; Komarek, 2010; Reyes et al., 2012; Mather et al., 2013; Mabuza et al., 2014; 
Musah et al., 2014; Ndoro et al., 2014). This model was chosen over the Heckman sample 
selection model, which has been used by many studies (e.g., Goetz, 1992; Alene et al., 2008; 
Jagwe et al., 2010; Ouma et al., 2010; Bwalya et al., 2013; Geoffrey et al., 2013; Sebatta et 
al., 2014; Zamasiya et al., 2014; Mmbando et al., 2015). The presence of zero amounts sold in 
the dependent variable poses a statistical challenge when analysing market participation micro-
data. The use of OLS is not appropriate, as it fails to take into account the fact that the data is 





Table 5.1: Variables included in the market participation double-hurdle model and their 
description 
Variable code Variable name and description 
MZOUTPUT Maize output harvested last season (tons) 
MZSELL Household sold maize in the market last season (1=Yes) 
MZSOLD Quantity of maize sold (tons) 
MZSOLDPROP Proportion of maize output sold 
AGE Household head age (Years) 
GENDER Household head gender (1=Male) 
EDUCAT Household head education level (Years) 
HHSIZE Household size (Numbers) 
MZPRICE Price of maize output per ton (Rands/ton) 
LANDSZE Land size household has access to (ha) 
TLU Livestock size (TLUs) 
ASSETS Value of household assets (Rands) 
GRANTS Household has access to social grants (1=Yes) 
GRANTBEN Number of social grant beneficiaries per household 
TOTINC Annual total household income (Rands) 
GRANTINC Annual income from social grants (Rands) 
FARMINC Annual income from farm activities (Rands) 
OTHERINC Annual income from other off-farm activities (Rands) 
GRANTPROP Proportion of income from social grants 
FARMPROP Proportion of income from farming activities 
GRANTUSE% Proportion of social grants income used in farming 
EXTENSION Access to extension (1=Yes) 
INFORM Number of information sources 
MARKET Market access (1=Good) 
CREDIT Access to credit (1=Yes) 
TRAINING Access to agricultural training (1=Yes)  
ASSOC Farmer group member (1=Yes) 
MKTDIST Distance to the maize market (km) 
FARMEXP Household head farming experience (Years) 
IRRIGAT Access to water for irrigation purposes (1=Yes) 
HHEMPLOY Household head off-farm employment (1=Yes) 
BUSINESS Ownership of small non-farm business (1=Yes) 
HGWALA Harry Gwala district (1=Harry Gwala) 
UMZINYAT Umzinyathi district (1=Umzinyathi) 
UTHUKELA Uthukela (1=Uthukela) 
UMKHANYA Umkhanyakude (1=Umkhanyakude) 
Source: 2014 household survey 
The Heckman approach addresses the statistical challenge posed by cases where market sales 
equal zero as a missing data problem. The approach assumes that zero observation is due to 
non-participation solely, implying that the participation volume decision includes only non-
zero observations. However, the issue of zero market sales was treated as a corner solution in 
this study, since a zero amount of maize output sold is a valid economic choice to be explained 
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and does not represent missing values (Reyes et al., 2012; Mather et al., 2013; Musah et al., 
2014). For example, a household may have decided to participate in the market, but fail to sell 
any volume, due to other challenges such as inability to transport the produce to the market. 
This implies that a zero observation could be due to either non-participation or participation 
but zero volume sold. The double-hurdle model produces better estimates than the Heckman 
model when one is dealing with true zeros (Dow and Norton, 2003). 
A corner solution model may also be estimated using the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), as has 
been done by a few market participation studies (e.g., Holloway et al., 2000; Martey et al., 
2012; Adenegan et al., 2013; Boniphace et al., 2014). However, compared to the double-hurdle 
model, the Tobit model is more restrictive. The Tobit model assumes that the decision to 
participate and level of market participation are made jointly and are affected by the same set 
of variables (Burke, 2009). The double-hurdle model, on the other hand, allows the decision to 
participate and intensity of participation to be determined by separate processes.  
The double-hurdle model can be thought of as a flexible version of both the Tobit and Heckman 
selection models (Eakins, 2014). Whereas the Tobit model assumes that the participation and 
volume decisions can be modelled as one equation, the double-hurdle model relaxes this 
assumption and models both decisions separately. Similarly, while the Heckman model 
assumes that zero observations arise due to non-participation only, the double-hurdle model 
relaxes this assumption and allows zero observations to arise in both the participation hurdle 
and volume hurdle. The double-hurdle model therefore features both the selection mechanism 
of the Heckman model (which is not a feature of the Tobit model) and the censoring mechanism 
of the Tobit model (which is not a feature of the Heckman selection model) (Eakins, 2014). 
The double-hurdle model postulates that a farmer faces two hurdles before they are observed 
with a positive level of market participation. The first hurdle corresponds to factors affecting 
the decision to participate in the market and the second to the level of participation, i.e., how 
much maize to sell in the market. This approach allows for distinguishing between fixed 
transactions costs, which influence only the first decision of participation, and variable 
transactions costs, which can influence both decisions (Key et al., 2000). For example, distance 
to the market was considered in both decision stages because farmers nearer to the market incur 
lower information costs, thus reducing fixed costs, and they also incur lower transport costs, 
reducing variable costs.  
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Similarly, association membership was considered in both stages, because group memberships 
may have higher access to information since group members exchange information and 
experience. On the other hand, individual members would incur less variables costs (transport 
costs and risks), as they share these with other group members. However, access to different 
information sources only mitigates the costs of accessing information, which are fixed costs, 
but not the variable transaction costs. According to Alene et al. (2008), this distinction not only 
improves the estimation procedure but also produces insights into the effectiveness of 
particular mechanisms for reducing transactions costs. The double-hurdle model was 
implemented in this chapter as explained in the previous chapter (with only minor notation 
variations), with fertiliser adoption replaced by market participation. However, for the sake of 
completion, the double-hurdle is presented as implemented in this chapter. While repetitions 
are inevitable, an attempt is made to minimise them. 
The double-hurdle model involved use of different latent variables to model each decision 
process, with a probit model determining the participation process and a truncated regression 
model determining the participation level.  
The model was specified as follows: 
Y*i1 = ziα + ui    Participation decision   (5.1a) 
Y*i2 = xiβ + vi    Volume decision   (5.1b) 
Yi = xiβ + vi    if Y*i1 > 0 and Y*i2 > 0  (5.1c) 
Yi =0     Otherwise    (5.1d) 
Where: Y*i1 is a latent endogenous variable representing a household’s participation decision, 
Y*i2 is a latent endogenous variable representing household’s volume decision, Yi is the 
observed volume of maize sold, zi is a vector of household characteristics explaining the 
participation decision (including an indicator of access to social grants as well as dependency 
on social grants), xi is a vector of variables explaining the volume decision (including an 
indicator of access to social grants and dependency on social grants), α and β are the 
coefficients to be estimated; ui and vi are independent, homoscedastic, normally distributed 
error terms.  
It should be noted that the double-hurdle model reduces to the Tobit model when ziα is equal 
to 1. Therefore, a log likelihood test was done to justify the use of the double-hurdle model 
over the Tobit. Based on the log-likelihood values obtained from a separate estimation of the 
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probit, truncated regression and Tobit models, the likelihood ratio statistic (λ) was computed 
as follows: 
λ =2 [LLprobit+LLtrunc  - LLtobit]      (5.2) 
where: LLprobit, LLtrunc  and LLtobit are the likelihood values from the probit, truncated regression 
and Tobit models, respectively. The test statistic has a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of independent variables (including the intercept) (Greene, 2003). The 
Tobit model is rejected in favour of the double-hurdle model if λ exceeds the appropriate χ2 
critical value, as was the case in this study (Burke, 2009; Mabuza et al., 2014). 
As in previous chapters, selection bias was tested for in the model. This is because social grants 
are not a random intervention but a targeted intervention. Selection bias may occur because the 
farmers with higher intrinsic motivation and ability are more likely to have more income and 
assets, meaning that they are less likely to qualify to benefit from social grants. These motivated 
farmers are also more likely to participate in the maize markets, resulting in selection bias. The 
probit model (Eq. 5.1a) was first estimated using the Heckman selection probit model 
(heckprob command in Stata), with access to social grants as the selection variable. The 
likelihood ratio test of independent equations was done to indicate if there was evidence of 
selection bias at the conventional 10% significance level. The truncated regression (Eq. 5.1b) 
was also tested for selection bias by adding the inverse mills ratio (IMR) to determine its level 
of significance. The tests showed that there was no evidence of selection bias on both equations. 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was done to test for potential endogeneity of level of 
dependency on social grants in the model. This is because it is possible that causality might 
flow from market participation to dependency on social grants, since increased market 
participation results in increased farm income. The increased farm income would result in 
decreased dependency on social grants. The test was implemented by firstly regressing social 
grant-dependency on the exogenous explanatory variables, obtaining the residuals, and then 
adding these residuals in Eq. 5.1a and 5.1b. A statistically significant estimated coefficient of 
the residuals would mean endogeneity problems, while a statistically insignificant estimate (as 
was the case in this study) means no evidence of the endogeneity problem. The potential 
endogeneity of other variables, such as quantity produced, prices and assets (Boughton et al., 
2007; Reyes et al., 2012; Mather et al., 2013) was not tested. Therefore, the estimated 
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coefficients of these variables should be interpreted as associations, not as causality 
relationships. 
As explained in the previous chapters, one of the double-hurdle model’s limitations is that it 
uses all observations in the treatment and control samples, resulting in less reliable impact 
estimates. PSM and GPS were thus also estimated in this chapter for robustness checks and to 
provide more reliable causal estimates. These matching techniques were implemented as 
explained in Chapter 3. The PSM was used to estimate the impact of access to social grants on 
the likelihood of market participation and on the level of market participation. The GPS method 
was used to investigate the impact of the level of dependency on social grants on the likelihood 
of market participation and on the level of market participation. 
5.3 Results and discussions 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 shows the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents according to their 
market participation status. The table shows that close to 60% of the maize producers 
participated in the maize markets (MZSELL), selling, on average, over 200 kg (45% of the 
total maize output) in the 2013/14 season (MZSOLD and MZSOLDPROP). The proportion of 
maize market participators is comparable to other studies in South Africa. For example, 
Biénabe and Vermeulen (2011) reported a figure of 43% maize market participants in the 
Limpopo province. Again in Limpopo province, Hlongwane et al. (2014) reported that 51% 
participated in the maize market in Giyani. For the southern African region, Jayne et al. (2010) 
estimated that roughly 20-35% of the smallholder farmers sell grain in a given year. 
The table shows some significant differences in wealth and institutional or organisation support 
between market participants and non-participants. Households participating in the maize 
markets had bigger family sizes, were richer in assets and had more farm income. In terms of 
institutional or organisation support, the market participants had more access to extension and 
information. The market-participant category had more members of associations than non-
participants, highlighting the importance of groups in enhancing market participation by 
smallholder producers. Market participants had less access to social grants and received lower 
income from social grants. The table shows that, while non-market participants received 45% 
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of their income from social grants, market participants received 35% of their income from 
social grants. This indicates that market participants are less dependent on social grants than 
non-market participants. The table shows that the market participants were nearer to markets, 
had higher maize output and were more productive in maize production. 
Table 5.2: Socio-economic characteristics of the sampled households according to maize 
market participation status 






T tests  
(χ2 tests) 
AGE 56 56 57 -1.05 
GENDER  0.47 0.49 0.45 0.77 
EDUCAT 4.67 4.84 4.41 1.44 
HHSIZE 7.04 7.27 6.82 1.77* 
LANDSZE 1.93 2.15 1.80 0.97 
TLU 3.54 4.60 2.55 1.45 
ASSETS 82,105 85,637 79,579 2.15** 
GRANTS  0.85 0.80 0.91 18.7*** 
OFFFARMINC 40,204 40,790 40,979 -0.09 
FARMINC 6,553 7,343 5,249 2.47** 
GRANTINC 16,587 13,552 20,068 -6.82*** 
GRANTPROP 0.38 0.31 0.45 -8.16*** 
MZPRICE 1,484 1,674 1,243 10.09*** 
MZOUTPUT 0.516 0.710 0.316 5.27*** 
MZYIELD 0.977 1.169 0.715 7.71*** 
MARKET  0.20 0.25 0.16 9.07*** 
ASSOC  0.42 0.45 0.38 4.39** 
CREDIT  0.36 0.37 0.35 0.32 
EXTENSION 0.57 0.68 0.42 55.34*** 
INFORM 2.28 2.36 2.14 2.80*** 
TRAINING  0.41 0.39 0.43 1.22 
MKTDIST 24 20 33 5.23*** 
FARMEXP 19 19 19 0.24 
HHEMPLOY 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.01 
BUSINESS 0.08 0.12 0.05 11.02*** 
IRRIGAT 0.46 0.54 0.35 28.23*** 
HGWALA  0.42 0.37 0.47 8.49*** 
UMZINYAT  0.24 0.28 0.17 12.61*** 
UTHUKEL  0.19 0.11 0.34 64.02*** 
UMKHANY  0.15 0.25 0.02 6.07** 
MZSELL 0.57    
MZSOLD 0.278    
MZSOLDPROP 0.45    
 Notes: ***, **, and * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 




Table 5.3: The impact of social grants-dependency on maize market participation, the double-
hurdle model results 
Variables Market participation Maize marketed 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
GRANTS 0.277 0.210 -6.144** 2.937 
GRANTPROP -1.450*** 0.323 2.003 4.730 
AGE 0.012** 0.005 0.049 0.071 
GENDER -0.021 0.117 -6.021*** 2.408 
EDUCAT 0.037** 0.016 -0.136 0.213 
HHSIZE 0.005 0.017 0.275 0.222 
LANDSZE 0.122** 0.055 1.859** 0.918 
TLU -0.002 0.004 0.001 0.021 
ASSETS 0.275*** 0.084 -0.926 1.238 
MZOUTPUT 0.676*** 0.108 3.493*** 0.783 
MZPRICE 0.001*** 0.000 0.002** 0.001 
EXTENSION 0.325*** 0.122 2.912 2.061 
INFORM 0.068 0.059 - - 
ASSOC -0.111 0.140 3.476* 1.953 
CREDIT -0.076 0.120 -1.892 1.680 
TRAINING 0.244* 0.128 1.288 1.567 
MKTDIST -0.009*** 0.002 0.051*** 0.018 
FARMEXP 0.005 0.005 0.016 0.063 
HHEMPLOY -0.411*** 0.157 -1.750 2.225 
BUSINESS 0.300 0.217 5.108* 2.910 
UMZINYAT 0.510*** 0.161 -0.311 2.344 
UTHUKELA -0.493*** 0.158 4.736* 2.477 
UMKHANYA 1.683*** 0.267 -2.166 2.407 
_CONS -4.944*** 1.022 -16.457 15.570 
σ   2.794*** 0.435 
 
N 774 
Wald χ2(23) 231.42*** 
Pseudo R2 0.35 
% Correctly classified 80 
  
Hausman tests χ2(1)=0.87, p=0.35 F(1, 750)=0.49, p=0.48 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (χ2 (1) = 0.37, p = 0.54) 
Log-likelihood test: λ=622; χ2 (23) critical value=35 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
The significant and negative estimated coefficient of access to social grants (GRANTS) in the 
maize supply model suggests that households with access to social grants sell 6.14 tonnes less 
maize quantities in the market than those without. This result implies that access to social 
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grants, instead of helping households overcome the variable transaction costs, decreases 
incentives to sell more maize produce by the market participants. A plausible explanation for 
this result is that social grant recipient households are producing mostly for subsistence 
purposes, and enter the maize market aiming to raise a certain amount of income needed to 
maintain a desired consumption level. Therefore, increasing household income through social 
grants decreases the need to sell more maize produce in the market. This result applies to both 
the highly and lowly social grant dependent households, since the level of dependency on social 
grants (GRANTPROP) was not significant in the maize supply model. The results support 
evidence from descriptive and anecdotal reports (e.g., Aliber and Hart, 2009; Tshuma, 2012; 
Mabugu et al., 2014) that have reported a potential disincentive effect of social grants on 
smallholder commercialisation.  
Age (AGE) was positively related to the decision to participate in the market, implying that 
older farmers were more likely to participate in the market. This is because older farmers would 
have developed greater market contacts and trust that would allow them to trade at lower 
transaction costs. This result is contrary to a priori expectations and the majority of literature 
(e.g., Alene et al., 2008; Geoffrey et al., 2013; Musah et al., 2014). It was expected that 
increasing age will be associated with decreasing chances of market participation, as older 
farmers are less receptive to new ideas and are more risk averse than younger farmers. The 
implication of the result is that the effect of increased contacts or networks dominate the risk 
aversion associated with older farmers, resulting in a positive relationship between age and 
market participation. Some studies in South Africa (Randela et al., 2008; Maponya et al., 2015) 
have also reported this positive relationship between age and market participation. 
The negative estimated coefficient of gender (GENDER) on the maize marketed model implies 
that female-headed households sell 6.02 tonnes more maize quantities in the market than male-
headed households. This result is inconsistent with expectations and a number of studies (e.g., 
Boughton et al., 2007; Ouma et al., 2010; Geoffrey et al., 2013; Hlongwane et al., 2014; 
Sebatta et al., 2014; Mmbando et al., 2015). The expectation was that male-headed households 
would sell more due to their advantages in bargaining, negotiating and enforcing contracts. The 
result, which is in line with a few studies such as Boniphace et al. (2014) and Zamasiya et al. 
(2014), suggests that female-headed households are not at risk of exclusion in the market for 
staples such as maize. While the female-headed households may have disadvantages in the high 
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value cash crops markets where men dominate (Makhura, 2001; Boughton et al., 2007), the 
result indicates that female-headed households have advantages in the low value crop markets.  
The results show that households headed by more educated heads (EDUCAT) were more likely 
to participate in the maize market. This result is consistent with a priori expectations and 
literature (e.g., Masuku et al., 2001; Geoffrey et al., 2013; Maponya et al., 2015; Mmbando et 
al., 2015). The explanation is that the more educated understand and interpret market 
information better, resulting in lower transaction costs. However, once the decision to 
participate in the market is made, education level had no significant impact. This implies that, 
while education helps reduce fixed transaction costs such as search costs, it has no significant 
impact on the proportional transaction costs such as transportation costs. 
Increasing farm size (LANDSZE) was associated with higher chances of selling maize and as 
selling higher quantities of maize. This is because land is an important production factor that 
enables households to produce a surplus for the market. The result is consistent with many 
market participation studies (e.g., Makhura et al., 2001; Lerman, 2004; Boughton et al., 2007; 
Alene et al., 2008; Nepal and Thapa, 2009; Jagwe et al., 2010; Boniphace et al., 2014; Osmani 
and Hossain, 2015) that have highlighted the critical role that access to land plays in motivating 
smallholder farmers to produce for the markets. Increasing asset value (ASSET) was also found 
to be associated with increased likelihood of market participation. This is in line with the 
literature (e.g., Barrett and Swallow, 2006; Boughton et al., 2007; Reyes et al., 2012), which 
have shown the importance of assets in enabling smallholder farmers to produce a surplus 
necessary for participating in markets as sellers. Wealthier households are more likely to 
undertake riskier activities such as market participation because of their capacity to bear risks. 
The results demonstrate the importance of increasing production levels in market participation 
(MZOUTPUT). The households which produced more maize were more likely to participate 
in the market than households producing less maize output. After the decision to participate in 
the market was made, those with higher output were likely to sell more. The explanation is that, 
since market participation requires that the smallholder farmer produces a marketable surplus, 
those households with higher production levels are likely to have more than enough for family 
consumption. This result is consistent with the literature (e.g., Omiti et al., 2009; Komarek, 
2010; Bwalya et al., 2013; Geoffrey et al., 2013).  
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In agreement with a priori expectations informed by economic theory and the literature (e.g., 
Key et al., 2000; Boughton et al., 2007; Alene et al., 2008; Jagwe et al., 2010; Komarek, 2010; 
Ouma et al., 2010; Mather et al., 2013; Sebatta et al., 2014; Mmbando et al., 2015), the study 
found a positive relationship between the maize producer price (MZPRICE) and both the 
decision to sell maize and the quantity sold. This indicates that market prices provide incentives 
for households to participate and sell more maize in the market, implying rational economic 
behaviour by smallholder farmers. However, it must be noted that many smallholder farmers 
sell their produce right after harvest to satisfy their immediate cash requirements, and their 
capacity to wait and take advantage of higher prices is low (Alene et al., 2008). As such, this 
result should be interpreted as indicating that smallholder farmers are responsive to price 
changes, at least in the short term. 
The results show that access to extension (EXTENSION) was associated with increased 
chances of participating in the market. This result is consistent with the literature (Holloway et 
al., 2005; Alene et al., 2008; Zamasiya et al., 2014). Extension officers remain the main sources 
of agricultural market information among rural households and contact with extension agents 
keeps the farmers updated with information regarding market locations, prices and potential 
buyers/sellers. Training (TRAINING) was found to have a positive impact on the decision to 
participate in the market, implying that focussed farmer training may increase the chances of 
households participating in the market. While group membership (ASSOC) was insignificant 
in the market participation model, it was significant in the maize supply model. This implies 
that group membership played a less significant role as a channel of information exchange, but 
a significant role as a means of sharing variable costs, such as transport costs, among the 
sampled households. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Alene et al., 2008; Sebatta 
et al., 2014; Mmbando et al., 2015). 
As expected, and in line with the literature (Bwalya et al., 2013; Hlongwane et al., 2014; 
Mmbando et al., 2015), farmers who live further away from the markets (MKTDIST) had less 
chance of participating in the market than those who live nearer. This is because, to access 
market information, the smallholder farmer has to interact with market actors, as the market 
information published in formal channels such as newspapers is not very relevant to farmers in 
rural areas. Formal information sources mainly report national figures and the isolated nature 
of rural areas means that the local market situation could be very different from the national 
situation. As a result, the smallholder farmers have to physically go to the local market places 
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to gather such relevant information. The insignificant estimated information access variable 
(INFORM) confirms this to be the case in the study areas, as increasing diversity of information 
sources was not very useful, because the information may not be contextually relevant. 
Consequently, the farmers located further from the market incur higher search costs than those 
nearer to the market.  
Once the farmer has decided to participate, increasing distance was associated with increasing 
quantity of maize produce sold. This indicates that the higher transport costs that the farmers 
who live further away incur make them strive to meet a certain supply threshold to make a 
profit. The farmers who live further away sell more to make the same amount of money as the 
ones who live closer, due to the additional transaction costs. This agrees with other studies 
(e.g., Boughton et al., 2007), and contrary to others (Nepal and Thapa, 2009; Omiti et al., 2009; 
Agwu et al., 2012; Mmbando et al., 2015). Households where the heads were employed in the 
non-farm sector (HHEMPLOY) were less likely to participate in the market than those where 
heads were unemployed. This may be because households where heads are employed depend 
on wages for income and only practise farming for subsistence. This result, just like in the 
previous chapter, is consistent with the ‘recession push’ hypothesis, which postulates that 
increasing access to non-farm employment decreases entrepreneurship, as people generally 
prefer to work in wage employment and are reluctant to expand the risky farming ventures to 
commercial levels. The results show that owners of non-farm businesses (BUSINESS) sold 
more in the market than non-business owners. This may be because the non-farm business 
owners have established more contacts or networks, resulting in declining transaction costs.  
The significant district dummies show that farming households from both Umkhanyakude and 
Umzinyathi were more likely to participate in the market than those in Harry Gwala district. 
Smallholder farmers in Uthukela district were less likely to participate compared to the Harry 
Gwala smallholder farmers. As explained in the previous chapters, these significant district 
dummies imply that there are district-specific attributes that result in spatial variations in the 
political, social and agro-climatic environment of these districts which impact on market 
participation. These district dummies capture these variations that were not captured in the 
model.  
A possible explanation of the higher maize participation rates in Umkhanyakude than in Harry 
Gwala districts is that the culture of selling maize seems to have been inculcated among 
smallholder farmers in Umkhanyakude, particularly in and around the town of Jozini. While 
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Harry Gwala district has a high potential for maize production, particularly in the Ubuhlebezwe 
local municipality, access to the market is a major problem, due to poor roads. For example, 
the main road joining one of the high potential smallholder maize producing areas of Hlokozi 
and the nearest main town, Ixopo, is mostly a gravel road, which becomes impassable during 
the rainy season.  
A plausible explanation for the higher market participation rates in Umzinyathi district than in 
Harry Gwala is that, because the high temperatures and low rainfall make it difficult for many 
households to produce crops, there is a ready market for those who are able to produce a surplus 
from the surrounding communities. The lower maize market participation rates in the Uthukela 
district than in the Harry Gwala district may be because the rural areas in Uthukela are isolated 
and far from bigger urban centres. For those who participate in the market, the results show 
that farmers in Uthukela sell a higher volume of maize than those in Harry Gwala. The reason 
for this may be that, because of their location further from markets, those who sell have to sell 
in bulk to break-even. 
To check the robustness of the estimated social grants impact parameters, this chapter used the 
PSM and GPS methods. Table 5.4 presents the PSM results on the impact of access to social 
grants on the probability of market participation, whereas Table 5.5 shows the impact of access 
to social grants on the level of market participation. Table 5.4 shows that households with 
access to social grants had a lower chance of participating in the market. Specifically, the 
results in Table 4.4 show that the social grant beneficiaries had about 20% less chance of 
participating in the market, compared to non-beneficiary households. The Rosenbaum (2002) 
bounds test showed that the result became insignificant at Γ=1.81, implying that the results in 
Table 5.4 can be undermined by a hidden bias of over 80%. This large percentage indicates 
that the PSM are relatively robust to hidden bias. 
Table 5.4: The impact of access to social grants on the probability of market participation, 
PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 473 49 -0.19 (0.11) -1.68* 
Kernel matching method 473 55 -0.21 (0.11) -1.87* 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: Household survey 
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Table 5.5 shows that the social grant beneficiaries sold lower maize quantities in the market 
than non-beneficiary households. The PSM results support the conclusions made using the 
double-hurdle model that access to social grants has a negative impact on the level of market 
participation. These results were relatively robust to hidden bias, as the Rosenbaum (2002) 
sensitivity test indicated that the conclusion would change at Γ=1.96. 
Table 5.5: The impact of access to social grants on the level of market participation, PSM 
results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 473 56 -0.213 (0.12) -1.76* 
Kernel matching method 473 59 -0.190 (0.10) -1.90* 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: 2014 Household survey 
The GPS approach was used to examine the impact of the level of dependency on social grants 
on the probability and level of market participation. The GPS method was implemented as 
discussed in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.2.5.5, with the outcomes in this case being the probability 
and level of market participation. Figure 5.1 presents the graphs showing the average dose-
response and the treatment functions and their respective 95% confidence intervals for the 
probability of market participation. The table of results is presented in Appendix H. Figure 5.1 
indicates that the probability of market participation was not influenced by the level of 
dependency on social grants. The dose-response curve is generally flat in the region where the 
95% confidence bands are very narrow, implying that there is generally no association between 
social grant-dependency levels and the probability of market participation. This result is 
inconsistent with the double-hurdle model results, which indicated that increasing dependency 




Figure 5.1:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the probability of market participation 
The GPS results of the impact of social grant-dependency on the level of market participation 
are shown in Figure 5.2 and Appendix I. The results show that increasing income from social 
grants is associated with decreasing quantities of maize sold. The confidence bands are very 
narrow, especially for the range of dosages between 10% and 80%, implying that the result is 
reasonably reliable. Therefore, it is concluded that increasing dependency on social grants 
results in reduced levels of market participation. This result is also is inconsistent with the 
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Figure 5.2:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the level of market participation 
The empirical results have generally indicated that both access to social grants and the level of 
dependency on social grants are negatively associated with market participation. Even though 
there were variations in different models, all the methods used had negative signs for these 
variables where they were significant. The next section presents the main conclusions of this 
chapter and their policy implications. 
3.1 Conclusions and policy implications 
The majority of the smallholder farming households are beneficiaries of social grants. The 
question addressed in this chapter pertains to the extent to which smallholder farmers rely on 
social grants for income and are disincentivised to participate in the agricultural markets as 
sellers. This chapter assessed the effects of access to, and level of dependency on, social grants 
on the incentives of smallholder maize producers to participate in the produce markets. The 
double-hurdle model was used to analyse a sample of 774 smallholder maize producers from 
four districts in KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. For robustness checks, results from 
the PSM and GPS were presented. The double-hurdle model results showed that the level of 
dependency on social grants was associated with decreased chances of maize market 
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participation. Households with access to social grants were likely to sell lower maize quantities 
compared to households with no access to social grants.  
The conclusion is that the smallholder farmers who have access to, and depend more on, social 
grants are less likely to be market-oriented, as they are more likely to produce only for 
subsistence purposes and depend on social grants for income. The implication is that access to 
social grants has not helped households overcome the variable transaction costs, but instead 
reduced their incentives to commercialise their farming activities. The fact that social grant 
dependent households were more likely to produce only for subsistence purposes, and depend 
on social grants for income, suggests that social grants are spilling over to the undeserving 
household members, reducing recipient households’ incentives to engage in income-generating 
farming activities. This has negative implications on the government’s drive to increase the 
commercialisation levels of smallholder farmers and meet its target of establishing 300 000 
additional market-oriented smallholder producers by 2020. While this study is not advocating 
the removal of social grants to poor households, it suggests the need to re-look at how these 
two interventions (social grants and smallholder commercialisation) may be synchronised so 
that they do not work in opposing ways.  
The study results also suggest that female-headed households may be successfully included in 
the market for staples. Whereas there are concerns elsewhere that women are likely to remain 
subsistence farmers due to their exclusion from the market, this study indicates that there is 
potential of reversing that trend if women are encouraged to produce and sell staples such as 
maize. The results suggest that increased targeting of women for market participation may 
increase the impact of policy interventions that are aimed at improving market access. The 
study results also imply that policies aimed at reducing both fixed and variable transaction costs 
(such as improved road infrastructure and institutional support like extension, training, 
organising farmers into groups) should be prioritised to increase rates and levels of smallholder 
participation in maize markets. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL GRANTS ON FARM 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AMONG RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN KWAZULU-
NATAL 
4.0 Abstract 
This chapter aimed to investigate the extent to which access to, and level of dependency on, 
social grants inhibit or enhance the development of farm entrepreneurship in the rural areas of 
the KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. A total of 513 rural households were randomly 
selected in the Umzinyathi, Uthukela and Harry Gwala districts. The data were analysed using 
the Bartlett factor score regression method. Descriptive analysis showed that there were low 
levels of entrepreneurship among the rural households, suggesting the need for deliberate 
efforts to stimulate entrepreneurship if the government goals of eradicating rural poverty are to 
be met. The empirical results indicated that, while access to social grants was statistically 
insignificant, the level of dependency on social grants negatively influenced farm 
entrepreneurship development. This implies that the disincentive effects are not dependent on 
access to social grants per se, but on the level of dependency on the social grants for income. 
The chapter concludes that social grants, especially in households where they are more 
important, are spilling-over to unintended household members, creating disincentive effects 
which inhibit entrepreneurial development among rural farming households. Given that the 
entrepreneurial competencies can be learned and changed, the chapter also identified the policy 
variables to enhance farm entrepreneurship. The chapter recommends that government should 
prioritise the provision of support services such as training, extension and credit support, in 
order to establish entrepreneurial rural households. A greater emphasis should be on identifying 
the gaps in the farmers’ entrepreneurship skills set and then training the farmers according to 
their needs. 
 
Keywords: farm entrepreneurship index, social grants, smallholder farming, rural areas, 





South Africa is characterised by high unemployment and poverty levels (Stats SA, 2012; 
Herrington et al., 2015). Job creation and poverty reduction are thus top of the country’s 
national agenda (Fal et al., 2011; NPC, 2012). However, the country’s capacity to address the 
unemployment and poverty problems has been partly hamstrung by a relatively low level of 
entrepreneurial activity (van der Merwe and de Swardt, 2008; Agbenyegah, 2013). Even 
though South Africa’s entrepreneurship performance, as measured by the Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) index4, has increased in the past several years, it is still very low when 
compared to other developing countries (Fal et al., 2011; Dzansi et al., 2015; Herrington et al., 
2015; Singer et al., 2015). For example, whereas South Africa’s TEA index has fluctuated 
below 10% since the mid-1990s, countries such as Brazil or Mexico have had TEAs that are 
thrice as large (Fal et al., 2011; Herrington et al., 2015). The low entrepreneurship performance 
amidst high unemployment rates implies that very few people in South Africa are starting 
businesses despite having no other option for work, i.e., necessity entrepreneurship is low 
(Herrington et al., 2015). 
Among other factors (such as insufficient financial assistance, lack of skills, unsupportive 
regulatory framework, etc.), negative entrepreneurial attitudes have been identified as the 
major cause of the low entrepreneurship levels in South Africa (van der Merwe and de Swardt, 
2008; Agbenyegah, 2013; Herrington et al., 2015). According to Herrington et al. (2015) and 
van der Merwe and de Swardt (2008), South Africans generally lack the entrepreneurial spirit 
that is crucial for entrepreneurship development. Herrington et al. (2015) implored South 
Africans to move away from the concept of seeking employment to one of creating 
employment for themselves and others. This is important, as countries with higher 
entrepreneurial initiative indices tend to experience lower unemployment levels (Audretsch, 
2002; Herrington et al., 2015; Nieuwenhuizen and Swanepoel, 2015).  
In the rural areas, the importance of smallholder farming is such that entrepreneurship in 
farming should be prioritised. Several studies (e.g., McElwee, 2006; Vesala and Pyysiäinen, 
2008; Chandramouli et al., 2010; Khayri et al., 2011; Díaz-Pichardo et al., 2012) agree that the 
effectiveness of smallholder agriculture in reducing rural poverty and household food 
                                                 




insecurity can be enhanced if rural households become more entrepreneurial in their farming 
activities. Developing a business mind-set and entrepreneurship skills among rural farming 
households has several pros. Firstly, farm entrepreneurship can make farming a more attractive 
and profitable venture for rural youths (Tshuma, 2012; Demyen and Iulia, 2013; Bairwa et al., 
2014). Secondly, it makes smallholder agriculture become an important tool to reduce rural 
unemployment and thus control migration from rural to urban areas (Tshuma, 2012). Thirdly, 
developing entrepreneurship in smallholder agriculture can help support industrial 
development in rural areas through its forward and backward linkages (Bairwa et al., 2014). 
However, several factors can hinder the development of farm entrepreneurship. Subsidies, 
market regulation measures, fear of failure and certain personal attitudes and characteristics 
may influence, positively or negatively, entrepreneurship development (McElwee, 2006; North 
and Smallbone, 2006; de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; Chowdhury, 2008; Clark, 2009; Lee 
et al., 2011; Kibler, 2012; Kahan, 2013; Seuneke et al., 2013; Wennberg et al., 2013; Gadi et 
al., 2014; Herrington et al., 2015). Moreover, Kahan (2013) argued that entrepreneurship 
development may be hindered by social systems, such as social grants in South Africa, that 
may create dependency and lack of confidence in one’s own capacity to support livelihoods. 
Conceptualising and realising smallholder farming as a business comes with a multitude of 
challenges and constraints, most of which are entrenched in the way smallholder farmers think 
and decide.  
As highlighted in previous chapters, South Africa has cash transfer-based social grants which 
reach several millions of people. In 2014, over 16 million benefited from social grants (SASSA, 
2014). Since the social grants have become a major source of income and livelihood for most 
poor South Africans, especially in the rural areas (Tshuma, 2012), a relevant question to ask is 
whether social grants impede or catalyse the development of farm entrepreneurship. Despite 
the growing literature on rural or farm entrepreneurship (e.g., McElwee, 2005; Meccheri and 
Pelloni, 2006; de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; McElwee, 2008; Vesala, 2008; Clark, 2009; 
Ghiasy et al., 2009; Hosseini et al., 2009; McElwee and Bosworth, 2010; Nafukho and Muyia, 
2010; Onyebinama and Onyebinama, 2010; Vesala and Vesala, 2010; Rajaei et al., 2011; 
Baumgartner et al., 2012; Díaz-Pichardo et al., 2012; Rijkers and Costa, 2012; Pyysiäinen and 
Vesala, 2013; Rijkers and Söderbom, 2013), a few gaps can be identified.  
Firstly, relatively few of the empirical studies on rural entrepreneurship (e.g., Freese et al., 
2002; Nafukho and Muyia, 2010; Onyebinama and Onyebinama, 2010; Rijkers and Costa, 
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2012; Rijkers and Söderbom, 2013; Gadi et al., 2014; Nagler and Naudé, 2014) have focused 
on Africa, and even fewer (e.g., Mitchell, 2004; Ngorora and Mago, 2012; Agbenyegah, 2013) 
have focused on South Africa. As noted by Nagler and Naudé (2014) and Pato and Teixeira 
(2013), most empirical studies on entrepreneurship have focused on self-employment in urban 
areas. The limited empirical knowledge of rural entrepreneurship on the continent has resulted 
in rural entrepreneurship barely featuring in most poverty alleviation or entrepreneurship 
promotion strategies in Africa (Fox and Sohnesen, 2013; Pato and Teixeira, 2013; Nagler and 
Naudé, 2014). According to Nagler and Naudé (2014), the neglect of rural entrepreneurship is 
one of the major contributing factors to the limited success of rural development policies. There 
is, therefore, a need for greater empirical analysis of entrepreneurship in settings of poverty, 
such as Africa, in order to offer market-based solutions that can substantially and significantly 
reduce rural poverty (Robinson et al., 2004; Bruton et al., 2013).  
Secondly, the subject of farm entrepreneurship has generally not been investigated in the rural 
smallholder farming context. The few studies that have been done on rural entrepreneurship 
development in Africa have mostly assessed non-farm small business development. As a result, 
the determinants of farm entrepreneurship among rural households are not well understood in 
Africa, in general, and in South Africa, in particular. Thirdly, the conceptual and empirical 
linkages between social grants and farm entrepreneurship among rural households have not 
been directly addressed in the literature. Even though a wide range of literature has explored 
the impact of social grants on different outcomes (e.g., poverty, labour participation, etc.) in 
South Africa (Woolard, 2003; Samson et al., 2004; Armstrong and Burger, 2009), none of these 
previous studies, to the best knowledge of the present author, have directly investigated the 
possible disincentive impacts of social grants on rural households’ farm entrepreneurship 
development. 
This chapter, therefore, aimed to close these gaps by investigating the extent to which access 
to, and level of dependency on, social grants inhibit or enhance the development of farm 
entrepreneurship in the rural areas at the micro level, using primary data collected in KZN. The 
chapter also sought to understand and appraise the level of farm entrepreneurial capital among 
rural households, identifying other factors that influence farm entrepreneurship development. 
Policy-makers should be clear about where the farmers are along the entrepreneurial ladder so 
that they can design programmes that suit the farmers’ needs, capacity and focus. 
Understanding the factors that promote or hinder entrepreneurship is also important, to inform 
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policy-makers of the aspects that need to be addressed for farm entrepreneurship to grow in the 
rural areas.  
The novel contribution of this chapter is that, to the author’s knowledge, it is the first to 
generate a contextualised farm entrepreneurship index for the rural areas of South Africa. 
Moreover, the study distinguishes itself from previous studies by not only linking social grants 
and farm entrepreneurship, but also in the way the social grant variable was captured. Social 
grants entered the model as a dummy variable and a proportion variable, showing the level of 
dependency on social grants. The motivation for this approach was given in the previous 
chapters.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised into five sections. The next section describes farm 
entrepreneurship and discusses its conceptual link to social grants. The subsequent section 
briefly outlines the different approaches commonly used to understand entrepreneurship and 
then motivates the choice of the competency approach adopted in this study. Next, the chapter 
presents the research methodology, presenting briefly the data collection approach and the 
analytical techniques. The penultimate section of the chapter interprets and discusses the 
results, while the final section presents the main conclusions and policy implications of this 
chapter. 
4.2 Farm entrepreneurship and its conceptual link to social grants 
The term entrepreneurship has been used in varied ways in different contexts, resulting in 
multiple definitions and interpretations (Cole, 1968; Gray, 2002; Erik Hurst and 
Annamaria Lusardi, 2004; Schmitt-Rodermund, 2004; McElwee, 2005; de Wolf and 
Schoorlemmer, 2007; Williams, 2007; van der Merwe and de Swardt, 2008; Vesala and 
Pyysiäinen, 2008; Filion, 2011; Phelan and Sharpley, 2012; Phelan, 2014; Manyaka, 2015; 
OECD, 2015; Urban and Sefalafala, 2015; van der Lingen and van Niekerk, 2015). The history 
of the entrepreneurship concept and detailed bibliographies of studies that have defined 
entrepreneurship and operationalised it in different contexts has been provided by a number of 
studies (Nafukho and Muyia, 2010; Filion, 2011; Phelan, 2014). In summary, the multiple 
definitions of entrepreneurship highlight several key words or phrases, such as creativity, 
initiative, innovation, risk-taking, market orientation, opportunity exploitation, personality 
traits or new venture creation. A list of some of the most common elements used in the 
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definitions of the entrepreneur and the respective authors who introduced and/or included the 
elements is presented in Filion (2011). 
Since there is no agreed-upon definition, Gray (2002) recommended that researchers should 
pick the definition that fits their contexts. Stearns (1996) agreed, adding that less focus should 
be put on the definitional debate. According to Stearns (1996) and Phelan (2014), it is enough 
for each study to offer its own definition, which it later operationalises through analysis. 
Generally, the entrepreneurship literature has largely been influenced by Schumpeter (1949), 
who viewed an entrepreneur as a person of ideas and action, an individual with the ability to 
inspire others and go beyond boundaries of structured situations. According to Schumpeter 
(1949), an entrepreneur is a catalyst of change and is instrumental in discovering new 
opportunities. This makes the entrepreneurial function unique from other functions such as 
management. Cole (1968) defined entrepreneurship as the purposeful activity to initiate, 
maintain and develop a profit-oriented business. In other words, an entrepreneur is one who 
perceives profit opportunities and initiates action to fulfil currently unsatisfied needs (Kirzner, 
1985).  
According to Filion (2011), a definition of an entrepreneur should include at least these six 
elements: innovation, opportunity recognition, risk, action, resource use and value addition. 
Filion (2011) defined an entrepreneur as an actor who innovates by recognising opportunities 
and makes moderately risky decisions that lead to actions requiring the efficient use of 
resources and contributing an added value. In agriculture, entrepreneurship has been defined 
as being about developing a market-oriented and profitable farm business (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; Bairwa et al., 2014). A definition that 
was used in this study is that by Gray (2002), who defined an entrepreneur as an individual 
who manages an organisation or business with the intention of expanding it, and with the 
leadership and managerial skills necessary for achieving those goals. This definition is more 
appropriate to the smallholder farmers in the rural areas of South Africa, as it encompasses 
non-profitable forms of entrepreneurship (or forms of entrepreneurship that are temporarily 
unprofitable). 
There are two distinctive parts to entrepreneurship, both of which are important (Pyysiäinen et 
al., 2006; Kahan, 2013). The first category includes the skills that are required to effectively 
start and run a profitable business. The second category, which is not easy to define, speaks of 
the inner drive or desire to start and run a profitable business. It can be generally described as 
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entrepreneurial attitudes (Pyysiäinen et al., 2006) or the entrepreneurial spirit (Nafukho and 
Muyia, 2010; Kahan, 2013). Social grants may hinder entrepreneurship development by 
creating a dependency syndrome (Devereux, 2013), which reduces the desire or drive to engage 
in business. Social grants may inhibit the psychological capital development and 
entrepreneurship spirit of the recipients by creating hopelessness and destroying self-
confidence and resilience (Kahan, 2013). The new and growing psychological capital theory 
literature (Luthans and Youssef, 2004; Luthans et al., 2006; Luthans et al., 2007) highlights 
the importance of hope, confidence, optimism and resilience in an individual’s economic 
performance. Dependency on social grants may reduce the incentives or motivation of farmers 
to engage in activities that may enhance their entrepreneurship skills. The next sub-section 
briefly discusses the different approaches that have been adopted in the literature to understand 
entrepreneurship. 
4.3 Approaches to understanding farm entrepreneurship 
There are several approaches in the literature that have been employed in attempts to 
understand entrepreneurship. These are, inter alia, the traits approach, the behavioural 
approach, the opportunity identification approach and the competency approach (Man et al., 
2002; Kobia and Sikalieh, 2010; Phelan, 2014). Drawing mainly from psychology, the traits 
approach focuses on the identification of specific personality traits of an entrepreneur that 
separates the entrepreneur from the wider population (Kobia and Sikalieh, 2010; Caliendo and 
Kritikos, 2012; Phelan, 2014). The behavioural approach focuses on what the entrepreneur 
does and not who the entrepreneur is, considering the set of activities and processes associated 
with the creation of a new venture (Phelan, 2014). The opportunity identification approach 
focuses on an individual’s ability to exploit the entrepreneurial opportunities they face (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003).  
The present study uses the competency approach to study the rural households’ entrepreneurial 
characteristics. Even though the traits, behavioural and opportunity identification approaches 
are useful in understanding entrepreneurship, none of these approaches captures the true and 
overall picture (Kobia and Sikalieh, 2010; Phelan, 2014). Therefore, the competency approach 
has become an increasingly popular means of studying entrepreneurial characteristics (Man et 
al., 2002; Bergevoet et al., 2005; Man et al., 2008; Vesala and Pyysiäinen, 2008; Phelan and 
Sharpley, 2012; Sánchez, 2012). The competency approach is readily applicable to firms that 
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are smaller in size and dominated by the entrepreneur (Man et al., 2008), such as farms, and 
represent an appropriate framework for smallholder farmers in rural areas (Vesala and 
Pyysiäinen, 2008; Phelan and Sharpley, 2012). 
The competency approach focuses centrally on the higher-level characteristics or competencies 
that an entrepreneur needs to be successful. Competencies are the ability to perform specific 
tasks, that is, they are the underlying knowledge, skills, abilities, personality traits and 
know-how that result in effective task fulfilment (Langbert, 2000; Bergevoet et al., 2005).  In 
particular, the competencies refer to activities such as identifying customer needs, scanning the 
environment, formulating strategies, bringing networks together, taking the initiative, 
introducing diversity and collaboration (Man et al., 2002; Bairwa et al., 2014; Phelan, 2014). 
Man et al. (2002) identified six key sub-categories of entrepreneurial competencies, which are 
the opportunity, relationship, conceptual, organising, strategic and commitment competencies.  
These competencies can be developed by learning and experience and can be stimulated by 
changing the social and business environment and by directly influencing the farmer and his 
personality and capacities (Man et al., 2002; de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; Bairwa et al., 
2014). Since these competencies are changeable and learnable, this allows for intervention in 
terms of development of entrepreneurship among rural farmers (Man et al., 2002; Man et al., 
2008). The competency approach implies that farm entrepreneurship can be understood as a 
continuum, with more subsistence-oriented farmers, who generally lack these competencies, 
on the lower end and the market-oriented farmers on the upper end. The next section presents 
this chapter’s research methodology. 
4.4 Research methodology 
4.4.1 Data 
The data for this chapter were collected in the KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. While 
the same questionnaire was used to collect the data for all the chapters in this study, fewer 
households were asked the entrepreneurship module. The entrepreneurship questions were 
asked in only three of the four districts described in the previous chapter. This was because the 
entrepreneurship section of the questionnaire was more involved and complex. Not all of the 
enumerators were deemed competent enough to ask the entrepreneurship questions. A decision 
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was made by the researcher to only have the few capable enumerators ask questions relating to 
entrepreneurship, in order to get quality responses. The result is that only 513 of the total 984 
sampled households were asked the entrepreneurship questions.  
Questionnaire pre-testing, key informant interviews and focus group discussions were very 
important in collecting data for this chapter. During questionnaire pre-testing, ambiguities or 
difficulties with regards to question wording were noted and remedied. The pre-test 
respondents were asked to consider whether the entrepreneurial skills and competencies listed 
were appropriate, clear and comprehensive, following studies such as Man et al. (2008) and 
Phelan and Sharpley (2012). The results of the pre-test were used to rephrase some 
entrepreneurship questions, where it was felt their wording was not sufficiently clear or strong 
to differentiate between good and poor ratings. Key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions done during the pre-testing stage were also used to validate the results from the 
pre-test questionnaires. 
In addition to the modules that were described in Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters, the 
questionnaire sought to capture the farmers’ self-assessments of their entrepreneurship skills 
or competencies. The respondents were asked to rate - based on their own opinion - the extent 
to which they agreed that they possess a range of skills and competencies in relation to 
managing and operating their farming enterprises. This was done using a five-point Likert scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree), through to 5 (strongly agree). Likert scales with at least five 
categories are recommended, as they limit distortions in data scaling caused by ordinal data, 
leading to reasonably robust correlation coefficients (Finney and DiStefano, 2006; Garson, 
2008; Lu and Thomas, 2008). 
Self-assessment by the respondents of their own skills and competency levels is generally used 
in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Man et al., 2002; van Auken et al., 2006; Mulder et al., 
2007; van der Merwe and de Swardt, 2008; Vesala and Pyysiäinen, 2008; Lans et al., 2010; 
Morgan et al., 2010; Díaz-Pichardo et al., 2012; Phelan and Sharpley, 2012; de Lauwere et al., 
2014; Wang and Jessup, 2014; Matchaba-Hove et al., 2015). The use of self-assessed 
competencies is justified because farmers themselves have a better understanding of their own 
entrepreneurial capability and skills set (Rudmann, 2008; Vesala and Pyysiäinen, 2008; Lans, 
2009; Morgan et al., 2010). The farmer’s viewpoint is important in studying entrepreneurship 
because farmers make their production and business decisions based on their perceptions 
(Morgan et al., 2010). As explained by McElwee (2005), entrepreneurship in farming can be 
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best understood if the farmers are asked how they perceive themselves, i.e., the extent to which 
farmers see themselves as entrepreneurs.  
 The questionnaire included mostly the skills and competencies that are widely accepted in the 
literature, with a few skills and competencies added, modified or removed for those considered 
more relevant to the rural context, as informed by the results from questionnaire pre-testing. 
The discussions with the farmers and key informants indicated a number of competencies that 
are associated with an entrepreneur in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal. For example, the most 
common in the lists, among others, were market and profit orientation, ability to identify and 
pursue opportunities, doing things that no one has done (e.g., introducing a new crop into the 
area), doing things differently and the ability to network or build relationships (e.g., bringing 
in new buyers or investors). Hard work or commitment (being the first to arrive and the last to 
leave the fields), passion and willingness to learn were also considered important.  
Competency assessment is a subjective process, which is both contextual and situational in 
nature (Hayton and McEvoy, 2006; Phelan and Sharpley, 2012; Alsos et al., 2014). 
Generalisation should not be a priority but these assessments should always take account of the 
context as well as the individual they are applied to (Hayton and McEvoy, 2006; Phelan and 
Sharpley, 2012). The household was used as a unit of analysis because several studies (e.g., 
Ram et al., 2000; Jervell, 2011; Alsos et al., 2014) have shown that it is more relevant to focus 
on entrepreneurial households than on individual entrepreneurs. According to Alsos et al. 
(2014), taking the household as the unit of analysis helps to present a view of entrepreneurial 
development that emphasises the important role of household decision-making in 
entrepreneurial growth. A total of 24 entrepreneurship skills and competencies were identified 
and used to generate the latent entrepreneurship index.  
4.4.2 Empirical model: The Bartlett factor score regression (FSR) model 
This study used the Bartlett factor score regression (FSR) method, a single equation score-
based latent variable regression, to achieve the chapter’s objectives. Despite the fact that the 
parameter estimates obtained using latent variable scores are typically biased, as a result of the 
measurement error that is inherent in the prediction of a latent variable (Lewis and Linzer, 
2005), these score-based regression methods are popular with researchers (Grice, 2001; Holbert 
and Stephenson, 2002; Osgood et al., 2002; Lu and Thomas, 2008; Devlieger et al., 2015). 
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Their popularity is due to the fact that single equation regressions are more intuitive and less 
complicated when compared to the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach (Skrondal 
and Laake, 2001; Croon, 2002; Lu et al., 2005; Lu and Thomas, 2008; DiStefano et al., 2009; 
Lu et al., 2011; Devlieger et al., 2015). Whereas mis-specification errors in one part of an 
equation system can spread to the whole system in SEM, this does not happen in single equation 
estimation (Croon, 2002; Lu and Thomas, 2008).  
Recent developments in single equation estimation have resulted in situations where the bias 
when regressing factor scores can be avoided (Skrondal and Laake, 2001) or reduced (Croon, 
2002). Skrondal and Laake (2001) showed that a combination of Bartlett and regression FSRs, 
which is termed the ‘bias avoiding’ method (Lu and Thomas, 2008; Devlieger et al., 2015), 
results in consistent parameter estimates in certain situations. As a result, the Bartlett FSR was 
chosen because it produces unbiased estimates when the factor scores are used as the dependent 
variable, as was the case in this chapter (Skrondal and Laake, 2001; Lu and Thomas, 2008; 
Devlieger et al., 2015). The Bartlett FSR method consisted of two steps: (1) the farm 
entrepreneurship index was generated using principal component analysis (PCA); and (2) the 
computed farm entrepreneurship index was used as a dependent variable in a linear regression. 
The next sub-section describes how PCA was used to generate the index, while the following 
sub-section discusses the linear regression model. 
4.4.2.1 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
The first step of the Bartlett FSR involved generating the farm entrepreneurship index using 
PCA. Entrepreneurship is generally measured using an index (Lichtenstein and Lyons, 2001; 
Smith et al., 2007; Ács and Szerb, 2010; Marcotte, 2012; Phelan, 2014) at the national or 
individual level. PCA has been used extensively to construct different indexes by researchers 
(e.g., Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Manyong et al., 2006; Vyass and Kumaranayake, 2006; 
OECD, 2008; van der Merwe and de Swardt, 2008; Achia et al., 2010; Howe et al., 2012; 
Muchara et al., 2014; Sinyolo et al., 2014b). Following these studies, PCA was used to create 
a multi-criteria farm entrepreneurship index, by merging the entrepreneurship indicators and 
determining the appropriate weights. 
From an initial set of n correlated variables, PCA creates uncorrelated components, where each 
component is a linear, weighted combination of the initial variables (Jolliffe, 2002; Armeanu 
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and Lache, 2008; Norman and Streiner, 2008). For example, from a set of variables X1 through 
to Xn; 
PC1 = a11X1 + a12X2 + …+ a1nXn 
PC2 = a21X1 + a22X2 + …+ a2nXn  
⁞ 
PCm = am1X1 + am2X2 + …+ amnXn       (6.1) 
Where: amn represents the weight for the mth principal component (PCm) and the nth variable.  
The weights for each principal component are given by the eigenvectors of the covariance or 
correlation matrix. The covariance matrix is used if the original data is measured in reasonably 
similar units or comparable scales (Morrison, 2005; Vyass and Kumaranayake, 2006). 
Conversely, the correlation matrix is preferred when the variables are measured in different 
units or scales (Morrison, 2005). The variance (λ) for each principal component is given by the 
eigenvalue of the corresponding eigenvector. The components are ordered so that the first 
principal component (PC1) explains the largest possible amount of variation in the original 
data, subject to the constraint that:  
a112 + a122 + …+ a1n2 = 1       (6.2) 
The second component (PC2) explains additional but less variation than the first component 
and is uncorrelated with the first component (PC1), subject to the same constraint. Subsequent 
components are uncorrelated with previous components, while explaining smaller and smaller 
proportions of the variation of the original variables. The higher the degree of correlation 
among the original variables in the data, the fewer the components required to capture common 
information (Morrison, 2005). PCA works best when variables are correlated, but also when 
the distribution of variables varies across cases (Vyass and Kumaranayake, 2006). Use of PCA 
is predicated upon the assumption that data are continuous. This assumption was violated in 
this study by using ordinal variables. To correct the statistical error of using ordinal variables 
in a PCA analysis, polychoric correlations, instead of the Pearson correlations, were calculated 
and the resulting correlation matrix used in the PCA analysis (Basto and Pereira, 2012; Howe 
et al., 2012). 
There were 24 correlated entrepreneurship skills and competencies that were identified and 
used to generate the entrepreneurship index in this study. Variables with low standard 
deviations carried low weights, while those with high standard deviations carried high weights 
176 
 
from the PCA (Howe et al., 2012). The entrepreneurship factor scores were computed using 
the Bartlett predictor (Bartlett, 1937). This approach is more suitable when the factor scores 
are used as a dependent variable since it produces unbiased estimates. Only the factor scores 
of PC1 were used to construct the entrepreneurship index, since the aim was to create a single 
measure of the entrepreneurship. PC1 was then used as a dependent variable in the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model, as explained in the next sub-section.  
4.4.2.2 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and description of variables 
used in the model 
The second step of the Bartlett FSR to investigate the impact of access to, and level of 
dependency on, social grants on farm entrepreneurship involved estimating the following 
equation using OLS: 
E*i = βxi + δ1Gi + δ2GDi + εi       (6.3) 
Where: E*i is the latent entrepreneurship index of household i; xi is a vector of household 
characteristics; Gi is a dummy variable showing whether or not a household has access to social 
grants; GDi is the proportion of household income from social grants; xi is a vector of household 
characteristics, β’s and δ are parameters to be estimated and εi is the residual term. 
Eq. 6.3 was also estimated using a 2-limit Tobit model (Maddala, 1983; Wooldridge, 2002; 
Greene, 2003) for comparison purposes, as suggested by Hoff (2007). The Tobit model is 
appropriate because the PCA generated entrepreneurship index can be regarded as a corner 
solution, being bound on its upper and lower limits. There were a few observations at the upper 
(n=2) and lower (n=50) limits of the entrepreneurship index. The Tobit model is commonly 
used to deal with boundary values, especially in the context of fractional response variables 
(See, for example, Hoff, 2007; Ramalho et al., 2010; Ramalho et al., 2011; Murteira and 
Ramalho, 2013 for discussions). Manyong et al. (2006) and Muchara et al. (2014) used the 
Tobit model to deal with PCA generated indexes. 
As explained in the previous chapters, Eq. 6.3 produces an unbiased estimate of the impact 
parameter δ1 only if δ1 is uncorrelated with εi (Greene, 2003). Since social grants are not 
randomly distributed but a targeted and means tested intervention, it was suspected that there 
would be a correlation between δ1 and εi. However, this was tested using the two-step procedure 
by Heckman (1979), as explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.3, and there was no evidence of 
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selectivity bias. The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was done to test for potential endogeneity 
of the level of dependency on social grants in the model. This is because more entrepreneurial 
farmers are likely to have more farm income, and increased farm income would result in 
decreased levels of dependency on social grants. The Hausman test was implemented as 
explained in the previous chapters. Since entrepreneurship is influenced by variables such as 
the individual’s experience, training, education, family background and other demographic 
variables (Man et al., 2002; Rudmann, 2008; McElwee and Bosworth, 2010; Díaz-Pichardo et 
al., 2012; Seuneke et al., 2013), these were also included in the model.  
Tables 6.1 present the means of the demographics and socio-economic characteristics of the 
513 households that were analysed in this chapter. There were very minor differences between 
the descriptive figures presented in the tables and those presented in Chapter 3 for the 984 
households. Only the main points are therefore summarised, as the data was described in detail 
in the previous chapters. Table 6.1 shows that the households head averaged 57 years in age 
and that 47% of the households were headed by females. The household heads attained low 
levels of education, averaging about five years of formal school education. The households 
were big in size and had access to about 2 ha of arable land. Table 6.1 also shows that the 
households owned small numbers of livestock size and had moderate assets. Over 90% of the 
513 households had access to social grants, with an average of three social grants beneficiaries 
per household. The social grants contributed almost 50% of the households’ incomes, more 
than four times the 11% contribution of farming. The survey results also indicate poor access 




Table 6.1: Description of variables used in the OLS model 
Variable code Variable name and description Mean SD 
AGE Household head age (Years) 57 13 
GENDER Household head gender (1=Male) 0.47 - 
EDUCAT Household head education level (Years of schooling) 4.54 4.11 
MARRIED Household head marital status (1=Married) 0.46 - 
HHSIZE Household size (Numbers) 6.52 2.99 
LANDSZE Land size household has access to (ha) 1.90 4.47 
TLU Livestock size per household (TLUs) 2.35 5.93 
ASSETS Value of assets (Rands) 79011 43862 
FARMEXP Farming experience (Years) 19.08 14.09 
GRANTS Access to social grants (1=Yes) 0.92 - 
GRANTBEN Grant beneficiaries per household 3.18 1.81 
TOTINC Annual total household income (Rands) 45706 28331 
GRANTINC Annual income from grants (Rands) 21178 14569 
FARMINC Annual income from farm activities (Rands) 5097 6528 
OTHERINC Annual income from other off-farm activities (Rands) 19431 21251 
GRANTPROP Proportion of income from social grants 0.47 0.23 
FARMPROP Proportion of income from farming activities 0.11 0.07 
GRANTUSE Use social grant money in farming activities 0.78 - 
GRANTUSE% Proportion of social grants money used in farming 0.30 0.24 
RAINFALL Perceived rainfall (1=Good) 0.76 - 
SOILQUAL Perceived soil quality (1=Good) 0.55 - 
TENURE Secured land tenure (1=Yes) 0.32 - 
TILLAGE Tillage access (1=Yes) 0.38 - 
MARKET Market access (1=Yes) 0.20  
ASSOC Farmer association member (1=Yes) 0.39 - 
CREDIT Access to credit (1=Yes) 0.33 - 
EXTENSION Access to extension (1=Yes) 0.38 - 
TRAINING Access to agricultural training (1=Yes) 0.43 - 
COMUNIC Access to communication infrastructure  (1=Yes) 0.30 - 
IRRIGAT Access to water for watering crops (1=Yes) 0.35 - 
ROADDIST Distance to the nearest all-weather road (km) 2.93 10.14 
HHEMPLOY Household head off-farm employment (1=Yes) 0.18 - 
BUSINESS Small off-farm business ownership (1=Yes) 0.03 - 
HGWALA  Harry Gwala district (1=Harry Gwala) 0.48 - 
UMZINYAT  Umzinyathi district (1=Umzinyathi) 0.15 - 
UTHUKELA  Uthukela district (1=Uthukela) 0.37 - 
Notes: n=513 




4.5 Results and discussions 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics of the entrepreneurship competencies and skills 
Table 6.2 presents the summary statistics of the entrepreneurship competencies and skills that 
were considered in this study. 
Table 6.2: Frequencies of the entrepreneurial competencies and skills responses 
Entrepreneurship competency or 
skills 














Market orientation 20 13 15 33 19 
Profit orientation 25 18 17 26 14 
Negotiation and persuasiveness 26 18 16 27 13 
Business passion 30 18 17 21 14 
Creativity and innovation 21 11 16 32 20 
Risk taking 22 19 27 25 7 
Opportunity recognition 37 26 20 12 5 
Strategy formulation 23 17 22 25 13 
Environmental scanning 26 19 21 25 9 
General awareness 21 12 20 34 13 
Long-term or sustainability 
orientation 
30 24 23 17 6 
Growth orientation 23 22 24 18 13 
Long and irregular hours 24 20 19 26 11 
Motivation and ambition 20 14 18 30 18 
Initiative 16 12 15 33 24 
Flexibility and willingness to adapt 13 8 11 36 31 
Co-operation and networking 16 15 20 30 20 
Communication clarity 16 16 19 31 18 
Vision clarity 14 11 15 37 23 
Goal setting 13 7 19 33 28 
Competitiveness and results 
orientation 
13 10 17 36 24 
Willingness to learn new things 12 10 18 36 24 
Accountability   15 15 15 33 22 
Emotional coping 12 11 12 34 31 
Notes: n=513 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Table 6.2 indicates low levels of farm entrepreneurship, as the percentages of those who agreed 
or strongly agreed that they possess the entrepreneurial competencies were barely over 60% 
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for all the competencies. The table shows that while over 70% of the respondents agreed that 
they were market-oriented, only 32% felt that they were risk-takers, with more than 40% 
disagreeing (19%) or strongly disagreeing (22%) that they are risk-takers. Whereas the majority 
of households indicated that they are flexible and easily adapt, are able to set clear goals and 
visions, are competitive and cope very well emotionally with circumstance, fewer households 
felt that they are able to discern market trends in order to exploit market opportunities or are 
long-term or sustainability or growth oriented. The results indicate that just about 50% of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they were profits driven, creative or innovative, co-
operated well with others or good negotiators.  
4.5.2 Generating the entrepreneurship index using simple addition 
As an initial step in generating the entrepreneurship index, and for comparison purposes, a 
simple entrepreneurship score was generated by adding the individual scores of the 24 
competencies. The advantages of this sum score method is that it is relatively easy to calculate, 
straightforward to interpret and preserves the variation in the original data (DiStefano et al., 
2009). Since a five point Likert scale was used, taking 1 for the lowest score and 5 for the 
highest score, the composite score from the sum score method ranged from 24 to 120. The total 
composite score of 24 indicates a household that strongly felt that they did not possess any of 
the 24 competencies, that is, a household that is not entrepreneurial. A score of 120 indicates 
households that strongly felt that they possessed all the 24 competencies that were listed, 
implying that they are highly entrepreneurial.  
Table 6.3 presents the entrepreneurial scores of the sampled households. Analysis of the simple 
entrepreneurship score showed that 10% of the households had the lowest possible score of 24, 
while only 0.4% of the households (2 households) had a perfect 120 score. Fifty-seven percent 
of the households scored greater than the average score of 72, while only 10% of the households 
had scores higher than 100. The table indicates that there are low levels of farm 




Table 6.3: Entrepreneurial scores of the sampled households 
Entrepreneurial score Freq. Percentage  
24  50 10 
120  2 0.4 
> 72 292 57 
> 100 51 10 
Notes: n=513 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Further descriptive analysis was done to assess the relationship between the simple 
entrepreneurship score and ownership of non-farm small businesses. The analysis indicated 
that households who owned non-farm small businesses had higher entrepreneurship scores 
(mean 87) than those with no non-farm businesses (mean=74). The t-test (t=-2.00, p=0.047) 
indicated that the two means were significantly different. The fact that non-farm business 
owners had higher scores implies that the score is valid as an entrepreneurship measure, 
because ownership of non-farm business, as a form of diversification, is a proxy to indicate a 
household’s entrepreneurial abilities (Erik Hurst and Annamaria Lusardi, 2004; Haugen and 
Vik, 2008; Clark, 2009; McElwee and Bosworth, 2010). In the next subsection, the 
entrepreneurship index was generated using PCA. 
4.5.3 Generating the entrepreneurship index using principal component 
analysis 
The major disadvantage of the sum score method described above is that it assigns equal 
weights to all 24 competencies. However, the components of the entrepreneurship index are 
expected to have different influences (Ács and Szerb, 2010), implying that assigning equal 
weights is incorrect. To avoid the arbitrary selection of weights, PCA was used to merge the 
entrepreneurship indicators and determine the appropriate weights. 
The correlation matrix, presented in Appendix J, indicated moderate to higher degrees of 
correlation among the entrepreneurship variables in the data. All the correlation coefficients 
were greater than 0.3, showing that the correlation matrix satisfies the basic requirement for a 
successful factor extraction (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Norman and Streiner, 2008). The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.96, greater than the 0.8 that 
is considered reasonable (Antony and Rao, 2007; Norman and Streiner, 2008). The high KMO 
measure indicates that patterns of correlations are compact and that factor analysis should yield 
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reliable factors (Field, 2005). The Bartlett's test of sphericity was highly significant (χ2=11271, 
p<0.001), indicating that it is highly unlikely that the correlation matrix was obtained from a 
population with zero correlation. The above tests indicate that a valid principal component 
analysis can be performed. 
Three principal components (PCs) that had Eigen values greater than one were retained using 
the Kaiser criterion (Field, 2005), explaining about 70% of the variance in the data. The factor 
loadings of at least 0.5 were considered significant, and are presented in bold in Table 6.4. The 
first PC (PC1) explained 58% of the variation and was strongly correlated with all the 24 
original variables. This suggests that these 24 criteria vary together, such that when one 
increases, the remaining ones also increase. This result was expected, as it implies that an 
entrepreneurial rural household is one that is characterised by all the entrepreneurship skills 
and competencies. As explained in Man et al. (2002), an entrepreneur needs to hold a balance 
of different competencies and an emphasis on only a few is not enough to ensure business 
success. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the multi-item index was 0.96, which is higher than the 
acceptable value of 0.7 (Man et al., 2008; Kader et al., 2009; Agbenyegah, 2013). This 
indicates a high level of internal consistency for the scale, implying that the 24 questions all 
reliably measure the same latent entrepreneurship variable. 
None of the entrepreneurship skills and competencies were dominant in PC2 and PC3, and no 
economic meaning could be attached to these PCs. Therefore, PC1 was used to generate the 
entrepreneurship index because it explained the highest variation and it was the only 
component that made economic sense. The correlation between the two indexes, one from 




Table 6.4: Generation of the entrepreneurship index: PCA results 
Variables Principal components 
PC1 PC2 PC3 
Market orientation 0.773 0.433 -0.103 
Profit orientation 0.759 0.447 -0.022 
Negotiation and persuasiveness 0.730 0.463 0.037 
Business passion 0.715 -0.043 0.295 
Creativity and innovation 0.732 0.060 0.321 
Risk taking 0.589 0.291 -0.106 
Opportunity recognition 0.765 -0.109 0.259 
Strategy formulation 0.776 -0.173 0.344 
Environmental scanning 0.754 0.263 0.118 
General awareness 0.758 0.024 -0.026 
Long-term or sustainability orientation 0.800 0.223 0.051 
Growth orientation 0.688 -0.331 0.331 
Long and irregular hours 0.806 -0.207 0.122 
Motivation and ambition 0.797 -0.248 -0.092 
Initiative 0.807 -0.052 -0.160 
Flexibility and willingness to adapt 0.813 -0.029 -0.181 
Co-operation and networking 0.720 -0.453 -0.068 
Communication clarity 0.745 -0.314 -0.265 
Vision clarity 0.776 0.129 0.273 
Goal setting 0.780 -0.124 -0.365 
Competitiveness and results orientation 0.767 0.106 -0.469 
Willingness to learn new things 0.785 -0.244 -0.191 
Accountability   0.804 -0.270 -0.049 
Emotional coping 0.819 0.205 0.002 
    
Eigen value 13.95 1.59 1.15 
% of variance 58.11 6.63 4.79 
Cumulative % of variance  58.11 64.74 69.53 
Notes: n=513 
Source: 2014 household survey 







4.5.4 The impact of access to, and level of dependency on, social grants on farm 
entrepreneurship 
Table 6.5 presents the results on the impact of access to, and dependency on, social grants on 
farm entrepreneurship (second stage of the Bartlett FSR model), estimated using OLS and the 
Tobit model. The dependent variable was the entrepreneurship index, generated using PCA. 
The highly significant F value indicates that the OLS model fits the data well. This implies 
that, collectively, the independent variables significantly influenced farm entrepreneurship. 
Multicollinearity was not a problem, as the variance inflation factors (VIF) ranged between 
1.08 and 2.43 and averaged 1.47. Since no evidence of selectivity bias was detected using 
Heckman’s two-step procedure, the OLS model results in Table 6.4 do not suffer from sample 
selection bias, even without adding the IMR.  
The Hausman test found no evidence of endogeneity between social grant-dependency 
(GRANTPROP) and entrepreneurship at the conventional 10% significance level. The Tobit 
results, presented in Table 6.5, are very similar (in terms of qualitative conclusions that can be 
drawn) to the OLS results, implying the robustness of the estimated results and that censoring 
is not a problem. There are only some slight differences in the magnitudes and statistical 
significance of the estimates. The OLS and Tobit results converge where there is limited 
censoring of values (Wilsont and Tisdell, 2002). Henceforth, interpretations apply to the OLS 
results. 
The results in Table 6.5 show that estimated coefficient of access to social grants (GRANTS) 
was positive, but insignificant at the conventional 10% level. In contrast, the results indicate a 
negative relationship between level of dependency on social grants (GRANTPROP) and farm 
entrepreneurship. This result suggests that increasing level of dependency on social grants may 
have created disincentive effects which inhibit entrepreneurial development among the rural 
farming households. While this result is consistent with other studies in South Africa (e.g., 
Bertrand et al., 2003; Samson et al., 2004; Abel, 2013), which have found negative 
relationships between social grants and households’ economic activities, it highlights the fact 





Table 6.5: The impact of access to, and dependency on, social grants on farm entrepreneurship, 
OLS and Tobit results 
Variables OLS model Tobit model 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
GRANTS 0.034 0.134 0.046 0.168 
GRANTPROP -0.265* 0.160 -0.340* 0.185 
AGE  -0.011*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.004 
GENDER  -0.164*** 0.068 -0.183** 0.086 
EDUCAT -0.015 0.010 -0.017 0.011 
MARRIED -0.075 0.072 -0.117 0.088 
HHSIZE  -0.027*** 0.010 -0.033*** 0.013 
LANDSZE  0.256*** 0.030 0.312*** 0.044 
TLU 0.018*** 0.005 0.043*** 0.012 
ASSETS  0.008 0.036 0.005 0.046 
RAINFALL -0.097 0.086 -0.133 0.116 
SOILQUAL -0.063 0.059 -0.059 0.077 
TENURE  0.193*** 0.065 0.241*** 0.082 
TILLAGE  0.023 0.072 0.055 0.095 
MARKET 0.307*** 0.078 0.420*** 0.104 
ASSOC  0.110 0.090 0.172 0.110 
CREDIT  0.141** 0.066 0.174** 0.077 
EXTENSION  0.192*** 0.064 0.230*** 0.080 
TRAINING  0.304*** 0.082 0.394*** 0.110 
ROADDIST  -0.005* 0.003 -0.008** 0.004 
COMMUNIC  0.213 0.183 0.259 0.212 
FARMEXP  0.005** 0.002 0.007*** 0.003 
IRRIGAT 0.138** 0.062 0.209*** 0.078 
HHEMPLOY  0.095 0.086 0.147 0.107 
UMZINYAT  -0.058 0.112 -0.129 0.131 
UTHUKELA  -0.084 0.080 -0.123 0.100 
CONSTANT -0.047 0.438 1.168 0.812 
/sigma   0.775 0.041 
     
F(26, 480) 9.33***  5.78***  
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.34  0.16  
N 513  513  
uncensored   441  
left-censored   50 (Min <=-2.04) 
right-censored   2 (Max>=1.86) 
Test of selection bias: IMR=-0.08; p=0.65 
Hausman test: F=1.12, p=0.29 
Multicollinearity tests: Mean VIF=1.47; Max VIF=2.43; Min VIF=1.08 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
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The disincentives effects have negative implications on the government’s drive to increase 
production and commercialisation levels of smallholder farmers. This points to the need to link 
social grants to economic activities such as farming in order to meet the government’s broader 
job creation and rural development targets. Researchers such as Zembe-Mkabile et al. (2015) 
have suggested that the effectiveness of cash transfer programmes in developing countries 
depends, in large part, on their linkage to other anti-poverty measures. Given that the other 
major alternatives to social grants, such as the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), 
have failed to reduce rural poverty or unemployment (McCord, 2003; McCutcheon and 
Parkins, 2009; Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015), the need for policy priority towards developing 
farm entrepreneurship in the rural areas cannot be overemphasised. 
The negative estimated coefficient of age (AGE) means that there is a negative association 
between entrepreneurship and age. A unit increase in age results in a decrease in the 
entrepreneurship index of 0.01 points. This implies that younger rural farmers are more 
entrepreneurial compared to older farmers. This result is consistent with previous literature 
(e.g., Man et al., 2008; Rudmann, 2008; McElwee and Bosworth, 2010). As explained by 
Rudmann (2008), this is because younger farmers are more ambitious, flexible and open to new 
ideas than older farmers. Younger farmers have the drive and propensity to start businesses, 
and in general, entrepreneurs tend to become less entrepreneurial with age, with older business 
owners generally less growth-oriented and less likely to invest more and start new businesses.  
Although age was negatively associated with entrepreneurship, additional years of farming 
experience (FARMEXP) was positively related with entrepreneurship. This is in line with other 
studies (e.g., de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; Seuneke et al., 2013) that have reported that 
farmers develop their entrepreneurship skills through learning-by-doing. In other words, an 
entrepreneur becomes more competent with additional years of experience (Man et al., 2008). 
The insignificance of education level (EDUCAT) in the model reinforces the result that farmers 
rely on trial-and-error to develop their entrepreneurship. The result indicates that when it comes 
to entrepreneurship development in smallholder agriculture, it is farming experience that 
counts more than one’s education level. Several studies (Reardon et al., 2006; Bayene, 2008; 
Nagler and Naudé, 2014) have reported that schooling is relatively more important for finding 
non-farm wage employment than for entrepreneurship development in Africa. 
Contrary to expectations, female-headed households were found to be more entrepreneurial in 
agriculture than male-headed households (GENDER). The results indicate that male-headed 
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households have an entrepreneurship index that is 0.16 points lower than that of female-headed 
households. This is unexpected, as conventional theory points towards men having more capital 
(social, human, psychological, financial and physical) (Yang and An, 2002; Mallick and Rafi, 
2010; Rijkers and Costa, 2012) that should enhance their entrepreneurship development. The 
result, which is contrary to studies such as Bauernschuster et al. (2010), but in line with other 
studies such as Bock (2004), may be indicative of the lack of options for women outside 
farming, meaning that women are more committed to farming than their male counterparts. In 
other words, women make more effort to try and make smallholder farming work for them as 
they do not have many alternatives, i.e., necessity farm entrepreneurship. As reported by 
Mitchell (2004), most women entrepreneurs in South Africa become entrepreneurs because 
circumstances push them. 
The results also indicate that bigger households are less likely to be entrepreneurial, compared 
to smaller households (HHSIZE). This could be because bigger families have bigger demands 
for their own consumption. Bigger families are thus less likely to produce a surplus and are 
less likely to be market-oriented compared to smaller families. The other explanation of this 
result is that bigger households are less dependent on farming, compared to smaller households, 
as their bigger families demand that they instead engage in other economic activities. This is 
because, even though farming can support a certain number of household members, it becomes 
imperative that bigger households look to other sectors, as the farm may not be able to sustain 
them. 
Land size (LANDSZE) was positively associated with entrepreneurship. In line with the 
literature (e.g., Bergevoet et al., 2005; Chandramouli et al., 2010; Singh, 2013; de Lauwere et 
al., 2014), this result indicates that farmers with bigger land sizes have more risk-bearing ability 
compared to farmers with smaller pieces of land. Access to more land allows the households 
to produce more and raises the possibility of producing a surplus. The results also show that 
livestock size (TLU) was positively associated with entrepreneurship. This is because those 
with larger livestock sizes are better equipped to take more risk than those with smaller 
livestock sizes. Livestock offers the rural households a fall-back position, in case their 
investments do not pay off as expected. Table 6.4 indicates that perceived land tenure security 
(TENURE) was positively related with entrepreneurship. Farmers with secure land tenure have 
greater incentive to undertake risky investments in productive inputs and technology, since this 
188 
 
implies their ability to maintain long-term use over their land. This result is consistent with 
studies on the role of land tenure on investments (e.g., Brasselle et al., 2002; Fenske, 2011). 
The results show a positive association between access to markets (MARKET) and 
entrepreneurship. Market access implies less transaction costs and speaks of opportunities of 
making good profits out of farming activities. It is these prospects that encourage farmers to be 
more adventurous in their farming activities. Discussions with the farmers indicated that the 
reason why they resort to subsistence farming was because they fail to sell their produce due 
to lack of markets. A guaranteed market is thus one of the most pressing needs that should be 
addressed to stimulate entrepreneurship among the rural farming households. The results also 
show that access to credit (CREDIT) was positively related with entrepreneurship. Access to 
credit support shapes the ability of rural households to invest for the long-term and make 
calculated decisions for risky income flows, thus fostering entrepreneurship development.  
The results highlight the importance of extension access (EXTENSION) in smallholder 
farming. The households with contact with extension officers gain access to information on 
new technologies or markets, which is important in successful farm entrepreneurship. This 
result is in line with the literature (Hosseini et al., 2009). As reported in Kahan (2013), 
extension is key in stimulating rural farm entrepreneurship and efforts to improve rural 
entrepreneurship should seek to make effective use of the extension officers. Access to training 
(TRAINING) was associated with increasing farm entrepreneurship, since relevant training 
improves farmers’ entrepreneurship skills. While most of the farmers in the rural areas depend 
on trial-and-error, this result implies that entrepreneurship can be improved by providing 
relevant training. This agrees with the literature (e.g., Man et al., 2002; Bergevoet et al., 2005; 
de Wolf and Schoorlemmer, 2007; Man et al., 2008), which reported that entrepreneurship can 
be developed by focussed training. 
As expected, access to irrigation (IRRIGAT) had a positive estimated coefficient in the model. 
Access to irrigation decreases the risk of crop losses, increases the prospects for multiple 
cropping, adopting high value crops and crop diversification. Those with access to reliable 
water are likely to be more entrepreneurial than those with no access. This result is consistent 
with a number of studies (e.g., Tesfaye et al., 2008; Bacha et al., 2011; Kuwornu and Owusu, 
2012; Singh, 2013; Sinyolo et al., 2014a), which have shown the importance of secure water 
access in ensuring smallholder farming success. Chandramouli et al. (2010) found that 
irrigators had significantly higher entrepreneurial scores when compared to non-irrigators in 
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Karnataka, India, implying that there are significant differences in the entrepreneurial 
behaviour of farmers in irrigated and dryland areas. 
The negative estimated coefficient for distance to the nearest all-weather road (ROADDIST) 
highlights the importance of good infrastructural support in spurring entrepreneurship 
development among rural households. The result implies that households that are located 
further away from good roads are less likely to be as entrepreneurial as households that are 
near good roads. This is because poor roads act as barriers to accessing markets, information 
or other important facilities. This result supports conclusions by other studies (e.g., Aliber and 
Hart, 2009; Aliber and Hall, 2012), who have highlighted the importance of the provision of 
generic support and infrastructure to create conducive environments for smallholder agriculture 
in the rural areas of South Africa. 
The PSM was also estimated to provide further robustness checks on the estimated access to 
social grants coefficient. The results are presented in Table 6.6. In contrast to Table 6.5 which 
found an insignificant estimated coefficient of access to social grants on farm entrepreneurship, 
the PSM results show that access to social grants had a positive impact on farm 
entrepreneurship. The improved result using PSM is because it uses only matched sub-samples, 
resulting in more reliable estimates. This result is fairly robust, as the Rosenbaum (2002) 
bounds test  indicated that it would take a bias that would more than triple the odds of becoming 
a social grant recipient to change the conclusion (Γ=3.4). 
 
Table 6.6: The impact of access to social grants on farm entrepreneurship, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 467 33 0.51 (0.31) 1.66* 
Kernel matching method 467 36 0.38 (0.22) 1.74* 
Notes: * means significance at 10% 
Source: 2014 household survey 
The results in Table 6.6 suggest that access to social grants plays a positive role in farm 
entrepreneurship development. The explanation of this result is that the guaranteed and regular 
monthly income from social grants allows rural households to take more risks in their farming 
businesses. This agrees with Samson (2009), who explained that social grants provide a coping 
mechanism for the poor, supporting a minimal level of subsistence and allowing them to take 
a chance on riskier ventures that are likely to result in a higher income. Other reports (e.g., 
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DSD et al., 2012) have also indicated that income from social grants has been used by 
households to improve their human capital (e.g., paying to attend courses to improve their 
skills), which allows households to improve their entrepreneurial competencies. 
The results of the GPS approach on the impact of social grant-dependency on farm 
entrepreneurship are presented in Figure 6.1 and Appendix K. The results show that increasing 
dosages of less than 20% are associated with increasing farm entrepreneurship. However, 
increasing levels of dependency on social grants above 20% result in decreasing farm 
entrepreneurship. This supports the conclusions made above that access to social grants have a 
positive impact on farm entrepreneurship. However, high levels of dependency on social grants 
hinder farm entrepreneurship development. 
 
 
Figure 6.1:  The average dose-response and treatment functions and 95% confidence bands for 
the farm entrepreneurship level 
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4.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
Developing farm entrepreneurship is key to achieving the rural poverty reduction and 
development goals in South Africa. The concern that social grants, which have emerged as the 
main income source of many rural households, may inhibit the growth of farm entrepreneurship 
among rural households needs to be investigated. This chapter’s objective has been to 
empirically investigate rural farm entrepreneurship and its linkage to social grants in South 
Africa, a topic that has not been adequately investigated hitherto. The present study has 
indicated that, generally, the level of farm entrepreneurship among rural households in 
KwaZulu-Natal is low. This means that meeting the government’s rural objectives requires that 
the business-as-usual approach should be discarded in favour of a deliberate and holistic 
approach that involves creating a conducive policy environment for the development of a 
business mind-set among rural households. 
The chapter concludes that, while access to social grants may improve farm entrepreneurship, 
increasing levels of dependency on social grants impede farm entrepreneurship. The chapter 
shows that the incentive or disincentive effects are not just about access, but the relative 
importance of social grants on household income. The results indicate that social grants have 
the potential to go beyond addressing the immediate needs of poor households and contribute 
to building the entrepreneurial capital of the rural households at low dosages. This suggests 
that policy options for promoting farm entrepreneurship need not compete with social grants, 
but rather complement each other. This result suggests that it is the relatively high amounts of 
income from social grants that create disincentive effects which inhibit entrepreneurial 
development among rural farming households. This suggests that policy options for promoting 
farm entrepreneurship should take into cognisance the negative effect of social grant 
dependency. 
Given that the entrepreneurial competencies are changeable, the study has identified the policy 
variables that need to be considered to develop farm entrepreneurship. The study has 
highlighted the importance of government support (credit, extension, tillage, market and 
training) in enhancing farm entrepreneurship, implying that the government’s desire to develop 
farm entrepreneurship among the rural areas requires that priority be given to these support 
services. A greater emphasis should be on giving the rural farmers relevant and focussed 
entrepreneurship skills training, as well as market support. Training should be informed by the 
skills that are lacking among rural households and should build on the farmers’ indigenous 
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knowledge and experience, starting at the level of understanding the farmers are at. An 
important consideration in providing the training, or any other intervention, for that matter, is 
the heterogeneity of the farmers. Since the farm entrepreneurs are heterogeneous, not 
homogeneous, interventions such as training will have differing outcomes to the different farm 
entrepreneurs. This calls for efforts for interventions to be targeted to farmers on an individual 
basis. 
Support to develop rural entrepreneurship should be gender sensitive. Since the study has 
shown that women make up the majority of the farmers, and are more entrepreneurial than their 
male counterparts, it is important that support is tailored to reach these enterprising women for 
greater rural entrepreneurship development. These interventions should bear in mind the 
patriarchal nature of the rural areas, and should not only target beneficiaries who control assets 
such as land. This disempowers women, because, even though they are the farmers, the land 
usually belongs to men. In line with other studies, the study highlights the importance of 
generic support and infrastructure in creating an enabling atmosphere for the success of 
smallholder agriculture. Access to good roads, for instance, allows farmers to be connected to 
information and markets relatively easily. This helps them to be innovative and entrepreneurial. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
7.1 Recap of the purpose of the study 
Against the background that the South African government has prioritised the expansion of the 
smallholder sector as part of its broader job creation and rural development strategies, and that 
concerns have been raised that social grants might have created disincentives to farm, this study 
aimed to provide in-depth evidence of the incentive/disincentive impact of social grants on 
smallholder farming activities. While a wide range of literature explored various dimensions 
of the impact of social grants, literature exploring the potential linkages between social grants 
and smallholder farming activities in South Africa is scarce. Only anecdotes and descriptive 
reports are available and these have reported that rural households are neglecting smallholder 
farming due to their reliance on social grants. According to these reports, rural households put 
small amounts of land under cultivation and do so for subsistence purposes, as they rely on 
social grants for income.  
However, this link between social grants and smallholder farming activity should be taken with 
a pinch of salt, since these reports have not been based on robust econometric analysis. This is 
because these reports might be just about the simultaneous existence of social grants and 
declining smallholder farming activity, which does not necessarily mean that one caused the 
other. Therefore, this study aimed at addressing the potential disincentive effects of social 
grants, using econometric analysis. The success of the government’s rural poverty reduction 
and job creation strategies depends upon the extent to which rural households have the 
incentives and motivation to farm, adopt modern farming techniques and commercialise their 
farming activities. Given that most of the rural households are beneficiaries of social grants, it 
is important that policy-makers have reliable evidence with regards to the extent to which these 






7.2 Conclusions and implications for policy 
This study aimed to assess the impact of social grants on different dimensions of smallholder 
farming activities, by capturing social grants in two ways: access to social grants and the level 
of dependency on social grants. The study indicated that social grants have a wide coverage, 
benefiting most of the rural households that were interviewed. The results also indicated that 
the social grants are well-targeted, benefiting mostly the poor, who have fewer alternative 
livelihood options. The study revealed high levels of poverty and unemployment among the 
household members in the rural areas of KZN, indicating a shortage of economic opportunities 
in these areas. While this underscores the importance of smallholder farming as a livelihood 
option, the results indicated low levels of land area cultivation, reduced participation by 
unemployed household members in smallholder farming activities and low levels of farm 
entrepreneurship. The question answered in this study is whether these outcomes are as a result 
of the households’ access to, or level of dependency on, social grants. 
By-and-large, the results indicated that the disincentive effects of social grants are not just 
about access, but about the level of dependency on the social grants. The results of this study 
imply that there is value in introducing the dummy and the continuous variables to capture the 
impacts of social grants, as the influence of the two variables varied for the different outcomes 
studied. In general, the results were largely consistent with the disincentive hypothesis, 
suggesting that access to, and dependency on, social grants have negative effects on 
smallholder farming activities. The results indicated that the rural households who depended 
more on social grants had fewer of their members participating in smallholder farming; used 
less chemical fertilisers; were less entrepreneurial and less likely to be market-oriented. 
Although access to social grants had a positive effect on the level of chemical fertiliser use and 
farm entrepreneurship, it had negative effects on the proportion of household members that 
engage in smallholder farming activities and market participation levels.  
These findings generally bolster recent concerns about potential unintended effects of the 
current social grant system and raise considerable doubt about whether the potential of 
smallholder farming can be adequately harnessed without addressing the social grant 
disincentives. The results imply that social grants are spilling over to unintended household 
members, creating a dependency syndrome among the recipient households. Given that social 
grants were found to be benefit mostly the poor households, the fact that these households have 
less incentives and motivation to farm, or invest in or commercialise their farming activities, 
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means that they have less chance of breaking out of the vicious cycle of poverty. While social 
grants may reduce extreme poverty, they are not enough to pull households out of poverty on 
their own, especially in the context of the sharing of social grants income with unintended 
household members. This points to the need to link social grants to economic activities such as 
farming in order to meet the government’s broader job creation and rural development targets. 
Given that the other major alternatives to social grants (such as the EPWP) have failed to reduce 
rural poverty or unemployment, policies should prioritise reducing the disincentive effects and 
making smallholder farming successful in rural areas. 
While the results were consistent with the descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence which 
showed that social grants recipient households were more likely to be subsistence-oriented, this 
study found no evidence of a negative causal impact of social grants on the proportion of land 
area cultivated. This result implies that the descriptive reports that had indicated that rural 
households in South Africa no longer cultivate much of their land because they receive social 
grants, is not supported by econometric results. It is argued that these reports are based on the 
simultaneous existence of social grants and declining land under cultivation, rather than on a 
demonstrable causality. Instead, the study identified several other constraints that 
policy-makers should focus on to improve the proportion of cultivated land in the rural areas. 
This study, therefore, demonstrates the importance of controlling for confounding effects when 
evaluating the disincentive effects of social grants. The distinction between correlations and 
causality should always be borne in mind when making such statistical inferences. 
The results also imply that the potential complementarity between social grants and 
smallholder farming has not materialised in South Africa. Even though there is evidence that 
social grants ease the constraints associated with job search in the non-farm sector, the results 
of this study, suggest that social grants have barely relaxed the financial constraints of the 
farmers, as it does in the job sector. With limited credit access in the rural areas, there is a need 
for a strategy that allows for social grants to relax the financial constraints of the farmers. Given 
that social grants are now viewed as a livelihood promotion measure, the study recommends 
that strategies to synchronise the objectives of social grants and smallholder farming be sought, 
so that the potential complementarity between the two interventions materialise. 
The study has also indicated the importance of expectations of success in motivating rural 
households to participate and commercialise their smallholder farming activities. In particular, 
the results indicated the importance of access to institutional and/or organisational support 
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(such as extension, training or associations), as well as infrastructural support (such as good 
roads or irrigation) in creating conducive environments that motivate the households to engage 
in different smallholder farming activities. The study also revealed that, even though the 
production side (incentives to cultivate or use modern technology) of smallholder farming was 
gender neutral, the marketing side was not. Female-headed households were found to more 
likely to participate in the market and had higher farm entrepreneurship levels. The study 
revealed the need to find strategies, such as introducing subsidies and focussed training, to 
encourage rural households to invest part of their social grants in smallholder farming 
activities.  
7.3 Policy recommendations 
To address the disincentive effects of social grants and ensure successful smallholder 
production and commercialisation, this study recommends a holistic approach that addresses 
both the social grants side as well as the smallholder farming side. In other words, 
policy-makers should aim to find strategies of reducing social grant dependency and 
disincentive effects, while simultaneously creating a conducive environment to improve the 
attractiveness, viability and success of smallholder farming. Specifically, the study 
recommends the following: 
a. Harmonise the objectives of social grants and smallholder farming in the rural areas 
Since social grants are important in addressing the immediate basic needs poor, the study 
recommends that they should continue, but that their objectives be harmonised with those of 
other anti-poverty options such as farming. The policy should promote the investment of some 
of income from social grants in micro-enterprises, such as smallholder farming, to generate a 
high multiplier effect. This applies especially to social grants such as the OAG that pay 
significant amounts of money. Given that credit access is limited in the rural areas, this can 
allow for social grants to relax the financial constraints of the farmers. 
b. Making smallholder agriculture more viable and attractive  
The study recommends policy priority towards creating a conducive environment for 
smallholder success (such as introducing irrigation or improving input supply services) in order 
for the unemployed rural people to participate in smallholder farming, improve land area 
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cultivation, adopt modern technologies and increase their entrepreneurship and market 
participation levels. In particular, the results of the study indicate the need for policy priority 
towards organising farmers into groups for marketing and providing support services such as 
training and extension provisions. A greater emphasis should be on giving the rural farmers 
relevant and focussed agricultural skills training, as informed by the skills needs of the farmers. 
The training should build on the farmers’ indigenous knowledge and experience, starting at the 
level of understanding the farmers are at.  
The trainings, which can be done or facilitated by the extension officers, should include 
encouragement of rural households to save and invest part of their social grant income on small 
businesses such as smallholder farming. The trainings should also encourage farmers to market 
their produce and cover marketing issues, so that more farmers have an incentive to participate 
in the market. 
c. Targeting female-headed households 
Government interventions should target women for better chances of success in achieving the 
government’s commercialisation targets. Not only is smallholder farming dominated by 
female-headed households, but this study revealed their higher chances of market participation 
and greater entrepreneurship levels. 
7.4 Study limitations and suggested areas of further research 
While this study is an improvement on the descriptive statistics linking social grants and 
smallholder farming outcomes in South Africa, its major limitation is that it has depended on 
cross-sectional data. Therefore, it is suggested that future research be conducted using panel 
data. The use of panel data would provide more robust impact estimates and a clearer 
demonstrable causality. The other limitation of the study is that the impact of social grants has 
been examined on a few smallholder farming outcomes. For example, market participation only 
included maize markets, while technology adoption only involved chemical fertilisers. It is 
recommended that future studies be done linking social grants to other crops, as well as other 
technologies, to get a clearer picture of how social grants affect households’ incentives to 
commercialise or adopt modern farming techniques. The study has also not investigated the 
effect of social grant dependency on market orientation (production decisions based on market 
signals). In other words, are social grants beneficiary households allocating their production 
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resources in a manner that indicates less interest in commercialisation? The impact of social 
grants on market orientation, as well as how market orientation leads to market participation, 
should be explored in further research. Lastly, the data analysed in this study was from only 
one province in South Africa. Even though it has been indicated that the data is relatively 
comparable to that in other rural areas across the country, the data is not nationally 
representative. It is recommended that a more nationally representative study be conducted to 





Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Introduction  
My name is                                                . I am from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The university is 
conducting research in KwaZulu-Natal that is looking at the impact of social grants on rural households’ 
entrepreneurship, marketing and incentives to invest in agricultural activities in KwaZulu-Natal. There 
are no wrong and right answers to these questions. I would like to assure you that all the information provided 
here will be treated as STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, and will be used for academic purposes only. Interview 
will take about 45 minutes.  
 
Identification 
Interviewer name  Date of interview  
Name of key respondent  Respondent tel.  
District   Local municipality  
Codes: District 1=Harry Gwala 2=Umzinyathi 3=Uthukela 
            Local municipality 1=Ubuhlebezwe 2=Msinga 3=Imbabazane 4=Bergville 
Section A: Household demographics 
A1. What is the total number of your household members? Please complete table below (Record household 













       
       
Household position 
1 Household head* 
2 Spouse 
3 Daughter /son 
4 Other (specify e.g., 
cousin) 















1=Fulltime farmer           6=Student 
2=Regular salaried job    7=Retired  
3=Temporary job             8=Other (specify) 
4=Unemployed  
5=Self employed                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
A2 What is the total number of your household members**?   
A3 How many of the household members are adults (15 years old or more)?   
A4 How many of the household members are children (less than 15 years old)?  
A5 How many of the adult household members cannot work because of chronic sickness or old 
age? 
 
A6 How many of the household members are employed?  Permanently employed  
Temporarily employed  
A7 What is the household’s main religion? No religion=0 Traditional=1 Christian=2 Other 
(Specify)…=3 
 
* Household head refers to the de facto household head that stays in the household for 4 or more days per week 
** Please include only those who stay in the household for 3 or more days per week 
 
Section B: Farming activities and land holding  
 
B1 Are you involved in any crop or livestock farming activity?  1=Yes 0= No  
B2 If Yes in B1, Is the head of the household involved in farming full-time? 1=Yes 0= No  
B3 Is any other member of the household involved in farming activities? 1=Yes 0= No    
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B4 How many household members help with or are involved in farming regularly? (Complete table 
below on the number of days these members helped in farming activities in the last 30 days). 
 
Household member ID Number of days involved in farming activities in the 




B5 If Yes in B1, what farming activities is your household involved in and what is the main purpose of the 
farming activity? (Complete table below) 
Farming activity Tick Experience 
(number of 
years) 
Main purpose:  1=Main source of food 2=Extra source of food 
3=Main source of income 4= Extra source of income 5=Leisure 
activity / hobby  6=Other (specify) 
Crop production    
Vegetable production    
Community gardens     
Livestock production    
Other (specify)    
 
B6 What is the total size of land the household has access to?  Irrigated land      ha 
Dry-land      ha 
B7 How do you feel about your land size? 1=Too small 2=Just right 3=Too large  
B8 How many hectares of the land the household has access to were cultivated 
since August 2013?  
Irrigated land       
ha 
Dry-land      ha 
B9 Rate the quality of your land for crop production  0=Poor 1=Average 2=Good  
B10 How did you acquire the land and what was 
the size in hectares? 
Allocated by Inkosi      ha 
Inherited        
ha 
Leasing/ renting      ha 
Bought      ha 
Other (Specify)………….      ha 
B11 Are you satisfied with the present tenure security of your land? Yes=1 No=0  
B12 Are you permitted to sell or rent your piece of land? Yes=1 No=0  
B13 If No in B12, do you think people should be able to sell or rent their land to others? Yes=1  No=0  
B14 How do you feel about the rainfall distribution for crop production since August 2013? 0= Very 
Poor 1=Poor 2= Average 3=Good 4=Very good 
 
 
Section C: Crop production and marketing system 
 
C1 Did you grow any crops in the past summer season (August 2013-March 2014)? Yes=1 No=0 
 
C2 If Yes in C1, please indicate your cropping and marketing activities in the past summer (rainy) season by 


























Maize                   
Tomatoes             
Potatoes               
Spinach               
Cabbage        
Beans        
Onions        





       
 Water source codes* 
1=Rain fed 2=Irrigation 
3=Both 
Market outlet codes** 
1=Local shop    2=Shops in town 3=Neighbours  
4=Contractors    5=Hawkers 6=Other (specify) 
 
Table C2B 













Maize                 
Tomatoes           
Potatoes             
Spinach             
Cabbage      
Beans      
Onions      
Butternut      
Other 
(Specify) 
     
Market outlet codes* 
1=Local shop    2=Shops in town 3=Neighbours  4=Contractor    5=Hawkers 6=Other (specify) 
 
C3 Did you grow any crops in the past winter (April 2014-July 2014)? Yes=1 No=0 
 
C4 If Yes in C3, please indicate your cropping and marketing activities in the past winter (dry) season by 
completing Tables C4A and C4B. Specify units for ALL quantities e.g., kg or ton, buckets. 
 
Table C4A 




















Maize                   
Tomatoes             
Potatoes               
Spinach               
Cabbage        
Beans        
Onions        
Butternut        
Other(Specify)        
 Water source codes* 
1=Rain fed 2=Irrigation 
3=Both 
Market outlet codes** 
1=Local shop    2=Shops in town 3=Neighbours  
4=Contractor    5=Hawkers 6=Other (specify) 
 
Table C4B 











from farm (km) 
Maize                 
Tomatoes           
Potatoes             
Spinach             
Cabbage      
Beans      
Onions      
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Butternut      
Other (Specify)      
Market outlet codes* 
1=Local shop    2=Shops in town 3=Neighbours  4=Contractor    5=Hawkers 6=Other (specify) 
 
C5 Have you ever failed to sell your produce due to lack of market? 0=No 1=Yes   
C6 If Yes on C5, how often do you fail to sell your farm produce due to lack of market? 
Sometimes=1 Always=2 
 




C8 Which market outlet do you prefer most? (Tick the most preferred) 
Local informal shop  Neighbours  
Larger shops in town  Hawkers  
Contractor    
 
C9 Please indicate the level to which the following reasons influence your market outlet preference as 
mentioned in C8. Codes: Strongly disagree=1 Disagree=2 Neutral=3 Agree=4 Strongly agree=5 
 
Reason Level Reason Level 
I obtain higher prices  It is near   
I incur lower marketing costs  It is less risky than other alternatives  
I obtain more market information  It is the only marketing channel available to me  
I have established networks or 
contacts 
 It is more convenient than others  
 
C10 Generally, how would you rate your level of market access? 0=Poor 1=Average 2=Good   
 
Section D: Inputs use and technology adoption 
 
D1 Did you use any fertilizer since August 2013? Yes=1 No=0  
D2 If yes on D1, which type of fertilizer did you use in your field in the last 12 months? Organic 
fertilizer=1 Inorganic fertilizer=2 Both=3 
 
D3 If you used any inorganic fertilizer, what were the sources of the 
inorganic fertiliser and how many kg’s did you get from the source? 
Bought   kg 
Government   kg 
NGO   kg 
Other (specify)   kg 
D4 If you bought inorganic fertilizer, how much was its price per 50 kg? R 
D5 Do you think the price of fertilizer is high, low or average? 1=Low 2=Average 3=High  
D6 If bought, where did you buy your fertilizer mainly? 1=Small informal agro-dealers 2=Large 
agro-dealers 3=Hawkers or vendors 4=Other farmers 5=Other 
(specify)………………………………. 
 
D7 What is the distance to the fertilizer collection point?         km 
 
D8 Did you use any improved seeds varieties for your crops since August 2013? Yes=1 No=0          
 























Maize       
Tomatoes       
Potatoes       
Spinach       
Cabbage       
Beans       
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Onions       
Butternut       
Other 
(Specify) 
      
       











dealers 3=Hawkers or 
vendors 4=Other farmers 
5=Other (specify)……… 
 
D10 Did you hire any labour for your farming activities since August 2013? 0=No 1=Yes  




D12 How did you control pests or diseases in your field since August 2013?  0=None 1=Cultural 
control  2=Chemical control 3=Both  
 
D13 If you used chemical control methods, what were the sources of the 
pesticides and how much quantities did you get from the source? (Please 




Other (specify)  
D14 If you bought pesticides, how much was its price per 500 ml? R 
D15 Do you think the price of pesticides is high, low or average? 1=Low 2=Average 3=High  
D16 If bought, where did you buy your pesticides mainly? 1=Small informal agro-dealers 2=Large 




D17 How do you control weeds in your field? 0=None 1=Weeding 2=Apply herbicides 3=Both  
D18 If you used herbicides, what were the sources of the herbicides and 




Other (specify)  
D19 If you bought herbicides, how much was its price per unit? R 
D20 Do you think the price of herbicides is high, low or average? 1=Low 2=Average 3=High  
D21 If bought, where did you buy your herbicides mainly? 1=Small informal agro-dealers 2=Large 




D22 If not using any of the improved inputs above, what are the reasons for not using the inputs (Tick 
appropriate reasons for each inputs)? 
Reasons  Seed Fertiliser Pesticides Herbicides  
Too expensive     
Not profitable     
None supplied     
Transport challenges     
Others (specify)     
 
D23 Did you use these agricultural technologies since August 2013? (Complete table below) 
Technology Adopted  Source of knowledge 
Soil conservation techniques   
Pest management practices   
Crop rotation   
Mulching   




2= Other farmers 






Section E: Livestock and asset ownership 
 
E1 Please indicate your livestock production and marketing activities by completing the table below 
Livestock type Goat Cattle Sheep Chicken Ducks/goose Donkey Pigs  Other 
(specify) 
Number owned today         
Money spent on feeds, 
chemicals, vet services, etc., 
since August 2013 
        
Number sold since August 
2013 
        
Total amount from sales 
since August 2013 (Rands) 
        
Main market livestock 
sold* 
        
Number slaughtered for 
family purpose 
(consumption or ritual) 
since August 2013 
        
Number given to others as 
gifts, fines, etc., since 
August 2013 
        
*Main market codes: 1=Local butchery    2=Supermarket 3=Neighbours     4=Hawkers 5=Other (specify)       
 
E2 What is the main purpose or function for keeping livestock 1=Sales 2=Consumption 
3=Wealth 4=Draught power 5=Cultural reasons 6=Other  
 
 
E3 How much of each of the following animal products were harvested and how much was sold since August 
2013? (Complete table below) 
 Quantity produced (Specify 
units) 
Quantity sold (Specify units) Money from sales 
Milk and milk products    
Eggs    
Hides    
Other (specify)    
 
 
E4 Do you own the following assets? (Indicate number owned in the appropriate box, zero if not owned. Also 
indicate the average price you would charge if you were to sell the asset) 
 
Asset No. Asset 
value  
Asset No. Asset 
value  
Asset No. Asset 
value  
Block, tile house   Car   Cell phone   
Block, zinc house   Motor- cycle   TV   
Round, thatch 
house 
  Bicycle   Radio   
Round pole and 
mud or shack 
house 
  Tractor   Mouldboard 
plough 
  
Tap   Wheel- barrow   Knapsack 
sprayer 
  
Borehole   Spades   Tractors   
Protected well   Hoes   Ripper   
Water tank   Telephone   Disc harrows   
Trailers   Rotary slashers   Disc plough   
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Cultivators   Fertilizer 
spreaders 
  Ridgers    
Harvesters   Other (Specify)   Wheat drills   
Other (Specify)   Other (Specify)   Other (Specify)   
 
Section F: Access to grants  
 
F1 Are any of your household members receiving government grants? Yes=1 No=0  
F2 If yes on F1, how many are on the: Old age grant?    
Child support grant?   
Disability grant?   
Foster child grant?  
Care Dependency grant?  
F3 Do you pool income from social grants with other income sources in the household? Yes=1 
No=0 
 
F4 Do you use some of your grant money to buy agricultural inputs? Yes=1 No=0    
F5 If Yes on F4, how often do you do that? 1=Sometimes 2=Always  
F6 If Yes on F4, what percentage of the grant money do you normally use for agricultural 
purposes? 
        
% 
 




G Other income sources and expenditure patterns 
 
G1 What were the other sources of your household income since August 2013? (Indicate approximately how 
much each source contributed and how often).  





Number of times 




Remittances     
Arts and craft      
Permanent  employment      
Temporary/casual employment     
Hawking/petty trading     
Other (specify)     
 
G2 How much money was spent on food items since August 2013? R 
G3 How much money was spent on non-food items since August 2013? R 
G4 Taking all means* into consideration, how would you describe your household food consumption 
since August 2013? 1=Frequent food shortages throughout the year 2=Occasional food shortages 3=No 
food shortages, no surplus 4=Food surplus  
 
*All means include: own production + food purchases + help from different sources + food hunted from forest, lakes, etc. 
 
G4 How do you judge your household’s poverty status in relation to other households in the area 
0=Very poor 1=Poor 2=Average 3=Rich 4=Very rich 
 
 
Section H Institutions and support services 
 
H1 Please indicate if you are a member of these groups and your level of decision making 
Group Yes=1   
No=0 
Level of decision making Low=1 
Moderate=2 High=3 
Farmer association    
Marketing co-operative or group   
Savings group (stokvel)   
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Water user association   
WARD   
Other (specify)   
 
H2 If you are a member of a marketing co-operative, do you think membership has improved your 
market access? Yes=1 No=0 
 
 
H3 Did you use any credit or loan facility since August 2013? Yes=1  No=0  
H4 If yes in H3, what was the main source of the credit/loan? Relative or friend=1 Money lender=2 Savings 
club (stokvel)=3 Input supplier=4  Financial institution=5 (Specify name of financial 
institution…………………………) Output buyer =6  Other=7(Specify)……………………) 
 
H5 What was the purpose of the loan/credit? Family emergency=1 Agricultural purposes=2  Both=3 Other 
(specify…………………………………….)=4 
 
H6 Were you able to pay back the loan/credit in time? Yes=1 No=0  
H7 Did you receive funding or any other sources of credit support from government since August 2013?  
Yes=1    No=0 
 
H8 If yes in H7, how often do you receive the funding or credit for farming activities?  Never=0 
Sometimes=1  Always=2 
 
H9 Did you have any contact with extension officer since August 2013?  Yes=1    No=0  
H10 If yes in H9, how often did you contact extension officers?  Never=0 Sometimes=1  Always=2  
H11 If yes on H9, did you invite the extension officer?  Yes=1  No=0  
H12 Are the extension officers from: 1=Government/ parastatal? 2=Non-governmental organisation (NGO)? 
3=Private company? 
 
H13 What is the distance to the extension office?    km 
H14 Did you or a member of your household receive any training from government or any other 
organization? Yes=1    No=0 
 
H15 If yes on H14, please specify the training provided………………………………………………  
H16 How would you describe the usefulness of the training received in farming? Not useful at all=1 
somewhat useful=2 Useful=3 Very useful=4 
 
 
H17 Do you use the following sources of agricultural information?  
Source of information Yes=1 No=0 Source of information Yes=1 No=0 
Extension workers  Internet  
Radio/television  Other farmers  
Newspaper  Other (specify)…………………….  
Cell phones/SMS  Other (specify)…………………….  
 
H18 What is your main source of farming information 0=None 1=Radio/television 2=Extension officer 
3=Cell phone/SMS 4=Internet 5=Newspaper 6=Other farmers 7=Other 
(specify)………………………………. 
 
H19 Do you understand the information disseminated by the main information source in H18? Not at all=0 
Somewhat=1  Absolutely=2 
 
 
H20 What is the distance from your farm to the nearest all-weather road?  km 
 
H21 Do you agree with the following statements with regards to infrastructure in your area? Strongly 
disagree=1  Disagree=2 Neutral=3 Agree=4 Strongly agree=5 
 
Statement Level 
In general, the road network in the area is good  
In general, the water distribution network is in good condition  
In general, the infrastructure at the market is good  








Section I: Farmer entrepreneurship 
I1 Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements pertaining to the way you view your 
farm. Strongly disagree=1 Disagree=2 Neutral=3 Agree=4 Strongly agree=5 
1. I view my farm as a business  
2. I am market-oriented and produce for the market  
3. I view my farm as a means of earning profits  
4. I am more interested in profits than just food production  
5. I am passionate about my farm business  
6. I take calculated risks to make my farm profitable  
7. I take huge risks, sometimes risking personal assets and security  
8. I am constantly looking for new opportunities to grow my farming business  
9. I have a clear vision of how my farm business will grow  
10. I always look for better, more efficient and profitable ways to do things  
11. I am able to recognise market gaps and exploit market opportunities  
12. I always try new crops and cultivars, better animals, and alternative technologies to increase 
productivity, diversify production and reduce risk 
 
13. I manage my farming business as a long-term venture with a view to making it sustainable  
14. My production decisions are based on what is possible, not just what I need   
15. I work long and irregular hours to meet demands  
16. I am highly motivated and ambitious  
17. I always view change as an opportunity  
18. I am very flexible and always willing to adapt  
19. I always take responsibility for solving problems that I face   
20. I always cooperate with others, I network and utilise contacts effectively  
21. I possess persuasive communication and negotiation skills  
22. I have the ability to set goals, reach them and set new ones  
23. I am very competitive  
24. I am always willing to learn new things  
 
I3 Please consider your own abilities against each of the skills listed below and indicate your own level of skill 
against each. Codes: 1=Very low 2=Low 3=Medium 4=High 5=Very high 
 
1. Financial: Managing financial resources, budgeting  
2. Organisational skills: Day to day administrative affairs, managing yourself and time  
3. Supervision: Manage/ supervise employees and their needs (incl. training/ recruitment)  
4. Marketing/ Sales: Identifying and reaching customers/ distribution channels  
5. Customer service: Handling service expectations and dealing with problems  
6. Small business regulations: risk assessment, legislation  
7. Goal setting: Ability to set goals, reach them and set new ones  
8. Environmental scanning: Recognise market gap, exploit market opportunity  
9. Business concept: Business and strategic planning  
10. Critical thinking: The ability to think critically  
11. Networking: Co-operation with others, networking and utilising contacts  
12. Negotiation: Persuasive communication and negotiation skills  
13. Accountability: Ability to take responsibility for solving a problem  
14. Emotional coping: emotional ability to cope with a problem  
15. Self-awareness: Ability to reflect and introspective  
 
 
 Concluding remarks 








Appendix B: Impact of level of dependency on social grant on the proportion of land 
area cultivated, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 349 202 0.015 (0.036) 0.416 
Kernel matching method 349 473 0.023 (0.027) 0.864 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: Household survey 
 
Appendix C: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the proportion of 
land area cultivated, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 0.65 0.03 -0.0002 0.02 
0.1 0.66 0.02 0.02 0.01 
0.2 0.68 0.02 0.02 0.01 
0.3 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.01 
0.4 0.72 0.02 0.0001 0.01 
0.5 0.72 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
0.6 0.71 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
0.7 0.69 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
0.8 0.67 0.06 0.00 0.03 
0.9 0.67 0.08 0.01 0.04 
1 0.65 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 















Appendix D: Impact of level of dependency on social grants on the proportion of 
household members who participate in farming activities, PSM results 
Matching method Number of households ATT t-test 
 Treatment Control   
Nearest neighbour 349 202 -0.063 (0.031) 2.03** 
Kernel matching method 349 473 -0.074 (0.023) 3.21*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * means significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
Source: 2014 household survey  
 
Appendix E: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the household 
members who participate in farming activities, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 0.52 0.03 0.03 0.02 
0.1 0.55 0.02 0.01 0.01 
0.2 0.56 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
0.3 0.55 0.02 -0.03 0.01 
0.4 0.52 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
0.5 0.49 0.01 -0.004 0.01 
0.6 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.01 
0.7 0.51 0.02 0.03 0.02 
0.8 0.54 0.03 0.03 0.03 
0.9 0.57 0.06 0.01 0.03 
1 0.58 0.08 -0.01 0.03 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 





Appendix F: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the probability of 
chemical fertiliser adoption, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 0.37 0.07 0.03 0.04 
0.1 0.40 0.06 0.04 0.03 
0.2 0.44 0.05 0.03 0.02 
0.3 0.48 0.04 0.03 0.02 
0.4 0.50 0.04 0.02 0.02 
0.5 0.52 0.03 -0.0004 0.02 
0.6 0.52 0.03 -0.02 0.02 
0.7 0.49 0.04 -0.04 0.04 
0.8 0.45 0.06 -0.05 0.06 
0.9 0.40 0.10 -0.04 0.06 
1 0.36 0.15 -0.03 0.06 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 
Source: 2014 Household survey 
Appendix G: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the intensity of 
chemical fertiliser use, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 19.06 6.50 5.06 4.56 
0.1 24.12 4.72 6.28 3.31 
0.2 30.40 4.88 4.65 1.84 
0.3 35.05 4.75 1.90 2.42 
0.4 36.95 4.23 0.23 2.11 
0.5 37.18 4.19 -1.35 2.18 
0.6 35.83 3.97 -4.58 2.28 
0.7 31.25 3.61 -7.73 4.04 
0.8 23.52 4.54 -7.97 6.15 
0.9 15.55 9.37 -5.42 7.52 
1 10.13 16.21 -2.32 9.01 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 




Appendix H: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the probability of 
market participation, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 19.06 6.50 5.06 4.56 
0.1 24.12 4.72 6.28 3.31 
0.2 30.40 4.88 4.65 1.84 
0.3 35.05 4.75 1.90 2.42 
0.4 36.95 4.23 0.23 2.11 
0.5 37.18 4.19 -1.35 2.18 
0.6 35.83 3.97 -4.58 2.28 
0.7 31.25 3.61 -7.73 4.04 
0.8 23.52 4.54 -7.97 6.15 
0.9 15.55 9.37 -5.42 7.52 
1 10.13 16.21 -2.32 9.01 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
Appendix I: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on the level of market 
participation, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 0.38 0.09 -0.09 0.05 
0.1 0.23 0.04 -0.02 0.02 
0.2 0.21 0.03 -0.004 0.02 
0.3 0.21 0.03 0.001 0.01 
0.4 0.21 0.02 -0.002 0.01 
0.5 0.21 0.02 -0.004 0.02 
0.6 0.21 0.03 0.002 0.04 
0.7 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.07 
0.8 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.08 
0.9 0.28 0.20 0.10 0.08 
1 0.38 0.09 -0.09 0.05 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 





Appendix J: Correlation matrix of the entrepreneurship competencies 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 1.0                        
2 0.8 1.0                       
3 0.7 0.8 1.0                      
4 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0                     
5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0                    
6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0                   
7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 1.0                  
8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0                 
9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.0                
10 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.0               
11 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.0              
12 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0             
13 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0            
14 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.0           
15 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0          
16 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0         
17 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0        
18 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0       
19 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0      
20 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.0     
21 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0    
22 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0   
23 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0  




Appendix K: The impact of level of dependency on social grants on farm 
entrepreneurship, GPS method results 
Treatment level Dose response function Treatment effect function 
Dose response Std. err Treatment effect Std. err 
0 -0.14 0.20 0.17 0.09 
0.1 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.08 
0.2 0.14 0.09 -0.004 0.05 
0.3 0.13 0.07 -0.08 0.04 
0.4 0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.04 
0.5 0.002 0.08 0.02 0.04 
0.6 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06 
0.7 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.10 
0.8 -0.04 0.13 -0.14 0.13 
0.9 -0.19 0.25 -0.17 0.15 
1 -0.36 0.38 -0.17 0.17 
Notes: treatment level means the contribution of social grants to total household income. 
Source: 2014 household survey 
 
